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Executive Summary 
 
The research goals of Work Package three were the following:  
 
1. Make an inventory and analysis of databases on best EU practices for innovation  
2. Analyse the recommendations made by audit offices and ombudsmen 
3. To identify relevant drivers and barriers that explain if and why these recommendations 
have (or have not been) implemented 
4. To make policy recommendations in order to improve the use of accountability 
information for public service innovation 
5. To disseminate the research results and policy recommendations among the involved  
organizations, to policymakers and the general public 
 
The research covered six countries: Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Romania and the 
United Kingdom. 
 
In order to reach these goals, the following methodologies and focus were adopted: 
 
1. A focus on good/best practices to create a database of awarded innovations 
2. The focus on awarded innovations gave us a tool to analyse individual social innovations 
3. A proposed model including Feedback, Accountability and Learning (FAL) to describe 
the sustainability of social innovations, with the following causal mechanism: FAL  Z 
4. Investigating the influence of Ombudsman and Supreme Audit Institution 
recommendations on social innovation added to this causal mechanism: (FAL, X)  Z 
5. As a part of the qualitative research a third factor, to explain for social innovation which 
happened independent of FAL or X, completed the causal mechanism: ((FAL, X) or Y)  Z 
6. A survey from 250 good/best practices gave us a quantitative picture of the influence of 
FAL on the sustainability of social innovation 
7. Over 70 interviews with Ombudsmen, Supreme Audit Institutions and the organizations 
they audited/investigated gave us a qualitative picture of the influence audits and 
investigations, together with their recommendations, have on social innovations 
 
Findings: 
 
1. Cases in our innovation database came predominantly from the public health sector, 
social welfare sector and general administration 
2. Most of the innovations in our database focused on e-Government, quality assurance, 
efficient procedures and citizen involvement 
3. The first causal mechanism: FAL  Z proved to be able to partly explain the 
sustainability of social innovation. Awarded innovations who have ceased to exist were 
in general characterized by a lower FAL-score than those who still existed 
4. Through the qualitative research into the implementation of ombudsmen and SAI 
recommendations on the second causal mechanism ((FAL, X)  Z) it was found that the 
reports of Ombudsmen and SAIs significantly influence the sustainability of innovations 
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5. The qualitative research also highlighted the importance of factors explaining social 
innovations independent of FAL or X, explaining the third causal mechanism: ((FAL, X) or 
Y)  Z 
6. The organizations who correlated significantly with  sustainable social innovations were 
characterized by: 
i. The concerns of staff, customers and ombudsmen impacting strategic decisions 
ii. A sense of responsibility amongst employees 
iii. Transparency about their results towards external stakeholders 
iv. A culture of open debates, the encouragement of experimentation and a forgiving 
culture if and when these experiments failed 
 
Policy Recommendations: 
 
1. In order to improve the sustainability of social innovations, the focus should be on 
improving feedback loops, accountability mechanisms and learning processes in public 
organizations 
a. Feedback:  
i. Encouraging staff members to express their concerns 
ii. Organizing procedures in order to effectively assess feedback 
information and ombudsmen 
iii. Take the concerns and recommendations from staff, customers and 
ombudsmen into account when making strategic decisions 
 
b. Accountability:  
i. Create a sense of responsibility amongst employees 
ii. Be transparent about the results towards external stakeholders 
 
c. Learning:  
i. Create a culture of open debates and constructive criticism 
ii. Encourage experimentation in processes, services and products, together 
with a realistic and forgiving culture around the probability of failure or 
success of the experiments 
2. Processes of audits and investigations should be tailored more to the effect they have on 
the implementation of their recommendations, especially where implementation is not 
legally mandatory 
a. Collaborative processes, with more regard and empathy for the audited or 
investigated organization’s context 
b. Transparency about the reasons for the audit/investigation and the Audit- and 
Ombud-norms that are being used 
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 Overview 1.
Wout Frees, Wouter van Acker & Geert Bouckaert (KU Leuven)  
 Synopsis 1.1.
Work Package 3 investigated the influence of feedback loops, accountability mechanisms and 
learning processes (FAL) within award winning public organizations on the sustainability 
(through time, not ecologically) of the innovations for which they were initially awarded. 
Focussing on six EU-member states (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Romania and 
the United Kingdom), we found that innovations who had disappeared after being awarded, 
originated in organizations who are characterized by a lower score on feedback, accountability 
and learning. Secondly, we found that the influence of ombudsmen and supreme audit 
institutions on these three factors is substantial, and that their role in promoting social 
innovation is potentially significant, but currently inhibited by a number of factors.  
After an extensive literature review we found the FAL-model to be an entangled concept which 
could explain the success or sustainability of public sector innovations. We created a survey 
which measures the extent to which FAL is entrenched within organizations which won awards 
over the past 12 years for innovative practices. Firstly, the cases of innovation provided us with 
an overview of the type of innovation that takes place most in Europe, as well as on which 
governmental level and in which policy area innovations take place. Secondly, we found that the 
overall FAL-score for organizations, as well as a number of individual survey-items, did indeed 
correlate with the sustainability of their innovations. Organizations with lower FAL-scores 
tended to be overrepresented amongst innovations which had ceased to exist, even though they 
had been awarded and mentioned as best practices. We think the lack of an entrenched FAL-
model in these organizations causes innovations to be improperly evaluated, information from 
accountability mechanisms to be inaccurately used and/or the information from feedback and 
accountability mechanisms to not lead to true learning processes.  
We also realize that this will not account for the whole of variation on our dependent variable: 
the sustainability of innovations. We therefore adopt a more complex causal model, accepting 
the influence of Ombudsmen and Supreme Audit Institutions on the FAL-processes in 
organizations, together with exogenous causes of social innovation which occur completely 
separate from the FAL-model. Through a literature review on the impact of Ombud- and Audit-
reports, we found a variety of influential factors which have been incorporated into an interview 
protocol. These protocols became the backbone of over 70 interviews which were conducted 
with auditors and auditees.  We found that processes and perceptions surrounding these audits 
greatly explain how the auditees deal with the recommendations coming from these sources. 
They therefore have a definite impact on the FAL-model in these organizations.  
We conclude our research report with suggestions for further research and a number of policy 
recommendations. 
  
  
 
Feedback, accountability & learning in public innovation 
 
  
LIPSE Research Report # 3 9 
To retain social innovations, public organizations should focus on: 
Learning processes 
1. …creating a culture of adversarial debate and openness for constructive criticism. 
Learning can take place when current mindsets clash with new information, refuting earlier held 
positions. Adversarial debates are a crucial platform for such information to start changing minds. 
2. …encouraging experimentation and alternative ways of getting work done. 
Innovation entails, by definition, changes and doing things differently. Experimentation, as 
controversial as it may be in the public sector, forms a great way to test ideas and new methods, 
before going all in.  
3. …not penalizing responsible staff members if a creative attempt to solve a problem fails. 
A key characteristic of experimentation is that it can fail. If the chances of being penalized are 
substantial when an experiment fails, people will cease to look for innovative ways to improve the 
status quo.  
Accountability mechanisms 
4. …employees who feel responsible for the performance of the organization. 
Employees with a sense of responsibility are part of an internal accountability system.  
5. …a culture of transparency about results towards external stakeholders. 
Transparency is an essential requirement for accountability. Since accountability supports 
innovation, transparency supports innovation too. 
Feedback loops 
6. …staff members who express their concerns, ideas and suggestions about the functioning 
of the organization. 
In line with recommendation 1, there needs to be a platform where the adversarial debates can 
actually influence the people who make strategic decisions. 
7. …staff members’ feedback information which has a significant impact on the strategic 
decisions made by the organization. 
Once such a platform is created, decision makers should take this feedback information into 
account when making strategic decisions. 
8. …customers’ feedback information which has a significant impact on the strategic 
decisions made by the organization. 
Besides civil servants, both ombudsmen and customers (through ombudsmen or independently) 
have a lot to say about a public organization’s functioning. Such critiques should be embraced as 
learning opportunities for every organization. Often both ombudsmen and customers/citizens 
know what they’re talking about, and may bring in fresh ideas. 
9. …the reports and recommendations from ombudsmen institutions have a significant 
impact on the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
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To retain social innovations, Ombudsmen’s and SAIs’ audit activities should: 
1. …create a cooperative and transparent audit- or ombud-process. 
This will enhance the quality of the recommendations and the communication between the 
auditor/ombudsman and organization under scrutiny.  
2. …use exit meetings not only as a formal step, but as genuine, open dialogue. 
Only when exit meetings are a true open dialogue will there be an optimal learning opportunity 
for the organization under scrutiny, and only then can closed feedback loops foster innovation. 
3. …make the audit- and ombud criteria clear and transparent. 
The Ombud- and Audit organization has a framework from which it looks at an organization in 
search of improvements. When these criteria are known to the organization under scrutiny, the 
recommendations will be better understood and have greater impact.  
4. …make clear why the auditee has been chosen for an audit. 
When an organization under scrutiny knows why it has been selected for an audit or 
investigation, this creates a more cooperative and transparent process.  
5. …enhance the expediency of recommendations by looking at the legal, administrative 
and political feasibility. 
Recommendations which have been formulated in the light of their feasibility will have a greater 
impact on the organizations under scrutiny and their innovations. 
6. …be aware of the influence of discussions in the media about audit- and ombud-reports. 
The content and way to communicate with a broader public should get high attention.  
7. …be aware that combined media and parliamentary attention is functional.  
Our analysis shows that parliamentary and media attention foster the implementation of 
recommendations when this attention happens simultaneously.  
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  Introduction 1.2.
In the Description of Work, the framework for our research was presented through the following 
research goals for Work Package three:  
 
1. Make an inventory and analysis of databases on best EU practices for innovation  
2. Analyse the recommendations made by audit offices and ombudsmen 
3. To identify relevant drivers and barriers that explain if and why these recommendations 
have (or have not been) implemented 
4. To make policy recommendations in order to improve the use of accountability 
information for public service innovation 
5. To disseminate the research results and policy recommendations among the involved  
organizations, to policymakers and the general public 
 
The focus on innovations in public administrations on the one hand, and the focus on policy 
recommendations by SAIs and Ombudsmen on the other, had one clear thing in common: 
change. Change in public organizations is caused by multiple factors, not in the least political 
agendas and regime changes. Internal reasons for change, on the other hand, are less obvious 
and less easy to grasp: Feedback information, Accountability mechanisms and Learning 
processes. These factors form the initial fertile ground in which the seeds, recommendations and 
new initiatives, can blossom into successful social innovation. For this reason, beyond focusing 
on the research goals stated above and in the description of work, we will also focus on the role 
these three factors play in determining the long term success of social innovations. Focusing on 
the long term is of importance for both academics and practitioners. First, because limited 
research has been done on the development of innovations over time. Second, because 
recommendations by SAIs and Ombudsman may contribute to an innovation’s life. We need to 
look further than just the drivers and barriers of social innovation; we need to look at the drivers 
and barriers of successful and sustainable social innovation. 
At the end of this chapter we present a short overview of the activities we will carry out with 
regards to our research goals. In chapter three we will focus on the methodology we use to reach 
the research goals stated in the description of work, as well as the added research on the role 
Feedback, Accountability and Learning play in creating an optimal environment for Audit- and 
Ombud-recommendations to flourish. In order to further clarify our focus on Feedback, 
Accountability and Learning, in addition to our focus on the impact of Ombud- and Audit-
recommendations on social innovations, we will now further elaborate the theoretical reasons 
for doing so. 
The study of organizational change and innovation has been criticized for various reasons. In 
1985, Pettigrew (Pettigrew, 1985) described the study of organizational change and innovation 
as being largely acontextual, ahistorical and aprocessual. He claimed that cross-sectional 
analyses were privileged over the more challenging endeavours to understand the dynamics of 
change across time and space. Since then, scholars such as Van de Ven & Poole (1995) and Weick 
& Quinn (1999) have demonstrated an increased interest in aspects such as time, process and 
pace of change and in the sequence of events. However, in 2001, Pettigrew (Pettigrew et al., 
2001) still claimed that the field of organizational change was far from mature in understanding 
the dynamics and effects of time, process, discontinuity, and context. What the organizational 
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change literature needs, according to Pettigrew et al. (2001), is a greater emphasis on the 
longitudinal study of change processes. 
More recently, Pollitt (2011) made an adjoining observation. He comes to the conclusion that 
“much of the research on innovation has […] focused on the early days – on the moment of 
innovation itself, what leads up to it, and what makes some innovations ‘catch on’ by attracting 
the right kind of ‘early adopters’” (Pollitt, 2011, 42). The later stages of their development have, 
however, been understudied. Therefore, Pollitt invites future research to focus upon questions 
such as “What proportion of administrative innovation is short-lived?”, and “Is there any pattern 
to those that become perennials rather than fade after the first bloom?” (Pollitt, 2011, 42). The 
only study so far, as we know, that has been focused on the sustainability of innovations was 
done by Pollitt, Bouckaert and Löffler (2007), who investigated the lifecycles of innovations 
presented at the European Quality Conferences, and made some worrying observations. They 
investigated the sustainability of a sample of innovations going back two years, through a 
telephone survey. We plan to go further and deeper than that. 
We are interested in the way in which organizational innovations develop throughout time, and 
in the mechanisms and processes that are responsible for these developments. This interest is 
not only driven by the urge to close a gap in the academic body of literature. It is also, and 
primarily, driven by the practical relevance for public managers and policymakers. Indeed, it can 
be argued that organizational change and innovation might constitute effective ways to achieve 
improvements in the performance and service levels of public sector organizations. However, as 
Pollitt rightly points out, administrative innovations and reforms have in the past been known to 
fade as fast as they first appeared (Pollitt, 2011). Of course, we do want the public sector to 
improve itself, but we want to avoid the disruptive effects created by the quick demise and rapid 
succession of innovations and reforms. In other words, we want innovations to be sustainable. 
In order to investigate the development of innovations throughout time, our research focuses on 
administrative projects or practices which were recognized as ‘best practices’ by national and 
international conferences and awards on excellence, innovation and/or quality in the public 
sector. We claim that these best practices are reasonable proxies for innovations. Indeed, the 
novelty of the submitted projects is an often-used criterion in the selection procedure for these 
conferences and awards. In addition, various researchers, mainly from the United States and 
Canada, have used public service (innovation) awards in academic research on innovations. 1 
The focus of our research on the dependent side of the equation is on the subsequent life courses 
of these projects and practices after their recognition as best practices. We want to know what 
happened to these innovations in the medium and longer term: Are they still operational today 
or have they ceased to exist? Were they actively and explicitly terminated or did they just fade 
away? Did they survive in their original form or were they transformed over the years? And 
finally, were they adopted by other organizations? These questions will be addressed through an 
online survey among the best practice cases in our database.  
On the independent side of the equation, we were inspired by a suggestion made by Pettigrew et 
al. (2001). These authors make the observation that there is a hunger among the practitioners of 
change to know whether those processes and mechanisms that are responsible for initiating 
                                                             
1 See for example: Borins, 2000, 2001, 2008; Gow, 1992; Glor, 1998; Rangarajan, 2008; Golden, 1990; 
Bernier et al., 2014. 
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change are similar to or different from those responsible for sustaining or regenerating 
organizational change. Building on this observation, we present a conceptual framework with 
three main dimensions: feedback, accountability, and learning. The literature suggests that these 
processes and mechanisms play an important role in the initiation of change. We are interested 
to know if they also play a decisive role in sustaining or regenerating change, and if so, in what 
way. 
On the basis of an extensive literature review, on which we will further expand in chapter two, 
we have found theoretical and empirical arguments supporting the thesis that feedback, 
accountability and learning might play a decisive role in the patterns of change and innovation 
within public sector organizations. In short, these arguments come down to this: 
- Feedback information allows an organization to correct its errors, to adjust its goals, to 
restore its performance levels, and to align itself with its environment (Van der Knaap, 
1995; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Morgan, 2006; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Downs, 1967; Walker, 
2013). 
- Accountability mechanisms, more specifically the public nature of the account giving and 
the possibility of sanctions, may provide the incentive for public officials to actually make 
changes in order to improve the performance of their organization (Bovens et al., 2008; 
Wynen et al., 2014).2 
- Finally, an organization which is characterized by a learning culture, has an open and 
receptive attitude towards different opinions and alternative ways of doing things, and 
has a tolerance for errors and risk-taking. Ideally, this open mindset is supplemented 
with structural and procedural arrangements that allow organizations to actively search 
for and process relevant feedback information, and to share this information within the 
organization and beyond (Garvin et al., 2008; Popper & Lipshitz, 2000; Greiling & 
Halachmi, 2013). 
 
Our expectation is that different constellations of these three dimensions (together called the 
FAL-model) at the level of the organization will lead to different patterns of change and 
innovation. It is our intention to describe the patterns of change and innovation for the best 
practices in our database, and to investigate if these different patterns can be linked with 
different constellations of the three dimensions at the independent side of the equation. For this 
purpose, we have developed these three dimensions into several sub-dimensions, and we have 
tried to make these measurable by translating them into survey questions. In addition, and as 
stated before, we developed a number of survey questions inquiring about the subsequent life 
courses of the best practice cases. 
However, internal feedback loops, accountability mechanisms and learning processes are not the 
only factors contributing to the sustainability of an innovation. We realize that some external 
factors can influence the FAL-model in organizations, whilst others can explain the sustainability 
of social innovation on their own, irrespective of the FAL-model.  We will therefore use a more 
complex vision on causality for this research, and adopt the concept of FAL as being part of an 
                                                             
2 However, an accountability regime which focuses too harshly on mistakes and sanctions may discourage 
entrepreneurship, risk-taking, initiative and creativity, and instead may provoke defensive routines, 
paralysis and window-dressing (Van Loocke & Put, 2011; Bovens, 2005; Bovens et al., 2008; Behn, 2001; 
Hartley, 2005). 
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INUS-condition. We will further elaborate on this concept in chapter five; it will suffice to say 
here that two of the external factors who can influence the FAL-model within an organization 
are ombudsmen and supreme audit institutions (SAIs). Indeed, if the recommendations and 
critiques of these organizations have a legally binding character, they can be ascribed full 
responsibility for certain social innovations, regardless of the FAL-model in the respective 
organization under scrutiny. 
To recap, our research goals as mentioned in the Description of Work are: 
1. Make an inventory and analysis of databases on best EU practices for innovation  
2. Analyse the recommendations made by audit offices and ombudsmen 
3. To identify relevant drivers and barriers that explain if and why these recommendations 
have (or have not been) implemented 
4. To make policy recommendations in order to improve the use of accountability 
information for public service innovation 
5. To disseminate the research results and policy recommendations among the involved  
organizations, to policymakers and the general public 
 
In order to reach these research goals we need to paint a complete picture on the nature of social 
innovation in Europe, the way these innovations develop through time and investigate the 
influence of Ombudsmen and SAIs. We will do so by carrying out the following tasks:  
- Create and analyse a database of good and best practices, over the past 12 years, from 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Romania and the United Kingdom. 
- Survey these good and best practices in order to find out what the lifeline of the 
awarded social innovations look like, and whether they still exist/turned out to be 
sustainable. 
- Survey these good and best practices for the way in which feedback, accountability and 
learning are entrenched and developed as concepts within the awarded organizations. 
- Investigate the influence of Ombudsmen and Supreme Audit Institutions by conducting 
in-depth interviews throughout the six previously mentioned countries.  
- Make policy recommendations in order to improve the use of accountability information 
for public service innovation. 
- Disseminate the research results and policy recommendations among the involved 
organizations, to policymakers and the general public. 
 
Before further expanding on the theoretical framework of the FAL-model in chapter three, we 
will, in the next chapter, clearly outline our methodology for both the quantitative and 
qualitative parts of our research, including the implications this methodology has on the 
conclusions we can draw from our research. In chapter four we will then view the results of our 
data mining and survey of social innovations. After presenting the conclusions of our interviews 
with Ombudsmen and Supreme Audit Institutions in chapter five, we will conclude with a 
summary of our findings and attach policy recommendations in order to improve the use of 
accountability information and to improve the FAL-structure in public organizations throughout 
Europe. All in furtherance of the sustainability of the social innovation initiatives that are being 
developed by public organizations all over Europe in their constant search to improve efficiency, 
effectiveness and hence the life of the people they work for. 
  
 
Feedback, accountability & learning in public innovation 
 
  
LIPSE Research Report # 3 15 
 Theory and Literature on Feedback, Accountability 2.
and Learning 
Wout Frees, Wouter van Acker & Geert Bouckaert  (KU Leuven) 
 Introduction 2.1.
In this chapter we will investigate the extensive body of literature surrounding the factors 
Feedback, Accountability and Learning. All three are comprised of many facets, and influence 
innovation in their own particular ways. After giving a short introduction on the issues and 
particularities of public sector innovation, we will respectively delve into the literature of factors 
enabling or disabling public sector innovation through Learning, Feedback and Accountability. 
In the chapter following this one, we will translate the literature review into a methodology to 
measure the influence of our FAL-model (derived from this literature review) on public sector 
innovation. 
 Public Sector Innovation 2.2.
Many observers are critical of the innovative nature of the public sector. It has been argued that 
the political, democratic and legal context of public administration constitute an impediment to 
innovation. Several reasons can be given for this. Drawing on the work of Bekkers et al. (2011), 
Bekkers et al. (2013) and Pollitt (2011), we discuss a few of these reasons: lack of competition, 
risk-avoidance, short-termism, and rule-obsession. 
 Lack of competition  2.2.1.
Many observers indicate that competition is one of the most important incentives for 
improvement and innovation. Organizations in a competitive environment can only survive if 
they are able to create new products, new services, more efficient production methods, better 
and more efficient ways of delivering services, and so on. Public sector organizations, however, 
are often in a monopolistic position. Citizens often have no choice but to be clients of the public 
organization in question. It is argued that since the public sector lacks competition, it also lacks 
incentives to improve and to innovate (Bekkers et al., 2011). 
 Risk-avoidance 2.2.2.
Innovation is risky business. Innovations often come about through a risky process, involving 
experimentation, trial and error, and uncertain outcomes (Pollitt, 2011; Levitt & March, 1988). 
Innovation can be seen as a journey which is not linear and rational but which leads to dead-
ends, mistakes, setbacks, and obstacles. As a consequence, mistakes and failures are part of any 
innovation process (Bekkers et al., 2013; Hartley, 2005). 
However, bureaucratic and political cultures are often viewed as risk-avoiding cultures. Risk and 
risk-taking are generally negatively perceived by public sector organizations (Bekkers et al, 
2011). The reasons for this are obvious. First of all, government works with public money. It is 
very hard for politicians and other public office holders to “persuade the media and the public 
that it is acceptable, in certain contexts and under certain conditions, to spend public money on 
things that turn out to be failures” (Pollitt, 2011, p. 39). 
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Secondly, decision-makers and implementers carry responsibility for failure. They are often 
harshly penalized for failures, both by public accountability mechanisms and by the media 
(Pollitt, 2011; Gilson et al., 2009). As a consequence, politicians and public managers are 
cautious to support radical innovations because there is a risk of failure, and hence a risk of 
getting blamed and penalized. Risk-, error-, and blame-avoidance thus become central 
characteristics of the public sector: public managers tend to make safe decisions in order to 
avoid risk and blame (Howlett, 2012; Bernier et al., 2007; Gilson et al., 2009; Bekkers et al., 
2011). 
 Short-termism 2.2.3.
A systematic, long-term, and goal-oriented perspective can create a fertile breeding ground for 
innovation (Drucker, 1985 – In Bekkers et al., 2011). However, public administration is under 
the influence of the political realm, which does not value long-term progress. Politicians want 
quick results in order to safeguard their mandates at the next election (Bekkers et al., 2011). 
This short-term orientation increases delivery pressures and forces public office holders to 
minimize risk-taking (Bekkers et al., 2013). 
 Rule-obsession 2.2.4.
The public sector is dominated by a bureaucratic culture in which compliance with rules and 
procedures is highly valued. And rightly so, because rules and procedures provide legal security 
and equity, which are important public values. The downside is that rules and procedures can 
become ends in themselves. They become accepted practices and their purpose is never 
questioned. When this is the case, these rules and procedures may limit the way in which new 
concepts, methods, technologies and processes are accepted – in other words, they may impede 
innovation (Bekkers et al., 2013). 
These four characteristics of the public sector are not beneficial to innovation. However, there is 
no reason for despair. The different strands of research dealing with innovation mention many 
other potential drivers for innovation. Three important fields of study in this respect are: the 
body of literature on learning and cognition; the body of literature on systems, feedback, and 
environment; and the body of literature on accountability (in particular the learning and 
improving function of accountability).  
In the following paragraphs, we will explore and discuss these lines of research. On the basis of 
this research review, we identify three dimensions which we claim are important for innovation: 
feedback, accountability, and learning. Moreover, we will develop a list of questions to measure 
the degree to which feedback, accountability and learning mechanisms are present in public 
sector organizations and to assess the characteristics of these mechanisms. On the basis of this 
questionnaire, we will then test whether or not these mechanisms are indeed conducive to 
innovation and if so, under which circumstances. 
 Learning 2.3.
Scholars from different research areas have conceptualized learning in different ways. 
 Cybernetic system learning: corrective system learning on the basis of 2.3.1.
feedback 
Many authors have looked at learning from a systemic perspective. In his description of 
cybernetic system learning Peter van der Knaap (1995) refers to, among others: Deutsch (1966), 
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Argyris & Schön (1978), Senge (1992), Ashby (1952), and Fiol & Lyles (1985). According to 
these authors, a cybernetic system has a specific purpose (e.g. the provision of water). To 
perform its function, a system needs inputs (e.g. spring water) from its environment, which it 
subsequently processes into certain outputs (e.g. drinking water and waste). The main principle 
guiding the cybernetic system perspective, however, is this: the self-steering part of a system is 
able to detect and correct error; if a system is capable of obtaining feedback information about 
the outcomes and effectiveness of its actions, it is capable of correcting its errors and improving 
its overall functioning (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
Thus, from the perspective of cybernetic systems, learning refers to the detection and correction 
of error. At least two levels of learning can be distinguished. Many authors have made this 
distinction, using different labels. However, the labels used by Argyris and Schön are probably 
the most influential. They differentiate between single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978). 
Upon the detection of an error, most people look for another operational strategy that will work 
within the same goal-structure and rule-boundaries. This is single-loop learning. Single-loop 
learning occurs on the basis of goal-seeking or confirmatory feedback. This kind of feedback 
does not challenge the purpose of the system: goals, beliefs, values and conceptual frameworks 
(‘the governing values’) are taken for granted without critical reflection. The emphasis is on 
‘techniques and making techniques more efficient’ (Usher and Bryant, 1989, p. 87 – in Smith, 
2013). Questions that may be asked are: Could we do what we are currently doing in more 
productive ways, doing it cheaper, using alternative methods or approaches for the same 
objectives? If an action we take yields results that are different to what we expected, through 
single-loop learning, we will observe the results, automatically take in feedback, and try a 
different approach. This kind of learning may lead to the gradual improvement of existing, well-
known policies. It solves problems but ignores the question of why the problem arose in the first 
place (Van der Knaap, 1995; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
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Figure 1: Single & double loop learning 
 
 
If we look deeper, however, we may find that what went wrong, did so because of the way the 
system is designed. Consequently, if we change the system’s underlying norms and assumptions, 
we may be able to prevent the error from happening again. An alternative and more 
sophisticated response, therefore, is to question the governing variables themselves, to subject 
them to critical reflection. This is described by Argyris and Schön as double-loop learning. 
Double-loop learning occurs on the basis of goal-changing or innovative feedback. It pertains to 
the detection and correction of errors in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s 
underlying norms, assumptions, policies and objectives. It may lead to discontinuous change and 
innovation (Van der Knaap, 1995; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
We may, however, reflect even further. We can reflect about what prevented us from seeing that 
the system needed changing, before something went wrong. Argyris and Schön call this third 
level of learning ‘deutero learning’. It entails an institutionalized capacity to learn (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978; Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008). 
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 Individual cognitive learning 2.3.2.
One may also look at learning from the perspective of the individual human mind.  On the basis 
of their experience, individuals develop cognitive schemata. These are mental constructs, belief 
systems, and knowledge structures that allow for understanding of situations and actions, and 
that serve as frames of reference for action and perception; individuals use their cognitive 
schemata to perceive, construct and make sense of their worlds and to make decisions about 
what actions to take (Van der Knaap, 1995; Lam, 2006). 
From the perspective of the individual human mind, learning refers to the development and 
refinement of these cognitive schemata. How does this happen? According to Kolb (1984) a 
learning person moves through a learning cycle of four stages: (1) concrete experience, (2) 
reflection of the experience/thinking about it (reflective consideration), (3) abstract searching 
for the meaning of the experience (abstract hypothesis), and (4) practical experimentation 
(active testing). After reflecting on a direct experience, the individual will try to interpret and 
process the acquired information on the basis of his or her current cognitive schemata. Building 
on this interpretation, a course of action can be selected. Since this new course of action will lead 
to new direct experiences, the consequences of these actions may then serve as the start of a 
new learning cycle (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
In the case of an unsuccessful interpretation, the observed consequences do not respond to 
expectations, causing the experience of cognitive dissonance: a state of doubt whether current 
knowledge and beliefs are still valid. As this feeling is psychologically uncomfortable, people will 
try to avoid or reduce it. One possibility is to actively avoid any information or situation that 
might cause dissonance. Another possibility for people to deal with cognitive dissonance is to 
reflect on and reconsider their existing cognitive schemata. It is this second possibility that may 
induce learning. Indeed, learning and the refinement of these schemata can only come from 
reflection on and reconsideration of cognitive schemata. So on a concluding note, kick starting a 
process of reflection is crucial to learning from a cognitive perspective (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
 Learning anxiety and psychological safety 2.3.3.
The experience of cognitive dissonance and the subsequent psychological process is also 
described by Kurt Lewin’s change theory, albeit using a slightly different language. Lewin’s 
change theory, which was developed in the 1940s, is comprehensively summarized by Edgar 
Schein (1995). According to Lewin/Schein’s theory of change, all forms of learning and change 
are triggered by some form of frustration caused by confronting information that refute our 
expectations or hopes. However, Lewin/Schein argue that disconfirming data is a necessary, yet 
insufficient condition for learning and change to occur. Indeed, we can choose to ignore the 
information as irrelevant, to deny its validity, or to blame the undesired outcome on others. As 
Schein puts it: “In order to become motivated to change, we must accept the information and 
connect it to something we care about. The disconfirmation must arouse what we can call ‘survival 
anxiety’ or the feeling that if we do not change we will fail to meet our needs or fail to achieve some 
goals or ideals that we have set for ourselves (‘survival guilt’)” (Schein, 1995, p. 3-4). 
Lewin/Schein argue that, often, we refuse to accept the disconfirming data because we 
experience what they call ‘learning anxiety’. Learning anxiety is defined as the feeling that if we 
admit that something is wrong, if we accept errors, then we may lose our effectiveness, our self-
esteem and maybe even our identity. This feeling may trigger defensive reactions toward the 
disconfirming data. Thus, the key to producing change is finding a way to deal with this learning 
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anxiety. According to Lewin and Schein, the solution lies in the creation of a sufficient amount of 
psychological safety for the learner (Schein, 1995). 
“The key to effective change management, then, becomes the ability to balance the 
amount of threat produced by disconfirming data with enough psychological safety 
to allow the change target to accept the information, feel the survival anxiety, and 
become motivated to change” (Schein, 1995, p. 5). 
To sum up, according to Lewin and Schein, psychological safety is crucial to learning and change. 
 Social learning 2.3.4.
The development of mental models and cognitive schemata by individuals does not occur in a 
social vacuum, however. The individual’s cognitive development is influenced by its social 
environment. Studied from a social perspective, learning depends on communication. On the 
basis of shared linguistic notions, people can exchange knowledge and beliefs. When 
communication is durable, a dialogue or a debate may arise. In a dialectic connection, opinions 
may be tested and verified, alternative viewpoints may be confronted, and mutual efforts of 
persuasion and argumentation may be made. In this way, the individuals participating in the 
dialectic connection are stimulated to reflect on their existing cognitive schemata, which may 
lead to learning and change (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
More still, the confrontation of viewpoints may lead to new viewpoints, transcending the 
opposition. Indeed, the confrontation of competing theses may result in a dialectical process 
through which a synthesis may be reached on a higher level (Bekkers et al., 2011). 
However, the possibilities of communication, dialogue, confrontation of viewpoints, and learning 
may be compromised by what Argyris (Argyris, 1987 – in Van der Knaap, 1995) has called 
‘defensive routines’. Indeed, in order to prevent the experience of embarrassment or threat, 
people tend to take refuge in defensive routines, which are concealing practices to obstruct the 
confrontation of viewpoints (Van der Knaap, 1995). When people feel threatened or vulnerable, 
they often engage in these kinds of defensive routines in order to protect themselves and their 
colleagues from losing face (Morgan, 2006b). The conception of defensive routines has a great 
deal of common ground with Kurt Lewin’s work on learning anxiety and psychological safety. 
 Organizational learning 2.3.5.
The notion of organizational learning has received ample scholarly attention over the last couple 
of decades. However, no theory or model of organizational learning has gained widespread 
acceptance (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Mariotti, 2012). The term ‘organizational learning’ is defined in 
any number of ways, widely differing in scope and focus. Whilst some definitions focus on the 
learning of individuals in the organizational context, others on the opposite side of the spectrum 
instead focus on an organization-level process that is distinct from individual learning. In the 
case of the latter, organizational learning is directly linked to the institutionalization (Knight, 
2002; Huysman, 1999) of such concepts as organizational culture, processes and procedures. 
Some scholars argue that organizations cannot learn; that only individuals can learn. For 
example, Weick (1991, p. 119 – in Mariotti, 2012, p. 216) states that “organizations are not built 
to learn. Instead, they are patterns of means-ends relations deliberately designed to make the 
same routine response to different stimuli, a pattern which is antithetical to learning in a 
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traditional sense.” Simon (1991, p. 125 – in Knight, 2002, p. 432) states that “all learning takes 
place inside individual human heads.” Nevertheless, Simon argues that 
“what an individual learns in an organization is very much dependent on what is 
already known to (or believed by) other members of the organization and what kinds 
of information are present in the organizational environment. […] human learning in 
the context of an organization is very much influenced by the organization, has 
consequences for the organization and produces phenomena at the organizational level 
that go beyond anything we could infer simply by observing learning processes in 
isolated individuals” (Simon, 1991, p. 125-126, in Mariotti, 2012, p. 216). 
In other words, Simon, and other scholars sharing this view, believe that the notion of 
organizational learning deserves scholarly attention. However, they do not see organizational 
learning as the learning of an organization. They see it as the learning of individuals in an 
organizational context (Crossan et al., 1995). In this view, organizational learning is seen as the 
sum of the learning of individual members of the organization (Mariotti, 2012; Knight, 2002). 
Other scholars, however, consider organizational learning to be more than the sum of the 
learning of individuals that constitute the organization. They argue that not only individuals can 
learn, but organizations as well. For example, Knight (2002, p. 436) argues “that learning is a 
notion that can be usefully applied at different levels, provided we accept that the detailed 
conceptualization of learning and associated constructs, such as memory, are not identical 
across the levels.” We might, for example, make the following comparison: Individuals develop 
mental models that they use as frames of reference to perceive and understand situations and to 
decide on which courses of action to take. Similarly, organizations develop shared mental 
models which have an influence on the decisions made by the management, and which guide the 
problem-solving activities and patterns of interaction among co-workers (Lam, 2006). Hedberg 
(1981, p. 6) draws another parallel: “Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive 
systems and memories.” Lam (2006) defines the collective memory of an organization as “the 
accumulated knowledge of the organization, stored in its rules, procedures, routines, and shared 
norms” (Lam, 2006, p. 124). 
In this view, organizational learning does not only comprise individuals learning in an 
organizational context, but also the organization learning through intra-organizational 
interaction. Identifying organizational learning, however, is tricky business. One tool which 
enables us to see if organization learning has taken place, is analysing whether cognitive 
structures and behavioural patterns remain despite personnel turnover (Knight, 2002). Hedberg 
(1981, p. 6) puts it this way: “Members come and go, and leadership changes, but organizations’ 
memories preserve certain behaviours, mental maps, norms, and values over time.” 
In short, organizational learning is a popular research topic. However, there is no scientific 
agreement on what constitutes organizational learning. In particular, the topic seems to suffer 
from two ailments: disagreement about the appropriate unit of analysis, and definitional 
confusion between the locus of the learning and the context of the learning. This makes any 
scientific discussion difficult. However, Knight (2002) has developed a matrix that might 
overcome these disagreements. By making the distinction between learner and learning context, 
the matrix distinguishes conceptually different forms of learning. The rows consist of the various 
agents of learning (i.e. each row represents a different learner). The columns regard the context 
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for learning. The matrix is an analytical framework that provides the opportunity to map prior 
research, and consequently, to make the conceptual disagreements discussable (Knight, 2002). 
Figure 2: Knight’s (2002) organizational learning-matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Knight, 2002, 438 
 
On the basis of this framework, we can map the rival conceptions of organizational learning that 
we discussed in the previous paragraph. In this study, we will regard organizational learning as 
the combination of individuals and groups learning in an organizational context, and the 
organization learning through intra-organizational interaction. 
 Organizational learning is a social affair 2.3.6.
Starting from this definition, organizational learning can be regarded as a social 
accomplishment, emergent from the interactions of organizational actors. Organizational 
learning takes place in networks of relationships between individuals, groups, and 
organizational actors. It is a collective accomplishment (Mariotti, 2012). According to this view, 
organizational learning is situated in the relational activities of actors: social processes are 
crucial in the formation of collective cognition and knowledge structures; social interactions and 
group dynamics within organizations are decisive factors in the shaping of collective 
intelligence, learning, and knowledge generation (Lam, 2006). Organizations are seen as 
consisting of groups of individuals that collectively try to make sense of a complex reality in 
their daily work activities (Brown & Duguid, 1991). 
 Exploitation, exploration and organizational survival 2.3.7.
Scholars in the research area of organizational learning have also examined how shared 
interpretative schemes affect the adaptive potential of organizations. According to Lam (2006), 
some scholars have claimed that collective mental models facilitate an organization’s capacity to 
process and interpret information in a coherent and purposeful manner, and to share 
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knowledge. In this manner, shared mental models are expected to aide learning and joint 
problem solving and, hence, to enhance the adaptiveness of organizations (Lam, 2006). 
However, as Lam (2006) indicates, other scholars have argued that shared mental models can 
create “blind spots” in organizational decision making and impede organizational change. They 
argue that organizations tend to persist in what they do because everyone in the organization 
has the same set of beliefs and values, and because it occurs to no one to question the existing 
ways of doing things. As a consequence, organizations may find it difficult to unlearn these 
deeply rooted practices and to explore alternative ways of doing things (Lam, 2006). 
Therefore, these authors suggest that there should be a sound balance between the exploitation 
of existing knowledge and competences, on the one hand, and the exploration/integration/ 
insertion of new ideas, knowledge, expertise and competences from outside the organization, on 
the other. 
Exploitation, according to Holmqvist (2003, p. 99) refers to the refinement of existing 
organizational knowledge and capabilities. Exploitation is about creating reliability in 
experience. It means productivity, refinement, routinisation, production, and elaboration of 
existing experiences. The exploitation of existing knowledge and competences may enable 
organizations to recombine existing knowledge and generate new applications from its existing 
knowledge base. This will most likely result in cumulative learning, which is continuous but 
incremental (Lam, 2006). At the same time, however, these learning processes can also result in 
a “simple-mindedness and a concomitant inability to explore new opportunities” (Holmqvist, 
2003, p. 99). 
These drawbacks, caused by exploitation, will need counteraction. Organizations will need to 
create variety in their experiences as well, by experimenting, innovating and taking risks. This is 
the so-called process of exploration (Holmqvist, 2003). The inflow of new knowledge and ideas 
may enable organizations to generate radical new products and processes. Sources from outside 
the organization are often thought to be in a better position to challenge existing perspectives 
and paradigms (Lam, 2006). In addition, Foldy (2004) argues that cultural diversity in an 
organization’s workforce enhances organizational performance. Indeed, alternative and new 
ideas and perspectives can be generated by culturally heterogeneous groups, who contribute to 
functional diversity. 
In the literature, a binary divide is made between intra-organizational learning processes on the 
one hand, and inter-organizational learning processes on the other. Where the former process 
favours exploitation, the latter favours exploration. The reason for this division may be found in 
the presence or absence of a dominant group. Intra-organizational learning is typically 
controlled by a dominant group, which has the power to select, promote, demote and dismiss 
organizational members. This situation tends to result in a status quo of organizational 
worldviews, norms, traditions, and rules (Holmqvist, 2003). 
Inter-organizational learning, on the other hand, has been claimed to be of a highly innovative 
and explorative character, because this type of learning has the potential to share somewhat 
different experiences between the learning entities (Holmqvist, 2003). Inter-organizational 
collaborations may enable formal organizations “to increase their store of knowledge not 
previously available within the organization” (Huber, 1991, p. 97 – in Holmqvist, 2003, p. 104). 
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They provide “a shortcut to radical change, by-passing organizational vicious circles and 
deadlocks” (Ciborra, 1991, p. 59 – in Holmqvist, 2003, p. 104). 
 Tacit and explicit knowledge, knowledge conversion, and knowledge 2.3.8.
management 
Knowledge management lies somewhat outside the field of organizational learning itself, but is 
very closely connected to it and critical for how organizational learning can operate. Knowledge 
management is the set of processes and practices by which knowledge is recognized, acquired, 
captured, codified, recorded, stored, aggregated, communicated, shared, transferred, converted, 
retrieved and reaccessed (Rashman et al., 2005; Gilson, Dunleavy & Tinkler, 2009; Levitt & 
March, 1988). 
Before we can elaborate on this, we need to discuss the conceptual distinction made, among 
others, by Polanyi (1966) and Nonaka (1994) between tacit and explicit knowledge (Hartley & 
Allison, 2002; Rashman et al., 2005). Explicit knowledge can be articulated, codified and 
transmitted using formal systems (e.g. language and mathematics) and captured in language-
based records (such as those in libraries, archives and databases). Tacit knowledge is personal, 
contextual, and often embedded in practice (concrete know-how, crafts and skills that apply to 
specific contexts), making it difficult to articulate and harder to share through formal language 
systems. The transfer of knowledge is dependent on close social interaction (Hartley & Allison, 
2002; Rashman et al., 2005). 
Hartley & Allison (2002) give us four modes of knowledge conversion through which tacit and 
explicit knowledge can be created and transferred between individuals and groups: 
- Socialization is the process of converting tacit knowledge (known by one person or 
group) to tacit knowledge (held by another person or group). It is a process of sharing 
experiences and thereby sharing tacit knowledge, such as shared mental models and 
technical skills. It includes the processes of observation and imitation. 
- Externalization is the process of articulating tacit knowledge into explicit concepts and 
ideas. The conversion process can be enhanced through dialogue and reflection. The use 
of metaphors and analogies, the telling of stories and anecdotes, the contrasting of 
situations and contexts can help explicit concepts to emerge from tacit knowledge. 
- Combination is the process of systematizing concepts into a knowledge system and it 
occurs through combining and converting different forms of explicit knowledge. Such 
knowledge can be diffused and learnt (at least in its explicit form) through reconfiguring 
existing information, analysing, combining and recategorizing. Databases are an example 
of the combination of explicit knowledge. 
- Internalization is the process of converting explicit to tacit knowledge. This process 
tends to be achieved through practice, by simply ‘having a go at it’. Manuals and other 
documentation of, for example, project evaluation can help to embed tacit knowledge, 
however, the ‘embodiment’ of knowledge through action is critical. 
 
 
Figure 3: Tacit and explicit knowledge conversion  
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Source: Hartley & Allison, 2002, 105 (adapted from Nonaka, 1994, 19) 
 
Both tacit and explicit knowledge are crucial for the functioning of an organization. Routine-
based conceptions of learning presume that practical knowledge, whether in implicit form or in 
formal rules, is recorded, maintained and accumulated in an organizational memory through 
rules, procedures, routines, and shared norms. The biggest obstacle for this documentation to 
happen efficiently and effectively is the turnover of personnel and passage of time (Levitt & 
March, 1988). 
However, it is argued that by far the biggest part of knowledge inside an organization will be 
tacit, inside the minds and practices of members of the workforce, not readily available for the 
rest of the organization (Gilson, Dunleavy & Tinkler, 2009). Unless the implications of 
experience can be transferred from those who experienced it to those who did not, the lessons of 
experience are likely to be lost through turnover of personnel (Levitt & March, 1988). 
Unfortunately, the conversion of tacit knowledge known by one person or group to tacit 
knowledge held by another person or group (socialization) is often resource-intensive, slow and 
individualized. Fast-changing environments can be problematic for such a pace of learning in 
organizations (Gilson, Dunleavy & Tinkler, 2009; Hartley & Allison, 2002). Consequently, the 
question of how knowledge can be more formally collected and stored in retrievable ways by 
and within organizations has attracted widespread attention. 
 Organizational learning as a combination of cognition and behaviour 2.3.9.
In an effort to synthesize previous models and theories of organizational learning, Fiol and Lyles 
(1985) suggest that “learning is the development of insights, knowledge, and associations 
between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, 
811). More precisely, they conceive learning as a dynamic relationship between cognitive and 
behavioural development (see also: Crossan et al., 1995). 
With the cognitive dimension of learning, Fiol and Lyles refer to the development of insights and 
cognitive associations, and to changes in the states of knowledge of organizations. Insights and 
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causal associations are developed via the filtering, interpretation, and processing of raw 
information about past actions and performance. This information is thus translated into 
concrete lessons for the future, lessons concerning causes of and possible solutions to problems 
(Dekker & Hansén, 2004). The behavioural dimension comprises changes in terms of 
behavioural and organizational outcomes. Not just any change however. It refers particularly to 
those adaptations that reflect the knowledge, insights and cognitive associations that have been 
developed (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). It refers to the institutionalization of the lessons learned. 
It should be noted, however, that learning is not a set, linear process in which behavioural 
change is always preceded by cognitive developments and in which cognitive developments are 
always followed by behavioural changes (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Dekker & Hansén, 2004). This 
means two things. First, new insights and ideas are not always turned into new practices. 
Assessments may be challenged, what is learned may be ignored, or the pressures on the system 
may not be sufficient to bring about changes (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000). Second, changes in 
behaviour may occur without any preceding cognitive development. However, those behavioural 
changes may sometimes give rise to a growing awareness about the effectiveness of those 
changes. To put it in the words of Crossan, Lane and White: ‘‘understanding guides action, but 
action also informs understanding’’ (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999, 524). 
 Inter-organizational learning and network learning 2.3.10.
Inter-organizational learning and network learning are newly emerging research topics. Given 
that groups and organizations can be thought of as learning entities and that the inter-
organizational network is the next system level after the organization, it is an obvious 
development to consider learning in and by organizational networks (Knight, 2002). 
However, most of the research in this area focuses on the learning of individual organizations in 
the context of an inter-organizational network, and not on the network as a learner. Even where 
it is recognized that the interaction might lead to new joint learning, the focus is typically on how 
each firm can derive private benefit. The authors tend not to see the network as an agent of 
learning, but as a context for learning (Knight, 2002). 
In order to avoid definitional confusion, Knight (2002) makes a distinction between inter-
organizational learning and network learning. ‘Inter-organizational learning’ refers to the 
learning of individual organizations in the context of an inter-organizational network. ‘Network 
learning’ on the other hand is defined as learning by a group of organizations, as a group. More 
specifically: it is the group of organizations itself that is the ‘learner’, not just the individual 
organizations within the network (Knight, 2002). 
 
 Inter-organizational learning 2.3.11.
Some scholars interpret inter-organizational learning as a process in which network members 
act jointly to create collective knowledge. However, inter-organizational learning may also refer 
to the sharing and transferring of knowledge from one network partner to another. In short, 
inter-organizational learning may involve one or more of the following elements: (1) creating 
collective knowledge; (2) sharing/transferring knowledge (Mariotti, 2012). 
It is misleading to think of knowledge transfer in terms only of the movement of explicit 
(abstracted) knowledge from one context to another – the drag and drop metaphor. Indeed, as 
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Hartley & Benington (2006, p. 104) put it: “Instead, knowledge is continuously reviewed, 
recreated or re-appreciated as it is taken into different settings or is rediscovered in relation to 
new purposes or alongside existing ‘old’ knowledge”. The transfer of knowledge is very often an 
active process of grafting and transplanting (adaption), rather than a passive copying of best 
practice (adoption). 
In order for inter-organizational learning to occur, it is crucial to have institutional 
arrangements, such as learning platforms and networks, that allow organizations to exchange 
experiences and knowledge. However, in this respect, three dilemmas should be overcome. The 
first dilemma relates to one of the key characteristics of networks: the motivation of self-
interested network members. It might be counterintuitive for these partners to participate in the 
network and to openly share valuable knowledge within the network. Information is power, so 
this valuable knowledge, which should be shared in order to make the network function, is often 
the kind of knowledge that individual private firms want to keep as proprietary (Mariotti, 2012). 
Therefore, in a private sector context of competition between individual organizations, in order 
to enhance knowledge sharing across organizational boundaries, this usually takes place in 
relatively closed and exclusive networks to safeguard competition as much as possible (for 
example in strategic alliances and supply chains) (Hartley & Benington, 2006). 
In contrast, the emphasis in many public service settings is on the widest possible sharing of 
knowledge in order to improve the quality of the public service as a whole. The public sector is 
consequently characterized by an overall framework of collaboration, rather than competition. 
However, public sector league tables, audit and external inspection are increasingly subjecting 
public sector organizations to competition over reputation and resources, with the result of 
making them less willing to share ideas and knowledge (Hartley & Benington, 2006). 
The second dilemma is the well-known ‘free-rider’ problem. Once a collaboration becomes 
successful, at least parts of its knowledge will become collective, and open to the entire public. 
Consequently, as in any market failure, there can be network members who enjoy the benefits, 
without participating in its establishment or maintenance (Mariotti, 2012). 
The third dilemma relates to the composition of the network. A study on inter-organizational 
learning in British local authorities by Downe et al. (2004) revealed that geographical location, 
size, local socioeconomic factors and political orientation were important factors in identifying 
other councils from which to learn. Typically, the preference was for similarity, although some 
organizations pursued learning from dissimilarity (Downe et al., 2004). Heterogeneity among 
network members can be beneficial because it allows the members to learn from a wider pool of 
knowledge (different perspectives, different experiences, and different competences). As many 
reader will know from experience, new insights and new knowledge can be the fruit of clashing 
perspectives (Hartley & Benington, 2006). On the other hand, homogeneity among network 
members can also be beneficial. Indeed, transfer of (tacit) knowledge is more efficient and more 
likely to be successful when the source and the recipient organization have a common language, 
knowledge base and understanding (Mariotti, 2012). This relates to the argument expressed by 
Downe et al. (2004) that successful knowledge transfer is in part dependent on the absorptive 
capacity of the recipient, which is in its turn determined by prior knowledge and skills, including 
language and technical knowledge (Downe et al., 2004) 
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 Formats and arrangements for inter-organizational learning 2.3.12.
Finally, learning from the experience of other organizations is a major means of organizational 
learning (Levitt & March, 1988). It can occur through a number of mechanisms and 
arrangements 
 Movement of personnel 
 Contacts between organizations 
 Professional communities and networks 
 Prizes and awards 
 … 
 Enabling factors for public sector learning 2.3.13.
It is important to understand the major factors that can enable organizational learning and the 
ones that can inhibit it. Numerous factors have been identified by the literature as potential 
enablers/inhibitors of organizational and inter-organizational learning. In Table 1 a selection of 
factors is provided. This selection is an adaptation of and addition to the typology of factors 
developed by Greiling & Halachmi (2013). Greiling & Halachmi, in their turn, based their 
typology on the work of Popper & Lipshitz (2000); Barrados & Mayne (2003); Friedman, 
Lipshitz & Overmeer (2003); Rashman, Withers & Hartley (2009). 
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Table 1: Factors enabling organizational learning 
Environmental enablers 
(external to the learning 
entity) 
Environmental uncertainty 
Amount of competition 
Amount of (public) pressure for innovation and modernization 
Regulatory obligations 
Legal constraints and ethical issues 
Costs and salience of potential errors 
Political enablers Top management endorsement and commitment to organizational learning 
Top management inducement of organizational learning culture 
Strategic thinking 
Cultural enablers 
(organizational learning 
values/culture) 
Transparency: honest and unbiased information disclosure 
Integrity and issue orientation: collecting and providing information and making 
judgments regardless of its implications, regardless of interests, status, personal 
likes, etc. 
General openness that encourages questioning, inquiry and constructive criticism 
Openness for feedback information, for alternative opinions and perspectives 
Tolerance for uncertainty: allowing cognitive dissonance 
Tolerance for errors Sense of safety about making errors and 
discussing them openly 
No-blame culture, trust-based culture 
Egalitarianism: power-sharing, participation, equal responsibility for 
performance, regardless of formal status (cf. TQM) 
Institutional learning 
conditions: structural and 
procedural arrangements 
that allow organizations 
to collect, analyse, store, 
disseminate and use 
information and 
knowledge 
Credible measurement and 
analysis 
Deliberate measurement practices: active 
measurement of a wide spectrum of performance 
Useful analysis 
Data quality assurance practices 
Information dissemination: widespread and timely communication of result 
information, in useful formats 
Regular review Practices for routine review of accomplishments 
Procedures for follow-up of decisions taken 
Internal platforms, arenas, forums to discuss and debate 
Knowledge management Making tacit knowledge explicit 
Recording, conservation and retrieval of 
knowledge and experience 
Creating, acquiring, capturing, aggregating, 
codifying, sharing and using knowledge 
Organizational memory Archives 
Documentation of procedures 
Organizational structure Bureaucratic structure – adhocracy – J-form 
Degree of autonomy/Distance from politics: Department – central agency – more 
autonomous agency 
Organizational capacity Organizational slack (people, money, time, competences, information, knowledge, 
political support, contacts) 
Large variety of relevant skills and knowledge that can be exploited 
Personnel turnover 
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 Systems, feedback, and environment 2.4.
Open vs. closed systems 
In “An outline of general system theory”, Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950) makes the fundamental 
distinction between open and closed systems: 
“We call a system closed when no materials enter or leave it. It is open if there is inflow and 
outflow, and therefore change of the component materials” (von Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 155). 
According to von Bertalanffy, the conception of an open system is more general than that of a 
closed system. Indeed, one can conceive a closed system as an open system in which the 
transport terms have been equated to zero. The opposite, however, is not possible (von 
Bertalanffy, 1950). 
Closed systems are stationary. They are in a state of equilibrium, which means that their 
composition remains constant throughout time. An open system on the other hand, may attain a 
stationary state, but only if certain conditions are met. If this is the case, the composition of the 
system is not constant. The system appears to be constant, but this steady state is maintained by 
a continuous exchange of materials with the environment (von Bertalanffy, 1950). 
Many biological and social systems can be characterized as open systems, while many physical 
and mechanical systems can be characterized as closed systems. However, the distinction 
between open and closed systems is not a dichotomous one, it is a continuous one. Indeed, the 
degree of openness can vary. For example, some open systems may be responsive only to a 
relatively narrow range of inputs from the environment (Morgan, 2006a). 
 The “open systems approach” to organization: the organism metaphor 2.4.1.
2.4.1.1.  Introduction 
The open systems approach is based on the principle that organizations are, just like biological 
organisms, open to their environment and that – in order to survive – they must achieve an 
appropriate relation with that environment; they must interact with it and they must adapt to it. 
A closed system, by contrast, is not dependent on its environment. It is autonomous, insulated, 
and sealed off from its environment (Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Daft, 1995). 
In more traditional management and organizational theories and studies, relatively little 
attention was given to the environment. Organizations were predominantly viewed and treated 
as closed mechanical systems. The environment was assumed to be stable and predictable and 
not to interfere with the functioning of the system. Attention was focused on principles of 
internal design with a focus on effectiveness and efficiency (Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978; 
Daft, 1995).  
In other words, the closed-system approach ignored the importance of the environment to the 
functioning of human organizations. It was preoccupied with principles of internal design and 
internal organizational functioning. Consequently, it failed to understand the processes of 
feedback which are essential to survival (Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Daft, 1995). 
In the open systems approach, much attention is devoted to the relationship between the 
organization and its environment. A dominant principle is that organizations have to adapt 
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themselves to their environments if they are to survive. Organizations have to align with their 
environments to remain competitive and innovative. Alignment implies that the firm must have 
the potential to learn, unlearn or relearn based on its past behaviours. It can be argued that 
organizational adaptation is the essence of strategic management: when it comes to dealing with 
changes occurring in the environment, Fiol & Lyles (1985) stress that this should be the key 
focus, and that it involves the continuous process of making strategic choices (Fiol & Lyles, 
1985). 
The principle of organizational adaptation is also reflected in contingency theory. This 
theoretical current asserts that there is no one ideal way of organizing. The appropriate form 
depends on the kind of task or environment with which one is dealing (Morgan, 2006a). 
2.4.1.2. The concept of an open system 
An open or organic system is continuously engaged in an exchange of materials and/or energy 
with its environment. This interaction is crucial for the survival of the system, and for 
maintaining the so-called steady state. The open system is, more precisely, engaged in a 
continuous cycle of input, internal transformation (throughput), output, and feedback: inputs 
from the environment (materials and/or energy) are transformed into some product, which is 
then exported into the environment, after which the system recharges itself with sources in the 
environment (Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Open systems share a number of characteristics: negative entropy, feedback, homeostasis, 
requisite variety and equifinality. (1) Closed systems are entropic. This means that they have an 
irreversible tendency to degenerate and decay. Open systems, on the other hand, try to counter 
these entropic tendencies by importing energy from their environments. The law of negative 
entropy posits that systems survive and maintain their steady states as long as they import more 
energy from the environment than they consume (Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978). (2) The 
feedback principle has to do with information input, which is a kind of signal to the system about 
environmental conditions and about the functioning of the system in relation to its environment. 
Such information constitutes feedback, which enables the system to correct for its own errors or 
for changes in the environment, and thus to maintain a steady state or homeostasis. (3) The 
concept of homeostasis refers to the self-regulating processes through which the inflow and 
outflow of materials and energy in organic systems is kept in balance. In other words, it refers to 
the ability to maintain a steady state (the ability to maintain life and form). These processes 
operate on the basis of negative feedback, implying that deviations from a certain set standard 
initiate corrective actions aimed at reducing the deviation (Morgan, 2006a; von Bertalanffy, 
1950; Katz & Kahn, 1978). (4) The principle of requisite variety asserts that – in order to be 
adequate and appropriate – the internal regulatory mechanisms of a system must be as complex 
and diverse as the environment with which it has to deal (Morgan, 2006a, 2006b). (5) The 
principle of equifinality builds on the idea that an open system can arrive at the same end state 
from different initial conditions, with different resources, and by different paths of development 
(Morgan, 2006a; Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Open systems are also regularly characterized in terms of interrelated subsystems. For example, 
an organization can be anatomized into organizational divisions, which in their turn, consist of 
smaller groups or departments, each of which contains individual human beings. If we interpret 
the whole organization as the system, then the other levels can be understood as subsystems, 
  
 
Feedback, accountability & learning in public innovation 
 
  
LIPSE Research Report # 3 32 
knowing that each subsystem in itself can be perceived as a complex open system in its own 
right (Morgan, 2006a). 
2.4.1.3. The organization as an open system 
Figure 5 is a schematic representation of an open system. In the context of public sector 
organizations, the inputs include raw materials, human resources, information and financial 
resources. In the transformation process, these inputs are transformed into something of value 
which can be exported back to the environment. In the context of public sector organizations, 
examples of valuable outputs are products and services for citizens and customers. Apart from 
valuable outputs, the transformation process can also create and export undesired by-products 
such as pollution to the environment (Daft, 1995). 
Figure 4: Open System  
 
Source: Daft, 1995, 12 
An organization is composed of several subsystems. The specific functions required for 
organizational survival are performed by several interrelated subsystems. In an organization, 
these subsystems may be called departments. Daft distinguishes between five essential functions 
which can be performed by organizational subsystems: 
- Boundary spanning: boundary spanning subsystems are responsible for exchanges with 
the environment; they handle input and output transactions; 
- Production: the production subsystem is responsible for the transformation process; 
- Maintenance: the maintenance subsystem provides supportive functions that enable the 
organization to run smoothly; examples are the personnel department and the janitorial 
staff; 
- Adaption: the adaptive subsystem is responsible for organizational change, adaptation 
and innovation; in order to do this, it scans the environment for problems and 
opportunities; 
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- Management: the management subsystem is responsible for providing direction, 
coordination, strategy and goals for the other subsystems. 
These subsystems are interconnected and often overlap. Departments may have multiple roles 
(Daft, 1995). 
2.4.1.4. Structural contingency theory  
General 
According to Lam (2006), the classical theory of organizational design assumed the idea of ‘one 
best way to organize’. This assumption was challenged by the contingency theory, which came to 
prominence during the 1960s and 1970s. Contingency theory argues that the most suitable 
structure for an organization is the one that best fits the relevant contingencies, such as the 
nature of the task or the environment with which the organization is dealing. Consequently, 
contingency theory is preoccupied with investigating the links between the nature of the task, 
the environment, structures and organizational performance (Lam, 2006; Morgan, 2006a.). 
Following Lam (2006), we discuss two important early contributions to contingency theory. 
A study of Burns & Stalker (1961) found that firms could be categorized in two main types: 
‘mechanistic’ and ‘organic’ organizations. Mechanistic organizations are typically rigid and 
hierarchical. They are characterized by: task specialization and functionally differentiated 
duties; precise definition of rights and obligations; a hierarchical structure of control, authority 
and communication; concentration of knowledge at the top of the organization. The study of 
Burns & Stalker found that this type of organization is well suited to stable and predictable 
conditions. Organic organizations, on the other hand, are typically more fluid in their structures 
and procedures. They are characterized by: continual adjustment and redefinition of individual 
tasks and duties; a network structure of control, authority and communication; knowledge may 
be located anywhere in the network. This type of organization is said to be better suited for 
environments characterized by rapid change and high complexity (Lam, 2006). 
In 1979, Mintzberg proposed a series of organizational archetypes: simple structure, machine 
bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, divisionalised form, and adhocracy. He argued that 
successful organizations design their structures to accommodate their environments. According 
to Mintzberg, bureaucratic structures work well within stable environments, but are not 
innovative and cannot cope with novelty or change in the environment. Adhocracies, by contrast, 
are highly organic and flexible forms of organization and are capable of radical innovation in a 
volatile environment (Lam, 2006). 
Structural contingency theory and innovation 
At the centre of contingency theory is the notion of ‘fit’. The theory asserts that an appropriate fit 
between organizational structure and key contingencies will lead to higher performance. 
Innovation may assist at achieving this fit by adapting structures to new circumstances. Figure 6 
shows Donaldson’s (2001) ‘structural adaptation to regain fit’ model, edited by Walker (2013) to 
include innovation. 
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Figure 5: ‘Structural adaptation to regain fit’-model 
 
Source: Walker, 2013, 18 
In accordance with structural contingency theory, the figure suggests that the fit or misfit 
between organizational structure and contingency influences the level of performance. When 
key contingencies change while the organizational structure remains unchanged, this will result 
in misfit, which may lead to reduced levels of performance. In order to restore performance back 
to acceptable levels, the organization has to adapt: it has to change its structure in order to 
accommodate the changed contingencies and to bring the organization back into fit (Walker, 
2013). 
2.4.1.5. The basic dynamics of search and change 
According to Downs (1967), organizational change is closely related with information seeking. 
He sets forth a basic model of search and change for both individuals and organizations. For our 
purposes, we will focus on the level of the organization. The basic model is a theory of dynamic 
equilibrium involving the following hypotheses: 
- All organizations are continuously engaged in scanning their immediate environment to 
some degree. They constantly receive a certain amount of information from their 
environments. This stream of information comes to them without specific effort on their 
part to obtain it. This constitutes a minimal degree of constant, ‘automatic’ search. 
- Each organization sets a level of performance it aspires to achieve. Organizations can 
choose different aspiration levels. A wide range of internal and external pressures will 
play a role in determining the aspiration level. 
- Whenever the performance level of the organization drops below the aspiration level, 
the organization will be motivated to search more intensively for alternative ways of 
organizing its business. Indeed, the perceived performance gap creates dissatisfaction, 
which incites the organization to intensify its normal search and to direct it specifically 
at alternatives likely to close the performance gap. Other things being equal, the 
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organization will select the alternative that involves the least profound change in its 
structure. 
- Once the organization has adopted a new course of action, enabling it to regain or 
surpass its original performance level, it will reduce its search efforts back to their 
normal, automatic degree of intensity. 
- If the intensified search fails to reveal any ways the organization can return to its 
original level of performance, the organization will eventually adjust its aspiration level 
downwards, to the highest level of performance it can attain. 
- When an organization is achieving its aspiration level, it is in a state of equilibrium. The 
organization is maximizing its utility in the light of its existing knowledge. The 
organization is not motivated to search for alternative ways to organize its business. 
- There is only one exception, namely when the constant, automatic search process by 
chance reveals an alternative that might allow the organization to move to an even 
higher level of performance. This possibility creates a potential performance gap and 
motivates the organization to explore this alternative. If the intensified search reveals 
that the organization can indeed improve its performance by shifting to the alternative, 
the organization will make the shift. Once the organization has adopted the new course 
of action, the new higher performance level will be regarded as the aspiration level. 
 Autopoiesis and the (relatively) closed nature of systems 2.4.2.
2.4.2.1. Introduction 
The idea of an organization as an open system which is in constant interaction with its 
environment, was challenged by the theory of autopoiesis. The term autopoiesis was introduced 
by two biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (Arnoldi, 2006). They posit that all 
living systems are closed, autonomous, and insulated, and make reference only to themselves. 
The ultimate aim of these systems is to (re)produce themselves (Morgan, 2006c). Although 
Maturana and Varela have strong reservations about applying the theory of autopoiesis to the 
social world, their work has had a profound influence on social and organizational studies. 
The body of literature about organizations devotes considerable attention to the boundaries of 
organizations. Organizations have boundaries which are easily or less easily penetrable. This 
permeability may refer to the entry and exit of persons, but more often it refers to the 
receptivity of the organization towards signals from the environment (de Bruijn & ten 
Heuvelhof, 1991). 
2.4.2.2. Receiving and filtering information from the environment 
Each organization has a management or perception filter that receives and filters signals from 
the environment. Open systems have a rather thin filter, allowing many external signals to enter 
the organization, while closed or autopoietic systems have a very thick filter, allowing only a 
limited amount of external signals to penetrate into the organization. More precisely, signals 
from the environment will only be perceived by an autopoietic organization when they relate to 
the internal frame of reference of the organization. In other words, autopoietic systems are not 
oriented towards their environments, they are oriented towards themselves. They make 
reference only to themselves. They respond only to impulses which are consistent with their 
own frames of reference (de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1991). Easton (1965) denoted this 
tendency of self-referral and relative closedness as an orientation towards withinputs, instead of 
towards inputs and feedback from the environment. 
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Katz & Kahn (1978) denote this process as the coding process: “Any system that is the recipient 
of information, […] has a characteristic coding process, a limited set of coding categories to 
which it assimilates the information received” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 433). These coding 
categories determine which types of information will be selected as relevant and how they will 
be perceived, interpreted and transformed. 
Thus, organizations have their own filters and coding systems that determine the amount and 
types of information they receive from their environment and the way the information will be 
perceived. However, within the organization, the different subsystems with their different 
functions will also have their own, (slightly) different frames of reference and ways of thinking. 
Therefore, each subsystem will respond to the same information in different ways. 
Consequently, within an organization, there may be problems of communication and 
interpretation between subsystems (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
2.4.2.3. Advantages of relative closedness 
According to the open systems approach, organizational closedness is detrimental to the 
survival odds of the organization. Indeed, the open system approach asserts that, in order to 
survive, an organization has to adapt itself to its environment. However, as de Bruijn & ten 
Heuvelhof (1991) indicate, relative closedness can have advantages as well. Being in a state of 
relative closedness allows an organization to shield itself from excessive turbulence and 
complexity from its environment, and to reduce the insecurity associated with it. Without this 
kind of shielding, the organization would react to every single impulse. The resulting overload 
could cause the organization to drift or even to disintegrate (de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1991). 
Similarly, unrestricted communication between the subsystems of an organization may produce 
noise and overload in the system. An organized state of affairs may require the introduction of 
constraints and restrictions to reduce random and diffuse communication between subsystems 
(Katz & Kahn, 1978). Thelen (quoted in Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 430-431) summarizes Ashby 
(1952) to make this point: “Stability of the suprasystem would take infinitely long to achieve if 
there were ‘full and rich communication’ among the subsystems […]. If communication among 
subsystems is restricted or if they are temporarily isolated, then each subsystem achieves its 
own stability with minimum interference by the changing environment of other systems seeking 
their stability.” 
2.4.2.4. Alteration of opening up and closing off 
The degree of closedness/openness of an organization is not necessarily static. It can fluctuate 
during the life course of the organization. For the purpose of innovation or adaptation, an 
organization may choose to be relatively open for a while in order to take in new information 
from its environment. In the aftermath, the organization may require a period of relative 
closedness in order to reduce the level of uncertainty. In this view, a periodic alternation of 
opening up and closing off may be seen as healthy for an organization (de Bruijn & ten 
Heuvelhof, 1991). 
 Feedback 2.4.3.
In “An outline of general system theory”, Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950) defines feedback as 
follows: 
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“Feed-back means that from the output of a machine a certain amount is monitored back, as 
‘information’, to the input so as to regulate the latter and thus to stabilize or direct the action 
of the machine” (von Bertalanffy, 1950, p.159-160). 
2.4.3.1. Cybernetic models of self-regulation 
The term ‘cybernetics’ was first used in the 1940s by MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener. The 
term is used to refer to processes of information exchange, including in particular negative 
feedback, which enables systems (such as machines and organisms) to self-regulate their 
behaviour and to maintain a steady state. The concept of negative feedback is closely related to 
the detection and correction of error: when a system exceeds certain specified limits, it will 
automatically initiate corrective action to maintain a desired outcome (Morgan, 2006b). 
Most cybernetic models of self-regulation are driven by the philosophy of a dual process system 
which involves a higher order mechanism that monitors and controls a lower order mechanism. 
We can illustrate this by referring to the functioning of a thermostat. The thermostat (the higher 
order) mechanism, monitors the temperature in a room and is programmed to initiate a heating 
mechanism (the lower order mechanism), if and when the temperature drops below a set lower 
limit, and to stop the heating mechanism if and when the temperature rises above a set upper 
limit (Wang & Mukhopadhyay, 2012). 
Thus, according to Morgan (2006b), any cybernetic system is based on four key principles: 
- The capacity to monitor significant aspects of the environment 
- The ability to relate this information to the operating norms/standards/reference values 
- The ability to detect significant discrepancies between the current state and the norm 
- The ability to initiate corrective action in order to reduce the discrepancies 
Similarly, Porter, Lawler & Hackman (1975) (in Katz & Kahn, 1978) specify four basic elements 
as critical: 
- Standards or specified objectives 
- Monitoring devices to measure current performance 
- Comparing devices to compare actual performance with stated objectives 
- Action devices to reduce possible discrepancies between objectives and actual 
performance 
The simplest cybernetic systems, such as house thermostats, can only correct deviations from 
the operating norms. They are unable to question the appropriateness of the operating norms 
themselves. More complex cybernetic systems are able to detect and correct errors in the 
operating norms. In other words, they are able to influence the standards that guide their 
behaviour (Morgan, 2006b). It is this kind of self-questioning ability that constitutes the 
fundamental distinction between single-loop and double-loop learning discussed earlier: 
- Single-loop learning: the ability to detect and correct error in relation to a given set of 
operating norms 
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- Double-loop learning: the ability to question the relevance and appropriateness of the 
operating norms 
2.4.3.2. The organizational locus of informational subsystems 
As indicated in previous paragraphs, feedback information about the performance of the system 
in relation to its environment is crucial for the survival of the system and for the upholding of its 
performance levels. According to Katz & Kahn (1978) two questions are crucial. The first 
question is: who gathers the feedback information? Katz & Kahn (1978) make the argument that 
it is important to have a specialized information subsystem which has information gathering as 
its sole or major task. The second question is: to whom should the information be reported? 
The question of a specialized information subsystem 
According to Katz & Kahn (1978), information gathering – especially the gathering of 
information regarding the system as a whole and its relations to the environment – is best 
assigned to a specialized subsystem for which information gathering is its major or its only 
responsibility. The opposite would entail a number of disadvantages. One could, for example, 
assign the information gathering task to an existing substructure, whose primary function is 
non-informational. According to Katz & Kahn (1978), this would be unwise because the primary 
task of the substructure would determine the types of information that would be received and 
the way they would be processed. Moreover, the members of the substructure are not 
necessarily expert in the subject about which information is sought, nor are they necessarily 
trained in research procedures (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
With a specialized informational subsystem, these problems may be avoided. However, other 
problems may arise. For example, top management directives may hamper the freedom of the 
subsystem and may narrow the receptivity of the subsystem down to only certain types of 
information. To avoid these kinds of dysfunctions, Katz & Kahn (1978) argue that it is necessary 
to grant the information subsystem a number of freedoms, similar to the freedoms a university 
researcher would enjoy. Most notably, top management should not pose specific questions to 
which they expect answers. Indeed, the answers provided could easily be influenced by the 
questions asked (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
The question of the optimal locus for reporting 
Katz & Kahn (1978) argue that information which has direct relevance for the functioning of the 
system as a whole should be reported to the top echelons of the organization. However, they 
recognize that it is often difficult for top managers to find the time to absorb the information and 
to translate it into adequate decisions (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
 Feedback for public sector organizations: typologies 2.4.4.
2.4.4.1. The source of the feedback 
Feedback information about the performance of an organization may come from 
- The staff of the organization 
- The stakeholders of the organization (clients/customers/citizens, partners,…) 
- Monitoring systems 
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- Actors engaged in policy evaluation 
- Ombudsmen, audit offices and other (administrative) accountability mechanisms 
The staff of the organization 
There are many ways the staff of an organization can provide feedback information to the 
management of the organization. Staff members may be required to report to their managers 
about what they have done, what their co-workers have done, about their problems and the 
problems of their unit, and about what they think needs to be done to overcome these problems. 
However, since this kind of information is often utilized for control purposes, there are great 
constraints on the free flow of upward communication. Staff members do not tend to give 
information to their managers that might put themselves or their co-workers in a bad light. They 
will only tell the boss what they want the boss to know (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
It has been argued that the more control is exercised through pressure and sanctions, the less 
adequate the flow of information up the line will be. Indeed, pressure and sanctions make people 
feel threatened or vulnerable. When people feel threatened or vulnerable, they often take refuge 
in defensive routines to protect themselves and their colleagues from losing face. They will try to 
conceal errors and problems because the surfacing of these issues might put them in a bad light. 
They will engage in impression management and window-dressing techniques to make 
situations look better than they actually are. They will fail to report deep-rooted problems 
(Morgan, 2006b). 
The stakeholders of the organization 
In the private sector, sales and profits are important indicators for the performance of the 
organization. Public sector organizations, however, are often in a monopolistic position. Citizens 
often have no choice but to be clients of the public organization in question. Consequently, the 
market share or the number of provided services is not a good indicator for the performance of 
the organization. A better indicator is the customer’s satisfaction with and appreciation of the 
provided service. Customer satisfaction surveys may provide this type of feedback information. 
But also complaint management systems may provide insight into the areas of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction of the customers. 
Monitoring systems 
Performance measurement or monitoring refers to the collecting of information about selected 
aspects or factors in the context of policy and management. The process of monitoring has a 
systematic and continuous character. Information is systematically gathered by means of 
periodic measurements. Thus, monitoring can be a permanent source of information for 
managers and policymakers. However, it offers only descriptive information. Monitoring 
systems can report how well the current operations may be working, but it cannot explain the 
reasons for the success or failure (De Peuter, 2011). 
Katz & Kahn (1978) refer to a particular kind of monitoring, which they label ‘operational 
feedback’. They define operational feedback as “systematic information getting that is closely 
tied to the ongoing functions of the organization and is sometimes an integral part of those 
functions” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 455). For example: keeping record of the number of produced 
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units. This kind of information is generated by the operational unit involved and it flows back 
directly to that same unit. The major function of operational feedback is similar to the negative 
feedback function of the higher order mechanisms that keep cybernetic systems on course. In 
other words, it rings alarms when the actual performance deviates from the norm. The major 
limitation of operational feedback is that it can only report on how well the current operations 
may be working, but it cannot explain the reasons for their success or failure (Katz & Kahn, 
1978). 
Policy evaluation 
Evaluation can be defined as “the systematic and objective determination of the worth or merit 
of an object” (Scriven, quoted in De Peuter, 2011, 112) or as “a structured process that creates 
and synthesizes information intended to reduce the level of uncertainty for stakeholders about a 
given program or policy. It is intended to answer questions or test hypotheses […]” (McDavid & 
Howthorn, quoted in De Peuter, 2011, 112). 
Thus, unlike monitoring, evaluation is capable of answering how and why questions and of 
finding relations and giving explanations. It possesses specific techniques and approaches to 
answer these kinds of questions (De Peuter, 2011). 
De Peuter (2011) argues that often, monitoring and evaluation are complementary. For example, 
the policy evaluation process may determine which types of information are needed in order to 
answer the questions asked. In these cases, monitoring systems may prove to be important 
sources of information (De Peuter, 2011). 
Whereas monitoring has a systematic and ongoing character, policy evaluations are mostly ad 
hoc events (De Peuter, 2011). 
Ombudsmen reports and (performance) audits 
Just like policy evaluations, ombudsmen reports and performance audits may provide public 
sector organizations with feedback information about important performance dimensions. 
However, there are important differences between policy evaluation on the one hand and 
ombudsmen and audit offices on the other. 
Desomer, Put & Van Loocke (2013) and D’hoedt & Bouckaert (2011) address these differences. 
First and foremost, policy evaluations are generally performed in a client-contractor 
relationship. This has important consequences for the independence of the evaluator. Since most 
policy evaluations are executed at the request of the client (often the government or the 
administration), the evaluator’s independence is often limited by the terms of reference (scope of 
the research, research questions, norms and standards, etc.) formulated by the client. 
Furthermore, it may be harder for the evaluator to obtain access to sensitive documents. Not to 
forget, the client is the owner of the evaluation report and can therefore decide not to make the 
report accessible to the public (D’hoedt & Bouckaert, 2011; Desomer, Put & Van Loocke, 2013). 
Ombudsmen and audit offices, on the other hand, perform their activities in a context of public 
accountability. More precisely, ombudsmen and audit offices are often charged by a political 
principal (parliament or the government) to exercise some kind of oversight over an agent (the 
government or the administration). They are, so to speak, auxiliary mechanisms to aid political 
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principals to oversee their administrative agents (Bovens, 2005a; Bovens, 2005b). The mandates 
of ombudsmen and audit offices are therefore based on the premise of independence. Their 
investigations are performed according to their own frames of reference (scope, research 
questions, norms and standards, etc.), and without the organization under scrutiny asking for it. 
Moreover, their reports are always made public (D’hoedt & Bouckaert, 2011; Desomer, Put & 
Van Loocke, 2013). 
2.4.4.2. The focus of the feedback 
Goal-seeking feedback vs. goal-changing feedback 
Goal-seeking feedback gives information about the degree to which the stated goals are 
achieved. Goal-seeking feedback is characteristic of single-loop learning. This kind of feedback 
does not challenge the purpose of the system: goals, beliefs, values and conceptual frameworks 
(‘the governing values’) are taken for granted without critical reflection. It may solve problems 
but ignores the question of why the problem arose in the first place. Goal-changing feedback, by 
contrast, does question the appropriateness of the stated goals and the underlying norms and 
assumptions. This kind of feedback is characteristic of double-loop learning and may lead to 
discontinuous change and innovation (Van der Knaap, 1995; Morgan, 2006b). 
Internal vs. external perspective 
The focus of the feedback may be on issues of internal design or on the relationship between the 
organization and the environment. To make this argument more clear, let us introduce Figure 7, 
which depicts the management and policy cycle as an open system model. 
De Peuter (2011) explains the logics of this model: Government is confronted with societal 
needs. In response to these needs, the government articulates policy objectives, both at the 
strategic and the operational level. Public sector organizations are charged with the fulfilment of 
these objectives. In order to do this, the organization needs inputs (raw materials, human 
resources, information and financial resources). In the subsequent transformation process, these 
inputs are transformed into products and services (output). These outputs are exported back 
into the environment. They are intended to have an impact on the societal needs, which were the 
reason for the initiation of the policy initiative (De Peuter, 2011). 
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Figure 6: Management and policy cycle as an open system model 
 
 
Source: De Peuter, 2011, 109 
Feedback about the internal design of the organization is preoccupied with techniques and 
making techniques more efficient. Attention is focused on ‘input’, ‘processes’, ‘output’ and their 
interrelationships. Relevant questions are: Could we do what we are currently doing in more 
productive ways, do it cheaper, use alternative methods or approaches for the same objectives? 
Other forms of feedback are more concerned with the functioning of the system in relation to its 
changing environment. Attention will be focused on the societal needs and the societal effects of 
policies. Relevant topics are, among others: the study of environmental trends and needs, the 
impact of the organization and its policies on the environment, including both the intended and 
the usually unanticipated consequences (Katz & Kahn, 1978; De Peuter, 2011). 
Functioning of a subsystem vs. functioning of the total system 
Some types of feedback focus solely on the functioning of a single subsystem, while others focus 
on the system as a whole and on the interrelationship of the subsystems within the total system. 
A scope which is too limited, may lead to sub-optimization. For example, the improvement of a 
sub-system at the expense of the organization as a whole (Van Loocke & Put, 2010). 
 Accountability 2.5.
 What is public accountability? 2.5.1.
According to Schillemans & Bovens (2011), a distinction can be made between accountability as 
a virtue and accountability as a social relation or a mechanism. Accountability used in the sense 
of virtue is a normative concept. It refers to a set of standards used to evaluate the behaviour of 
(public) actors. ‘Being accountable’ or ‘acting in an accountable way’ is seen as a positive 
characteristic of public officials or organizations. It is a similar virtue as being responsive and 
responsible, and being willing to act in a transparent and fair way. Accountability defined as a 
social relationship or mechanism, on the other hand, refers to ‘being held accountable’ and 
involves an obligation of an actor to explain and justify its conduct to a significant other 
(Schillemans & Bovens, 2011). In this contribution, we will use accountability in the latter sense.  
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2.4.5.1. The fundamental notion of accountability 
Many authors have offered theoretical contributions and definitions of accountability. We will 
discuss and compare three of them. We start with the influential definition of the ‘Utrecht 
School’ of accountability3, and consider some amendments and additions made by Lindberg 
(2013), who very recently conducted a literature review about accountability. We then contrast 
this with the dimensions of accountability suggested by Koppell (2005). 
‘Utrecht School’ of accountability & Lindberg 
Underlying the concept of accountability, is the principle of delegating authority to an agent, 
evaluating the performance of the agent, and applying sanctions if the performance is 
substandard. To paraphrase Lindberg, the basic idea of accountability is this: when decision-
making power is delegated from a principal to an agent, there must be a mechanism in place to 
hold the agent accountable for its decisions and if necessary to sanction the agent (Lindberg, 
2013). Thus, at a basic level, accountability is closely associated with authority. An actor who is 
merely executing orders without any discretionary power, cannot be a legitimate object of 
accountability (Lindberg, 2013). 
According to the ‘Utrecht School’ of accountability, which has been very influential in the study 
of this topic, accountability can be defined as a relationship between an actor (who can be either 
an individual person or an organization) and a forum (which can be either an individual person, 
an organization or a virtual entity (e.g. a God)) in which the actor has or feels an obligation 
(which can be either formal, informal or even self-imposed) to explain and justify his or her 
conduct to the forum, in which the forum can pose additional questions and pass judgment, after 
which the actor may face consequences (Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008, 225; Bovens, 
2005a, 184-185). 
As Bovens (2005a) indicates, this definition reveals at least three elements of an account giving 
relationship: information, debate and judgment. The element of information implies that the 
actor has or feels an obligation to inform the forum about his or her behaviour or performance. 
When a failure or an incident has occurred, the provision of information is often not sufficient, 
and has to be supplemented with explanation and justification for the failure. In response, the 
forum may initiate a debate with the actor, by discussing and questioning the quality and 
adequacy of the information or the appropriateness and legitimacy of the behaviour. Finally, it is 
not unusual that the forum renders judgment on the behaviour or performance of the actor. 
Furthermore, a negative verdict by the forum may result in some sort of sanction (Bovens, 
2005a). 
However, according to Bovens (2005b), not all elements are equally crucial in this definition. In 
essence, in order to qualify a relationship as an accountability relationship, it suffices that the 
actor, has or feels an obligation to inform the forum about his conduct. The accountability 
relationship gains weight when the forum has the possibility to pose further questions and to 
pass judgment about the performance of the actor. The most severe form of accountability arises 
when the forum has the opportunity to impose formal or informal sanctions on the occasion of a 
negative judgment (Bovens, 2005b). 
                                                             
3 Mark Bovens and his colleagues Thomas Schillemans and Paul ‘t Hart. 
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In addition to the definition of the ‘Utrecht School’, and also somewhat in deviation from it, 
Staffan I Lindberg identifies five defining characteristics of accountability: 
 An agent or institution (A for agent) who has an obligation to give an account 
 An area or domain (D for domain) subject to accountability 
 An agent or institution (P for principal) to whom A has to give account 
 The right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions with regard to D 
The right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform, explain or justify decisions with regard to D 
(Lindberg, 2013) 
Figure 7: Accountability of the actor by the forum 
 
Source: Bovens, 2005a, 186 
The right of P to sanction A for failing to provide the requested information or explanation is 
considered by Lindberg to be an essential defining characteristic of accountability. Lindberg 
convincingly argues that excluding this right from the definition would reduce the notion of 
accountability. Indeed, without the possibility of sanctions, decision-makers and actors would 
only disclose and explain their conduct to a level with which they themselves feel comfortable 
(Lindberg, 2013). 
The definition of Lindberg differs somewhat from the definition of the Utrecht School with 
regard to condition 5. In the definition of Lindberg, the right of P to sanction is limited to the 
right to sanction A for failing to provide the requested information or explanation (Lindberg, 
2013). In the definition of the Utrecht School, by contrast, the right of P to sanction is extended 
to the right to sanction A for (the (in)appropriateness and/or (il)legitimacy of) the conduct itself. 
However, this extension of the definition is mitigated by the fact that Bovens et al. do not 
consider this right to be an essential defining characteristic of accountability (Bovens, 2005b). 
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Koppell  
Koppell (2005) proposes five dimensions of accountability: transparency, liability, 
controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness. The first two dimensions of accountability 
(transparency and liability) are considered by Koppell to be fundamental, supporting notions of 
accountability. Transparency refers to the idea that an accountable actor must disclose and/or 
explain its conduct (Koppell, 2005). This dimension is closely related to the ‘information phase’ 
in the definition of the ‘Utrecht School’. Liability refers to the possibility of sanctions: 
accountable actors may face consequences that are attached to performance (Koppell, 2005). 
The other three dimensions of accountability are labelled by Koppell as the substantive 
conceptions of accountability. Controllability refers to the idea that accountable public 
organizations should carry out the will of the people as expressed through their elected 
representatives. The key question is: did the organization follow the orders of its principal? 
Responsibility refers to the idea that accountable public actors should not simply follow orders, 
but should also be guided and constrained in their conduct by laws, rules, norms, and 
professional and moral standards. Finally, public organizations may be called responsive if they 
meet the needs and demands of the population they are serving (Koppell, 2005). 
Lindberg is sceptical about these three so called substantive conceptions of accountability. He 
argues that controllability, responsibility and responsiveness may be desired outcomes or after-
effects of some types of accountability relationships, but that these conceptions should not be 
understood as integral to the notion of accountability itself (Lindberg, 2013). 
2.4.5.2. Classifications of public accountability 
There are many ways to classify types of accountability. According to Bovens (2005b), four 
guiding questions may be asked: Who should give account? To whom? Why? About what? 
The ‘to whom’ question makes a distinction between types of forums. Bovens distinguishes 
between (1) political accountability: account giving along the chain of political principal-agent 
relationships, that is to say towards ministers, elected representatives, and ultimately voters; (2) 
legal accountability: account giving towards civil or administrative courts; (3) administrative 
accountability: account giving towards auditors, ombudsmen, inspectors and controllers; (4) 
professional accountability: account giving towards (associations of) professional peers; and (5) 
societal accountability: account giving towards citizens, interest groups, the media (Bovens, 
2005a, 2005b). 
The who question is referred to by Dennis Thompson as the problem of many hands: “Because 
many different officials contribute in many ways to decisions and policies of government, it is 
difficult even in principle to identify who is morally responsible for political outcomes” (D. 
Thompson, quoted in Bovens, 2005a, p. 189). Bovens identifies a number of accountability 
strategies for forums to deal with the problem of many hands: 
- Corporate accountability: many public organizations are considered to be corporate 
bodies with independent legal status. In this capacity, the organization can be held 
accountable as a unitary actor. Legal and administrative forums often apply this strategy. 
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- Hierarchical accountability: this strategy is dominant in organizational and political 
accountability relations. Towards the outside world, the minister or the senior civil 
servant takes complete responsibility for the actions of the units under their authority. 
- Individual accountability: this strategy, which is typical for professional accountability, is 
based on strict individual accountability. Each individual is held accountable for his or 
her personal contribution to the conduct of the organization (Bovens, 2005a, 2005b). 
The why question relates to the nature of the obligation: why does the actor feel compelled to 
give account? Bovens (2005b) makes a distinction between diagonal, vertical and horizontal 
accountability. First of all, the relationship between actor and forum may be a vertical one. If this 
is the case, the forum has formal and hierarchical powers over the actor and can force the actor 
to give account. Most forms of political and legal accountability are characterized by this kind of 
vertical relationship between actor and forum. Alternatively, actor and forum may find 
themselves in a horizontal relationship. When this is the case, there is no formal obligation on 
behalf of the actor to give account. Account is given on a voluntary basis. Societal accountability 
is a typical example of this. Finally, there is the possibility of an intermediate form: diagonal 
accountability. An accountability relationship may be qualified as diagonal when there is neither 
a strict hierarchical relationship, nor pure voluntariness (Bovens, 2005b). 
Administrative accountability mechanisms frequently qualify as diagonal forms of 
accountability. For example, ombudsmen are often charged by a political principal (a minister or 
parliament) to exercise some kind of oversight over an agent and to report their findings to the 
principal. There is, however, no direct hierarchical relationship between the ombudsman and 
the organization under scrutiny (Bovens, 2005b). Typically, ombudsman offices do not have the 
right to sanction the agents for their actions or to coerce them into compliance. However, they 
can often use the courts to sanction agents if they fail to provide the requested information or 
explanations (Lindberg, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Horizontal, vertical and diagonal accountability 
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Source: Bovens, 2005a, 197 
Fourth, one can ask the question about what aspect of the conduct information and explanation 
is required. Some accountability arrangements may focus on legal compliance, while others may 
focus on financial correctness, and still others on the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy. 
Another possible distinction is that between accountability for the process and accountability for 
the product (Bovens, 2005b). 
The four guiding questions of Bovens may be supplemented by two additional dimensions, 
raised by Radin & Romzek (1996) and echoed by Lindberg (2013). A first dimension relates to 
the source of the accountability relationship. The accountability holder (or principal) can be 
internal or external to the agent being held accountable. For example, when a manager of an 
agency asks his or her subordinates to justify their behaviour, the source of the accountability 
relationship is internal. On the other hand, when voters hold their representatives to account, 
the source of the accountability relationship can be labelled as external. The second dimension is 
the degree of control exercised by the forum over the actor. This may vary from extremely 
detailed control and close scrutiny based on specific rules and regulations, to highly diffuse 
control and minimal scrutiny (Lindberg, 2013; Koppell, 2005). 
In addition to these six guiding questions, we would like to include a seventh one: the degree of 
publicness of the account giving. Pure public accountability is done in public. This means that the 
account giving is not done discretely, behind closed doors, but instead that it is open or at least 
accessible to citizens and the general public. Information about the conduct of the agent is 
widely available, the interrogations and debates are accessible to the public and the forum 
discloses its judgment (Bovens, 2005a). However, most organizational forms of accountability 
are strictly speaking not public. The account giving done by civil servants towards their 
superiors is a form of internal account giving which is usually not accessible to the public at 
large (Bovens, 2005a). Nevertheless, these internal, organizational forms of accountability can 
also be important levers or inhibitors for organizational learning and change. 
2.4.5.3. The functions of accountability mechanisms 
Central to the concept of accountability, is the idea that when decision-making power is 
transferred from a principal to an agent, there must be a mechanism in place for holding the 
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agent accountable for its decisions and if necessary to sanction the agent (Lindberg, 2013). 
Therefore, the first and foremost function of public accountability is democratic control and 
oversight by the political principal over the delegated powers exercised by their agents (Bovens, 
2005a, 2005b). 
In recent decades, the rise of (quasi) autonomous agencies has weakened the ministerial powers 
of oversight and control, thereby undermining the principle of ministerial responsibility, and 
creating a political accountability gap. Indeed, ministers remain formally answerable to 
parliament for the performance of these agencies, yet in practice, they are structurally 
uninformed about their day to day operations. Partly in reaction to this rising accountability gap, 
ombudsmen and audit offices have been created as auxiliary mechanisms to aid political 
principals to oversee their administrative agents (Bovens, 2005a). 
A second function of public accountability is to protect and/or enhance the integrity of public 
governance. The assumption is that, by securing information disclosure and justification, public 
managers are deterred from misusing their delegated powers (Bovens, 2005a).  
A third crucial function is the learning and improvement function of accountability mechanisms 
(Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000). Indeed, many ombudsmen and audit offices explicitly indicate in 
their mission statements that their goal is not only to oversee government performance, but also 
to help public service organizations to improve their performance (Van Loocke & Put, 2010). In 
the next section, we will explore in what ways accountability arrangements can foster learning 
behaviour and improvement in public sector organizations. 
 The potential contribution of (administrative) accountability mechanisms  2.5.2.
In this section, we will argue that a number of features of accountability mechanisms have the 
potential to foster learning, improvement, and innovation in public sector organizations. These 
features are notably: the provision of feedback information, the provocation of reflection, the 
provocation of debate, the public nature of the account giving, and the possibility of sanctions 
and/or rewards. The former three features relate to the cognitive development of public sector 
organizations. The latter two pertain to the behavioural dimension of learning: the motivation of 
public sector organizations to pursue actual improvements and changes. 
2.5.2.1. Information, reflection, and debate  
In the accountability literature, it is argued that a public accountability arrangement, if 
organized in an appropriate way, confronts public managers on a regular basis with feedback 
information about their own organization and stimulates both ‘accountors’ and ‘accountees’ to 
reflect upon and to debate about the successes and failures of past policies, both separately and 
in dialogue with one another (Bovens, 2005b, 47; Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008, 233). The 
literature about learning teaches us that these three features – the provision of feedback 
information, the provocation of reflection, and the provocation of debate – may induce cognitive 
development and thus learning. 
To begin with, the provision of feedback about past performances is crucial to corrective system 
learning. Indeed, on the basis of information about the outcomes and effectiveness of its actions, 
a policy actor can correct its errors and improve its overall functioning (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
Moreover, the stimuli emanating from the feedback information may lead to the feeling of 
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cognitive dissonance which may induce the policy actor to reflect on the appropriateness of 
policies and their underlying policy theories (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
In the definition of accountability by the Utrecht School, information about the actions of the 
actor is provided by the actor to the forum. However, in the case of administrative accountability 
forums such as ombudsmen and audit offices, the feedback information will often be gathered 
and processed by the forum. Ideally, the forum gathers information about the actions of the 
actor, processes this information into a clear and accurate diagnosis of important performance 
dimensions, and confronts the actor with it. Subsequently, the accountability arrangement may 
provide a setting which allows the initiation of a debate between the actors, the forum, and key 
stakeholders about past performances of the actor (Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008). 
In this debating phase, alternative viewpoints may be confronted, and mutual efforts of 
persuasion and argumentation may be made. In this way, the individuals participating in the 
dialectic connection are stimulated to reflect on their existing cognitive schemata (Van der 
Knaap, 1995). 
Furthermore, by providing a potential dissonant voice, the forum might break the possible 
conformist patterns of thought within the organization under scrutiny (D’hoedt & Bouckaert, 
2011). Indeed, organizations tend to persist in what they do because the members of an 
organization often share the same set of beliefs and values, and because it occurs to no-one to 
question the existing ways of doing things. Sources from outside the organization are often 
thought to be in a better position to challenge existing perspectives and paradigms, and to 
question long-held assumptions and behaviours (Lam, 2006; Salge & Vera, 2012). Accountability 
mechanisms such as ombudsmen and audit offices, which are thought to be independent 
institutions, seem to be in an appropriate position to provide such a voice if necessary. In short, 
accountability mechanisms may challenge the status quo by provoking open mindedness and 
reflection in political and administrative systems that might otherwise be primarily inward-
looking (in ‘t Veld et al., 1991 – in Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008). 
2.5.2.2. The public nature of the account giving and the possibility of 
sanctions  
The public nature of the account giving may foster competition 
The provision of feedback information and alternative viewpoints, and the provocation of 
reflection and debate may contribute to the cognitive development of public sector 
organizations: i.e. the developments of insights and cognitive associations, change in states of 
knowledge, and increased understanding of causal relationships. However, new insights and 
ideas are not always turned into new practices. A necessary condition for the conversion of new 
ideas into new practices is the willingness of public sector organizations to improve. 
This willingness should be inherent to the government. Indeed, the power to govern a people 
comes from the people. As a consequence, every government has the inherent obligation to 
govern its subjects as well as possible (Van Gunsteren, 1985). This implies that a government 
should always try to improve its public policies and services (Van der Knaap, 1995). 
However, many observers indicate that competition is one of the most important incentives for 
improvement and innovation (cf. supra). Organizations in a competitive environment can only 
survive if they are able to create new products, new services, more efficient production methods, 
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better and more efficient ways of delivering services, and so on. It is argued that since the public 
sector lacks competition, it also lacks incentives to improve and to innovate (Bekkers et al., 
2011). 
Bekkers et al. (2013) observed that other scholars disagree. They indicate that, although 
government is mainly in a monopolistic position, there is a trend of increasing market-like 
competition in the public sector. For example, due to the privatization and liberalization of 
specific service domains, which were formerly the exclusive terrain of government, public sector 
organizations increasingly have to compete with private organizations (Bekkers et al., 2013). As 
a consequence, public sector organizations increasingly have to pay attention to the quality, 
effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness of their services in order to survive. Secondly, 
Bekkers et al. (2013) indicate that regions and cities are increasingly competing with each other 
in terms attracting citizens, tourists, etc. The quality of services is an important source of 
competitive advantage is this contest (Bekkers et al., 2013). Thirdly, due to the decline of the 
importance of ideology and due to the depillarisation, voters have become increasingly 
footloose, pushing political parties to attract voters with the promise and proof of good 
governance (Bekkers et al., 2013). In other words, the improvement of the quality, effectiveness, 
efficiency and responsiveness of services and policies has increasingly become an issue of 
competition between regions, cities and political parties. 
Moreover, several arrangements have been developed that make the quality and outcomes of 
public services more transparent. As a consequence, the performances of public sector entities 
are increasingly subject to comparison, both within the public sector and between the public and 
the private sector. Obvious examples of such arrangements are benchmarking systems and 
league tables (Bekkers et al., 2013). However, public accountability arrangements such as 
ombudsmen and audit offices may also provide such transparency. Indeed, the account giving is 
done in public, meaning that it is open or at least accessible to citizens (Bovens, 2005a). The fact 
that the quality and outcomes of public services and policies are made transparent, in 
combination with the increase of (quasi-)competitive elements in the public sector, may act as 
an incentive for service improvements (Bekkers et al., 2013). 
However, there is also a downside to this transparency and competition. As Hartley & Benington 
(2006) rightfully point out, the increased competition between public sector organizations is 
detrimental to the possibilities of inter-organizational learning. Exactly because public sector 
organizations are increasingly subjected to competition over reputation and resources, they 
tend to become less willing to share good practices, experiences, ideas and knowledge, which 
puts a brake on the dissemination of successful innovations (Hartley & Benington, 2006). 
The possibility of sanctions and/or rewards may motivate public authorities to raise their games 
Not only may the public nature of the account giving constitute an incentive for public managers 
to do better. The possibility of getting sanctioned for errors or shortcomings may also motivate 
public authorities to reevaluate their products and processes, and to search for more efficient 
and/or effective manners of organizing them (Bovens, Schillemans and Hart, 2008).  
This argument was worked out in a detailed fashion by Wynen, Verhoest, Ongaro & van Thiel 
(2014). In fact, Wynen et al. assert that this idea is at the core of NPM: 
  
 
Feedback, accountability & learning in public innovation 
 
  
LIPSE Research Report # 3 51 
“In exchange for autonomy, public organizations (or their CEOs) would be held 
accountable by their minister and parliament for their performance and sanctioned 
or rewarded accordingly. […] It was believed that an increase in managerial 
autonomy combined with result control would, among others, stimulate a more 
innovation-oriented culture and ultimately lead to an increase of performance” 
(Wynen et al., 2014, 45). 
In essence, the argument can be summarized as ‘letting managers manage’, and ‘making 
managers manage’. Managerial autonomy provides public managers with the possibility and the 
latitude to experiment, to innovate, and to manage. As a complement, result control provides 
public managers with the pressure and the incentive to do so. Indeed, holding agencies 
accountable for their performance and linking result-achievement with sanctions and rewards 
stimulates or even forces managers to pursue higher levels of performance, quality and 
efficiency. This pressure may result in an (intensified) search for innovative ways to deliver 
services and to organize processes (Wynen et al., 2014). 
However, an accountability regime which is too rigorous and focuses too harshly on mistakes 
and sanctions, may discourage entrepreneurship, risk-taking, initiative and creativity. Mistakes 
and failures are part of any learning process. Innovation can be seen as a journey which is not 
linear and rational but which leads to dead-ends, mistakes, setbacks, and obstacles. When an 
accountability mechanism focuses to harshly on sanctions for making ‘mistakes’ or for not 
realizing immediate results, public managers will learn to avoid risk-taking, and to shield 
themselves against potential mistakes and criticism (Van Loocke & Put, 2010; Bovens, 2005a; 
Behn, 2001; Bekkers et al., 2013; Hartley, 2005). 
In addition, performance targets that are too static, may lead to the continuation of existing ways 
of working, to stagnation, and to the inhibition of innovation (Wynen et al., 2014). 
2.5.2.3. Why do (administrative) accountability mechanisms have the 
potential to stifle learning and innovation in public sector organizations? 
Thus far, we have discussed the possible ways in which (administrative) accountability 
mechanisms may contribute to learning, improvement, and innovation in public sector 
organizations. We should, however, take into account that accountability mechanisms, when 
organized in an inappropriate way, may also have detrimental effects on learning, improvement, 
and innovation. In this section, we will briefly discuss some possible dysfunctions of 
accountability mechanisms, insofar as they are relevant to the goal of learning and improving. 
 Formalism and goal displacement. An accountability regime which is too rigorous, may 
turn public institutions into formalistic bureaucracies which are obsessed with 
conformity with rules and procedures. Instead of a means to provide insight in and 
reflection about performances and processes, the account giving may become a goal in 
itself (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 2005). 
 Perverted behaviour and window dressing. An accountability regime which is too 
rigorous, may encourage perverted behaviour. Public managers may get better at 
fulfilling the requirements imposed by their accountability forums. However this does 
not necessarily mean that the actual performance of these public organizations in terms 
of policy-making and public service delivery will also improve. The managers may create 
a façade of plans, procedures and goals to satisfy the forum, while behind the façade, 
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everything continues as before (Van Loocke & Put, 2010; Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 
2008). 
 Tunnel vision and sub-optimization. Accountability forums may systematically focus on 
certain aspects, while ignoring others. For example, focusing on performance, but 
ignoring legality; focusing on technical aspects, but ignoring human aspects. 
Furthermore, a scope which is too limited, may lead to sub-optimization. For example, 
the improvement of a sub-system at the expense of the organization as a whole (Van 
Loocke & Put, 2010). 
 Rigidity and paralysis. An accountability regime which is too rigorous and focuses too 
harshly on mistakes and sanctions, may discourage entrepreneurship, risk-taking, 
initiative and creativity. Mistakes and failures are part of any learning process. 
Innovation can be seen as a journey which is not linear and rational but which leads to 
dead-ends, mistakes, setbacks, and obstacles. When an accountability mechanism 
focuses to harshly on sanctions for making ‘mistakes’ or for not realizing immediate 
results, public managers will learn to avoid risk-taking, and to shield themselves against 
potential mistakes and criticism (Van Loocke & Put, 2010; Bovens, 2005a; Behn, 2001; 
Bekkers et al., 2013; Hartley, 2005). 
 Conflicting expectations. Actors may be confronted with different accountability forums, 
each with its own set of evaluation criteria. These sets may be partially overlapping, but 
also partially diverging, and even mutually contradictory. It may be difficult to combine 
these different expectations or to prioritize between them. As a consequence, 
organizations trying to meet conflicting expectations are likely to end up in a state of 
dysfunctional paralysis. They tend to oscillate between behaviours which are consistent 
with conflicting notions of accountability (Schillemans & Bovens, 2011; Koppell, 2005; 
Bovens, Schillemans & ‘t Hart, 2008). 
 Conclusion 2.6.
If the above literature review is to make one thing clear, it is that Feedback, Accountability and 
Learning are extremely complex and multi-facetted concepts. It is therefore perhaps necessary 
to sum up the most significant factors. A complete, schematic overview, can be found in Annex II. 
For Learning, the idea of individual and organizational learning are strongly intertwined.  
Concepts such as cybernetics, organizational memory and knowledge management strongly 
focus on the organizational level, whereas psychological safety and social learning (amongst 
others) lean more towards the individual level of learning. The fact of the matter is that 
organizations are made up of individuals, that individuals function within structures, hierarchies 
and organizations, and that both levels influence each other. By looking at inter-organizational 
learning, we can add a third level as well. Just as people learn from other people, organizations 
can learn from other organizations. How people and organizations learn from their own and 
others’ past experiences can strongly influence the potential for innovation. Doing something 
new, and improving standing processes and/or products requires learning from the past and the 
status quo. As logical as this sounds, this is complex when one dives into the literature. Learning 
is perhaps the most elaborately researched dimension in our FAL-model, resulting in the largest 
number of factors to potentially influence social innovation. 
Feedback is an equally indispensable part of the internal processes in an organization’s 
endeavour to innovate. Although fewer concepts have been put forward by the literature 
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regarding feedback, most are multifaceted. Besides the effect of feedback on goals and objectives 
(Cybernetics), organizations can build mental and physical walls when receiving feedback 
information (Autopoiesis). Finally, the source of the feedback and the focus of the feedback can 
greatly contribute to the effect it has on innovation processes. Feedback forms a step prior to 
learning and innovation. Before learning and innovation can take place, getting information, 
from which you can then learn, is obviously essential. The question remains where this 
information comes from. 
One of the places where feedback information can be derived from is an accountability 
mechanism, or several of these mechanisms. Being held accountable obligates an organization to 
self-evaluate, and external accountability provides the organization with feedback information 
on its performance. Who specifically is held accountable, to whom one is held accountable, and 
the degree of publicness of this accountability process are only a few of the factors which 
determine how this dimension influences the innovation processes of public organizations.  
Together, Feedback, Accountability and Learning form integral parts of a cyclical process in 
which an organization self-evaluates, receives information, perceives it, and learns from it. Or 
not. The question which remains now is how these dimensions actually function within public 
organizations during the one cycle we observe. When we put this mechanism as simply as 
possible, it means that the non-existence of the FAL-model within an organization, leads to the 
non-existence of sustainable social innovation. Or, put in more logical terms: 
F + A + L   Sustainable Social Innovations (1) 
¬ F + ¬ A + ¬ L  ¬ Sustainable Social Innovations (0) 
The above summed-up factors will need to be translated into survey questions, and a further 
methodology will need to be designed in order to measure the factors in public organizations, to 
connect these factors with concrete innovations, and finally to assess the influence of other, 
external factors on the innovations and innovation processes of public sector organizations. In 
the next chapter we will lay out the methodology we used in our research on the processes 
influencing the sustainability of innovations, and further explain how our FAL-model should be 
placed in the complete lifecycle of an innovation. 
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 Methodology 3.
 
As mentioned in the introduction, our research into the factors influencing the sustainability of 
social innovations can be roughly divided into two parts: a quantitative part (focusing on the 
analysis of awarded organizations) and a qualitative part (focusing on the influence of 
Ombudsmen and SAIs on social innovation). We focus our research around the previously 
mentioned INUS-condition: ((FAL, X) or Y  Z). With the survey we try to get a quantitative 
picture of the ‘FAL’-variable in this formula, whilst with the qualitative research we try to map 
the influence and form of both X and Y. In this way the qualitative and quantitative parts of our 
research come together and form one research methodology in discussing the explanatory 
power of this INUS-condition.  
Put in more schematic terms, we can visualize the effect of the FAL-model on innovation through 
time: 
Figure 9: An innovation’s lifecycle 
  
The above visualized cycle is theoretically never ending. After an innovation (P) has started (in 
our case when the award has been given, used as a proxy), the FAL-dimensions will influence its 
future, leading to an explicit decision about its future, or the innovation withers away. After the 
decision about its future has been made, the innovation can either be changed, or left operating 
in its current form. When changed, the FAL-dimensions will again influence its future, as they 
are factors which constantly and permanently influence the processes, products and services of 
the organization. Considering limits in the scope and reach of our research, we will only 
investigate one of these cycles, but on a large-N basis. Future research should try to see the 
influence of the FAL-model throughout the entire life-cycle of an innovation, most likely with 
qualitative, narrative research methods such as process tracing. 
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Hereunder we discuss the adopted methodology for both parts, including the consequences our 
choices have on the results and conclusions we can draw. 
 Quantitative Methodology: The survey 3.1.
In order to investigate the nature of European innovations (What do they focus on? At what level 
of government do they take place? In which policy field?), and in order to get a good sample for 
our survey, we formed a database of Belgian, French, Dutch, Slovakian, Romanian and British 
administrative projects and practices which were recognized as best practices. We specifically 
looked at national and international conferences and awards on excellence, innovation and/or 
quality in the public sector. We claim that these best practices are reasonable proxies for 
innovations. Indeed, the novelty of the submitted projects is an often-used criterion in the 
selection procedure for these conferences and awards. In addition, various researchers, mainly 
from the United States and Canada, have used public service (innovation) awards in academic 
research on innovation.4 This, however, has some implications. Most importantly, it means that 
we investigate the top of the class. Awarded organizations can be expected to be excelling 
organizations, with a high probability that their innovations are sustainable. Made visual, we can 
look at our sample as follows, with 1 indicating a surviving/sustainable innovation, and 0 
indicating a disappeared innovation: 
Figure 10: Innovation sample, versus innovation population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When interpreting our findings and analysing our conclusions, this sample characteristic should 
always be kept in mind. Although focusing on this class of award winning organizations is a 
pragmatic choice in order to identify individual social innovations, this focus on best/good 
practices can nevertheless result in great insight into the functioning of innovations after they 
have been initiated. 
The criteria used to select conferences and awards were the following: 
 Recurring prizes and conferences are retained; one-off prizes and conferences are not; 
                                                             
4 E.g.: Borins, 2000, 2001, 2008; Gow, 1992; Glor, 1998; Rangarajan, 2008; Golden, 1990; Bernier et al., 
2014. 
  
 
Feedback, accountability & learning in public innovation 
 
  
LIPSE Research Report # 3 56 
 Prizes for innovative or excellent administrative projects and practices are retained; 
prizes for innovative or excellent policy-programs are not.  
 
This resulted in the following sources of best practices: 
International sources: 
 European Public Sector Awards 
 CAF Good Practices Database 
 Quality Conferences for Public Administrations in the EU 
 United Nationals Public Service Awards 
 RegioStars Awards 
 
Belgian sources: 
 Quality Conferences for Public Administrations in Belgium 
 Belgian eGovernment Awards 
 
French sources: 
 Victoire acteurs publics prix 
 Paroles d’élus 
 Interconnectes France 
 
Dutch sources:  
 Innovatie Top 10 
 KING Best Gejat Prijs 
 Pink Roccade 
 Innovatieprijs Bedrijfsvoering 
 
Slovakian sources: 
 Slovak National Quality Prize 
 
Romanian sources: 
 National Agency of Civil Servants Conference 
 National Association of Public Sector IT Specialists 
 Romanian Prize for Quality – J.M. Juran Foundation 
 Parliamentary Committee for IT and Communications 
 
British sources: 
 Public Sector Sustainability Awards 
 APSE Service Awards 
 Improvement & Efficiency Awards 
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The criteria used to select best practice cases out of the winners of these awards were the 
following: 
 Cases that received some kind of recognition are included in our research population 
(mere submissions to awards and conferences that did not receive any kind of 
recognition were excluded from our research population); 
 Cases from 2003 onwards are included in our research population; cases from before 
2003 are excluded from our research population;5 
 Cases that involve one, maximum two public sector organizations are included in our 
research population; cases that involve networks of organizations are excluded from our 
research population.6 
 
Using these criteria and sources we found the following number of potential cases: 
Table 2: Survey sample 
Netherlands 34 UK 163 
Belgium 97 Romania 53 
France 470 Slovakia 28 
 
Total 845  
 
The large difference between the number of cases makes cross country comparisons difficult. 
We will be able, controlling for country effects, to draw conclusions over the sample as a whole. 
The first problem we encountered concerned the variation of information between the different 
sources. All awards are accompanied by some sort of case sheet, in which the case who won the 
award is described. From these case descriptions we can learn a lot about the nature of 
innovations and their origins. Unfortunately, the case databases of several of the awards we 
focused on had been lost by their organizations. It was then up to us to find and regroup this 
information. In addition, not all of the award organizations were willing to share this 
information with us, even though one of the purposes of these awards is to create a diffusion of 
good practices by putting the best ones in the limelight. Finally, the great variance in the amount 
of information included in these case descriptions forced us to limit our qualitative investigation 
into these cases to the lowest common denominator. Although we maximized the usability of our 
database, future research efforts should strive to maximize the extracted information from these 
case sheets.    
                                                             
5 The reason for this is that the older the case, the harder it gets to find suitable respondents for our 
survey. 
6 The reason for this is that our survey questions are attuned to assessing the attributes or sub-
dimensions of accountability, the learning organization and feedback in one single organization. To 
measure these in a network of organizations would require a substantially different survey tool. 
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The survey was created based on an elaborate literature survey on the factors underlying 
Feedback, Accountability and Learning as promotors of sustainable social innovations. This 
survey was designed and tested by the KU Leuven for its Flemish and Dutch cases. Afterwards 
the survey was translated into English and French by the KU Leuven, after which it was again 
translated into Romanian and Slovakian by SNSPA and UMB respectively.   
Having identified the cases which had been given an award, or who had otherwise been 
recognized as a good/best practice, our biggest obstacle remained: finding the right respondent, 
and convincing them to participate in our research. The earlier mentioned research by Pollitt, 
Bouckaert and Löffler (2007) found that over 60% of their respondents did not know what had 
happened to an innovation which had been presented at an innovation conference only 2 (!) 
years prior. We encountered similar problems. Many, if not most of the contacts mentioned on 
the case sheets no longer worked in the same organization. Finding respondents other than the 
ones mentioned on the case sheets required much calling, e-mailing, work, and eventually 
(wo)man-hours. Although we were able to maximize our response rate by calling and sending 
reminder-emails for some of the countries in our sample, we were less successful in others due 
to the limits of our resources. 
For each of the best practice cases in our research population, our research team would track 
down a public official who was willing and able to fill in the questionnaire. The ideal respondent 
was someone:  
- who still works in the organization 
- who was involved in the project/practice from an early stage, preferable in a leading role 
- who was sufficiently high in rank within the organization 
 
Finally, we developed a survey tool to map the patterns of change and innovation for the best 
practice cases in our research population and to measure the different attributes and (sub-) 
dimensions of our conceptual framework on the level of the organization. 
The first part of the survey focuses on the subsequent life courses of the cases in our research 
population after their recognition as best practices. We want to know what happened to these 
innovations in the medium and longer term. We based the variable outcomes on the dependent 
side in large part on the work of Hogwood and Peters (1982). We differentiate between the 
following outcomes: 
- The innovation is still operational, in its original form 
- The innovation is still operational, but has been transformed 
o Expanded (in scope, budget, geographical span, etc.) 
o Reduced  
- The innovation is no longer operational 
o Terminated by an explicit decision and replaced by something new 
o Terminated by an explicit decision, not replaced by something new 
o Terminated without an explicit decision (faded away) 
 
We inquire about the subsequent life courses of the cases by means of a number of closed 
questions. These closed questions are complemented with some open questions, allowing the 
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respondents to elaborate, for example on the nature of the transformations and on the reasons 
for those transformations. 
The remaining parts of the survey try to measure the different (sub-)dimensions of our 
conceptual framework. For each (sub-)dimension, we confront the respondent with a number of 
statements. 7 The respondents are asked to describe their own organizations by indicating their 
level of agreement with each of these statements on a five-point scale. These Likert-scale 
questions are complemented with a number of multiple choice questions. Annex III gives an 
overview of the survey items per (sub-)dimension of our conceptual framework, as presented in 
chapter two of this research report. Per question, the Likert-scale answers were transformed 
into scores: if a respondent answered most strongly affirmative, s/he would receive 5 points, 
and only 1 point for the most strongly negative answer. The addition of these scores than leads 
to an aggregate on the Feedback, Accountability and Learning dimensions. Finally, the aggregate 
is divided by the maximum attainable score, creating a variation between the minimally 
obtainable score and 1. By combining the three scores, you would be able to place all 
organizations under scrutiny in the following space:  
Figure 11: FAL-Space 
 
 
 
In theory, the best scoring cases lie in the top corner, whilst the lowest scoring cases (with, 
theoretically at least, the non-surviving innovations) can be found in the furthest, lowest corner. 
After the survey had run and reached the maximum amount of responses we thought 
pragmatically possible, we subjected it to statistical analysis, the results of which are presented 
in chapter four.  
 Qualitative Methodology: The interviews 3.2.
Where the survey focused on the FAL-variable in our INUS-condition, the qualitative part or our 
research tries to explain the influence and content of the remaining part: X and Y. To investigate 
the influence of Ombudsmen and SAIs on social innovations (X), we investigated a minimum of 
                                                             
7 Inspiration for the statements was drawn from the following publications: Garvin, D.A., Edmondson, A.C., 
& Gino, F. (2008) & Edmondson, A.C. (1999). 
  
 
Feedback, accountability & learning in public innovation 
 
  
LIPSE Research Report # 3 60 
eight cases per country, preferably equally divided between Ombud- and Audit reports. The 
cases are reports in which the audit organization proposes a number of improvements and 
recommendations for better performance. We consider these recommendations as both 
feedback information, learning opportunities and obviously part of accountability mechanisms, 
all focused at improvements and innovation in the administration of the respective 
organizations under scrutiny. The criteria for the reports to be eligible to be a part of our sample 
were the following: 
- Number of years since the publication of the report/recommendations 
o Sufficiently long ago: there has been enough time to take action on the 
recommendations 
o Not too long ago: a sufficient amount of people who worked in the organization 
under scrutiny or in the ombud/audit institution at the time of the report, are still 
working there 
o Ideally, three to four years after the publication of the reports (Weets, 2008) 
- The subject of the performance audit: matters of continuous policy instead of single 
projects 
- The gravity of the subject in terms of the budgets that are at stake 
- Variation regarding 
o Level of government: at least several reports should be focused on regional issues 
and/or organizations in order to A) reflect the tendency throughout Europe 
toward decentralization of government tasks, and B) to reflect the national 
political and administrative structures for countries such as Belgium and the 
United Kingdom 
o Policy area: at least several reports should be focused on public utility services 
 
It should be noted that not all of the criteria were met by all of our cases. The ability and 
willingness (or rather lack thereof) of some organizations on both sides of the audit forced us to 
choose some cases which were, for example, conducted in 2013, instead of the ideal time span of 
3-4 years. In chapter five of this research report, as well as in the individual country reports 
(annex V through VIII) we go deeper into the cases that were picked, and explain some of the 
difficulties we faced in trying to find respondents, reports and the cooperation of auditees 
and/or auditors. First, however, we defined the criteria for finding a report. 
After an extensive literature review we found and categorized a large number of factors which 
had been found to influence the impact of Ombudsmen and SAIs. We used these factors to form 
our interview protocol, which was identical for all countries and which was, like the survey, 
designed and tested by the KU Leuven, before being translated in the respective languages of our 
country sample. The list of factors, including references, can be found in annex IV, along with the 
structure of our interview protocol. We can summarize our focus of questions to be on two main, 
overarching factors: 
- The process in which the audits were conducted (formal/informal, cooperative/coercive) 
- The reputation/role of the Ombudsman or SAI (watchdog/advisor, high or low expertise)  
 
Using these criteria resulted in the following cases for the qualitative part of our research: 
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Table 3: Slovak Ombud- and Audit cases  
Slovakia 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI Municipalities Banovce and Bebravou Waste Management 2007-2008 
SAI Zilina, City transport organization Public Transport 2011 
SAI Municipality Raslavice Waste Management 2011 
SAI Municipality Huncovce Waste Management 2011 
SAI Municipality Druzstevna Waste Management 2011 
SAI Municipality Helpa Waste Management 2011 
SAI Municipality Spissky Waste Management 2011 
Ombudsman Ministry of the Interior Electronic Voting 2010 
 
 
Table 4: British Ombud- and Audit cases  
United 
Kingdom 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
NAO Ministry of Justice Financial Management 2011 
NAO 
Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs 
Financial Management 
2011 
PAC The BBC Trust Investment Policy 2014 
PHS 
Ombudsman 
Planning Inspectorate Compensation for Citizens 2012 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Boat Dwellers 2013 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Home Care 2011 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Community Assets 2012 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Use of Consultants 2011-2012 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Transportation of Students 2012 
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Table 5: Belgian Ombud- and Audit cases  
Belgium 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI Flemish Employment Bureau HR Policy 2011 
SAI Tax Inspection Bureau 
Organization and 
Functioning 
2010 
SAI 
Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Penitentiary Institutions 
HR Policy 2010 
SAI Agency for the European Social Fund Use of Resources 2010 
Federal 
Ombudsman 
Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Penitentiary Institutions  
Complaint Reports on 
Prisoner’s Rights 
2009-2012 
Flemish 
Ombudsman 
Flemish Tax Collecting Agency 
General Annual  
Complaints Report 
2006-2013 
Flemish 
Ombudsman 
De Lijn (Public Transport) 
General Annual  
Complaints Report 
2009-2012 
Flemish 
Ombudsman 
Flemish Agency for Housing 
General Annual  
Complaints Report 
2010-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Romanian Ombud- and Audit cases  
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Romania 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI 
National Agency on Fiscal 
Administration 
Collection of Taxes 2012 
SAI 
National Agency on Fiscal 
Administration 
Anti-Corruption Policies 2012 
SAI National Company for Forests Patrimony 2013 
SAI 
Romanian Radio Broadcasting 
Company 
General  2012 
SAI Romanian Television Company General 2012 
SAI 
National Authority for Administration 
and Regulation in Communication 
Performance Measurement 2012 
SAI 
National Company of Highways and 
National Roads 
Regional Infrastructure 2012 
SAI 
National Company of Highways and 
National Roads 
National Infrastructure 2012 
SAI Ministry of Education Management of Public Funds 2013 
SAI National Chamber of Pensions IT Policy 2011 
Ombudsman National Union of Veterans General 2009 
Ombudsman Ministry of Education Transport of Students 2013 
Ombudsman 
National Authority for Persons with 
Disabilities 
Safety of Persons with 
Disabilities 
2013 
 
Table 7: French Ombud- and Audit cases  
France 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI 
Council for the Environment and 
Sustainable Development 
Transport Safety 2012 
SAI 
Ministries of Finance, Employment 
and Social Affairs 
Social Security 2011 
SAI 
Ministries of Social Affairs, Health and 
Finance 
Anti-Smoking Policies 2012 
SAI 
Ministry for the Environment, 
Sustainable Development and Energy 
Renewable Energy 2013 
SAI 
Ministry of Education (Higher 
Education and Research) 
Sport 2013 
SAI 
Ministry of Culture and 
Communication 
Museums 2011 
SAI 
Council for the Environment and 
Sustainable Development 
Biofuels 2012 
Ombudsman Ministry of the Interior Police 2011 
Ombudsman 
Ministry for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Health 
Vaccination Policy 2010 
Ombudsman 
Ministry for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Health 
Accidents at Work 2010 
Ombudsman Public Prosecutor Retirement Policy 2010 
Ombudsman Public Prosecutor 
Policy on the Settling of 
Fines 
2009 
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Table 8: Dutch Ombud- and Audit cases 
 
 
  
Netherlands 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI DNB: National Bank Stability of Banks 2011 
SAI Ministry of Economic Affairs European Procurements 2012 
SAI Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Tariff Regulations for the 
Energy Market 
2009 
SAI Ministry of Finance Evaluation of Subsidies 2011 
SAI ProRail (Railway Infrastructure) Use of Funds 2011 
SAI Ministry for Health and Sports Online Medical Care  2009 
Ombudsman Social Security Agency Anti-Fraud Policies 2010 
Ombudsman Inter-Provincial Network Child Welfare 2010 
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The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion, to give the respondents enough 
room to elaborate on issues they thought to be of importance, and the interviewers to go deeper 
into topics of interest, while still being able to compare the results across countries. For this 
comparison, it is important to realize that the Ombudsmen and SAIs differ significantly between 
countries when it comes to culture, resources and legal authority. In the individual country 
reports we go deeper into the specifics of each audit organization. Despite this disparity 
between the national and local audit organization we were able to draw some notable 
conclusions. The most important difference is that between France and Romania, on the one 
hand, and Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the UK, on the other. In France and Romania 
the audit organizations we focus on can make legally binding recommendations. These can cause 
social innovations regardless of our FAL-model, and are therefore important in order for us to 
give content to the Y-variable in our INUS-condition: ((FAL, X) or Y)  Z. 
The results were written down in the earlier mentioned individual country reports, for which 
each partner was individually responsible. From these individual report we synthesized an 
overview and highlighted some key commonalities and differences, together with a few overall 
conclusions, as presented in chapter five. Chapter five, therefore, brings together the 
quantitative part of this research (the survey) with the qualitative part (the interviews). Both 
look at a different part of the INUS-condition. The quantitative part looks at the characteristics of 
the innovations that were investigated, together with the influence of FAL on the sustainability 
of these innovations. The interviews on the other hand look at the other factors in the formula 
that could affect the sustainability of innovations, besides the FAL-model.  
Quantitative:   ((FAL, X) or Y)  Z 
 
Qualitative:    ((FAL, X) or Y)  Z 
 
Combined:   ((FAL, X) or Y)  Z 
In the following chapters we will discuss these three integral parts of our research in this order. 
Chapter four will discuss the survey findings, chapter five will go into the qualitative part our 
research, whilst in the conclusions the two parts will be combined to form a complete picture of 
the factors influencing social innovations sustainability. 
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 Feedback, Accountability and Learning in Award 4.
Winning Public Organizations 
Wouter van Acker & Geert Bouckaert (KU Leuven)  
Based on survey data gathered by: 
- Wouter van Acker & Wout Frees (Belgium & the Netherlands) (KU Leuven) 
- José Nederhand (the Netherlands) (Erasmus University Rotterdam) 
- Carmen Savulescu & Ani Matei (Romania) (SNSPA) 
- Erwane Monthubert (France) (ENA) 
- Matus Grega (Slovakia) (UMB) 
- Sophie Flemig (the United Kingdom) (University of Edinburgh) 
 
 Introduction 4.1.
The FAL-model, as explained in the second chapter of our research report, can explain the 
sustainability of public sector innovations. At least, so we suspect. In order to investigate the 
influence of the FAL-model on the sustainability of social innovations we carried out a survey. As 
can be read in our chapter on the used methodology, we used award winning social innovations 
as a proxy for social innovations in general. Through our survey, consisting of more than 50 
different items on the dimensions of Feedback, Accountability, and Learning, we measured each 
of these awarded organizations based on the FAL-model. We assume that a higher score will 
mean a higher probability that the innovation is still operational today. If there is a lower FAL-
score in these organizations, we expect innovations to be more likely to ‘fail’ and disappear after 
time has passed.  
Before moving to the analysis of our survey-results, we should focus on our sample. First of all, 
as mentioned in our chapter on methodology, we used the following international and national 
prizes: 
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Table 9: Overview of good practice sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We contacted all these prizes, and asked them to send us the case descriptions of their winning 
innovations. Unfortunately, not all organizers were willing to cooperate with this request. 
Consequently, we do not have all the qualitative evidence that we would have liked. 
Furthermore, it took an enormous amount of work and (wo)man-hours to get a decent amount 
of responses from our sample. Varying numbers of award organizations per country further 
influenced differences in sample size over the countries. The difference in the number of 
responses is particularly large between countries, making it difficult to compare the six 
countries in our sample. There is little institutional memory, so many people knew little about 
an innovation, especially if the innovation was initiated many years ago. At the same time, due to 
personnel turnover, the institutional memory became even smaller. Finally, many people do not 
want to talk about innovations if they ‘failed’. This rather skewed our sample towards successful 
innovations which are still active. However, despite these setbacks and difficulties, we managed 
to get a sample worthy of analysis, and were able to draw a number of conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
International sources
European Public Sector Awards
CAF Good Practices Database
Quality Conferences for Public 
Administrations in the EU
United Nations Public Service Awards
European eGovernment Awards
RegioStarts Awards
Belgian National Sources
Quality Conferences for Public 
Administrations in Belgium
Belgian eGovernment Awards
Dutch National Sources
Innovatie Top 10
KING Best Gejat Prijs
Pink Roccade
Innovatieprijs Bedrijfsvoering
French National Sources
Victoire acteurs publics (prix 
modernisation administration)
Paroles d'élus
Interconnectes France
Romanina National Sources
National Agency of Civil Servants Conference
National Association of Public Sector IT Specialists
Romanian Prize for Quality  J.M. Juran Foundation
Parliamentary Committee for IT and Communications
Slovakian National Sources
Slovak National Quality Prize 
UK National Sources
Public Sector Sustainability Awards
APSE Service Awards
Improvement & Efficiency Awards 
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Table 10: Response rate 
Country Sample Response Response rate 
Belgium 97 76 (30.9 %) 78.4 % 
France 470 83 (33.7 %) 17.7 % 
Netherlands 34 23 (9.3 %) 67.6 % 
Romania 53 31 (12.6 %) 58.8 % 
Slovakia  28 16 (6.5 %) 57.1 % 
United Kingdom 163 16 (6.5 %) 9.8 % 
Total 845 245 (100 %) 29.0 % 
 
More than the sample size difference per country, it is the skewed variation between ‘Non-
survivors’ and ‘Survivors’ that cause challenges for our analysis. This variation is, however, 
consistent with findings by other social innovation scholars, such as Borins (1998, p. 115), who 
found that 91.6% of his sample was still operational after twelve years. On the other hand, a 
different reason for these particular findings is possibly the lack of institutional memory in many 
governmental organizations. Pollitt, Bouckaert and Löffler (2007) conducted research on the 
sustainability of innovations in the European Quality Conferences. Through a telephone survey 
they tried to find out whether the innovations presented in the conference two years earlier 
were still operational. Even though a small number, 8%, of the innovations had been deactivated 
and about 31% had survived, a staggering 61% of the organizations could not tell the 
researchers what happened to the innovation they had presented two (!) years earlier. This 
shows that the institutional memory of public sector organizations is in particularly bad shape. It 
is this lack of institutional memory which could explain the skewedness in our sample. Many of 
the organizations whom we invited to participate in our survey may not have known what we 
were talking about. Consequentially, our sample could have overlapped with the 39% of Pollitt, 
Bouckaert and Löffler’s sample who did know about the innovation. Add to this the fact that we 
look back in time way further than Pollitt et al. did for their research, which would mean that the 
institutional memory factor is amplified by a multifold. This means that we might have missed a 
large part of the population, which is nevertheless incredibly interesting and attention-grabbing, 
not due to our methodology, but due to the organizational memory of our cases. 
In the second half of this chapter we will show that we have been able to acquire interesting 
findings, regardless of the challenges in our sample.  
Table 11: Survival/Non-Survival of Innovations Dichotomous 
Country Did Not Survive (0) Survived (1) 
Belgium 8 (10.8 %) 66 (89.2 %) 
France 6 (7.2 %) 77 (92.8 %) 
Netherlands 1 (4.3 %) 22 (95.7 %) 
Romania 8 (25.8 %) 23 (74.2 %) 
Slovakia  2 (12.5 %) 14 (87.5 %) 
United Kingdom 1 (6.3 %) 15 (93.7 %) 
Total 26 (11.1 %) 217 (88.9 %) 
 
Just 1 and 0 as variation on the independent variable is rather an oversimplification. Cases can 
have different ways of surviving and disappearing. The following table therefore gives a more 
detailed picture of our sample. In this table we find that many of the awarded innovations have 
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indeed been expanded. Meaning that the scope of the innovation has expanded, it has since been 
improved or modernized, or the innovation has been diffused to other organizations. 
 
Table 12: Survival/Non-Survival of Innovations  
Country 
Withered 
Away 
Actively 
Stopped 
Replaced by 
something 
new 
Operational 
in original 
form 
Operational 
in expanded 
form 
Operational 
in reduced 
form 
Belgium 6 (7.9%) 1 (1.3%) 3 (3.9%) 31 (40.8%) 34 (44.7%) 1 (1.3%) 
France 2 (2.4%) 3 (3.6%) 1 (1.2%) 54 (65.1%) 21 (25.3%) 2 (2.4%) 
Netherlands 0 (0.0%) 1 (4.3%) 0 (0.0%) 16 (69.6%) 6 (26.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
Romania 1 (3.2%) 7 (22.6%) 0 (0.0%) 13 (41.9%) 10 (32.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
Slovakia 1 (6.3%) 1 (6.3%) 0 (0.0%) 10 (62.5%) 3 (18.8%) 1 (6.3%) 
United 
Kingdom 
1 (6.3%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 10 (62.5%) 5 (31.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
Total 11 (4.5%) 14 (5.7%) 4 (1.6 %) 134 (54.5%) 79 (32.1%) 4 (1.6%) 
 
First, we will present some general findings for our sample: what type of innovations generally 
take place? In which policy fields do they occur? How big are the organizations in which they 
occur, and how old are these organizations? After that we will focus on the most interesting 
findings for the individual items from our survey8. Finally, we will look at the FAL-scores of the 
organizations under investigation. Does this actually have an influence on the sustainability of 
the social innovations in our sample? 
 Sample Characteristics 4.2.
First off, we asked ourselves in which policy areas the innovations in our sample of respondents 
took place, and if there are any specific differences between countries? We recognized 22 
different policy areas:  
- Administration of parliament 
- Agriculture and fisheries, food safety 
- Asylum, migration and human rights 
- Economic affairs, economic development, competition, SME, Industry and Enterprises 
- Education (higher and lower), training and learning 
- Employment, labour related affairs and gender equality 
- Energy and water supply 
- Environment, sustainable development, climate change 
- Finances, taxation, customs and excise 
- Foreign affairs, external relations and aid, development and cooperation, trade 
- General administration 
- Information, communication, sensitization 
- Internal audit and control 
- Justice, security, police, defence, emergency services 
- Mobility and transportation 
- Public health, health care, medical services 
- Public works, infrastructure and equipment 
                                                             
8 The complete overview of the responses per country, per item, can be found in annex I. 
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- Science, research, innovation 
- Social welfare, social affairs, social services, social security, social housing 
- Sports, youth, tourism, culture, art and media 
- Telecommunication and postal services 
- Urban development and spatial planning 
We present the results in the following graphs.
   
Preliminary Figure 12: Innovation per Policy Area Combined Sample 
   
Figure 13: Innovation per Policy Area Belgium  
 
   
Figure 14: Innovation per Policy Area the Netherlands  
 
  
   
Figure 15: Innovation per Policy Area Slovakia  
 
 
 
   
Figure 16: Innovation per Policy Area Romania 
 
   
Figure 17: Innovation per Policy Area United Kingdom  
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The first thing that jumps out in the above graphs is the dominance of four policy areas in our 
sample: Education, Public Health, Social Welfare, and General Administration. Whether this is 
because these sectors submit more projects for awards or because these sectors are inherently 
more innovative is not possible to determine from our data. It is, however, a very relevant 
finding. Especially since sectors like public service utilities, where many market mechanisms 
have been introduced in the past, hardy show up in our sample. These market mechanisms 
should have been stimulating innovation, as most literature tells us, in order to stay ahead of 
competitors. More research into these awards, their prize winners and the innovative culture of 
these areas is needed to provide a definite answer on the many questions that arise from our 
findings. 
Second, we looked at what type of innovation took place. Are they focused on quality 
management, e-government, participation? We recognized the following categories of 
innovations: 
- Cooperation between public organizations 
- Efficient use of resources 
- E-government 
- Financial management and contract management 
- Human resources 
- Leadership 
- Participation and partnerships 
- Policy support 
- Processes, procedures, files 
- Services  
- Socially, ethically and environmentally conscious government 
- Strategic, performance and quality government 
- Transparent, responsible and accountable government 
 
 
  
Preliminary Figure 18: Type of Innovation Combined Sample9 
  
                                                             
9 The information on the age of the innovations has been provided for all countries, with the exception of France. This information will be added at a later stage. 
  
Figure 19: Type of Innovation Belgium  
– 
 
  
  
Figure 20: Type of Innovation the Netherlands  
 
  
  
Figure 21: Type of Innovation Slovakia  
 
  
  
Figure 22: Type of Innovation Romania  
 
  
Figure 23: Type of Innovation United Kingdom  
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Some interesting things come to the fore here. First of all, each country seems to put emphasis 
on certain types of innovation. Romania and the UK clearly have a focus on citizen participation, 
with their score in that category far exceeding the other categories. At the same time, the 
Netherlands seem to be fixated on e-government innovations, whilst Slovakia’s efforts are put in 
the field of quality management through processes and procedures. Belgium is the only country 
which seems to represent a more diverse picture, without one or two categories clearly 
transcending the others. It should be mentioned however that the focus of certain national 
awards on a certain type of innovation (for example e-government) could lead to an 
overrepresentation in our sample. For our awards, cases and sample, however, this doesn’t seem 
to be the circumstance. What should be kept in mind, however, is the small size of the samples, 
especially for the UK, Slovakia, Romania and the Netherlands. Generalizing from our findings is 
therefore not possible. 
We also include two graphs concerning the non-surviving innovations, per policy area and per 
type of innovation. The sample is too small, however, to draw any conclusions from this. 
Figure 24: Non-Surviving Innovations per Policy Area 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
10 The information on the age of the innovations has been provided for all countries, with the exception of 
France. This information will be added at a later stage. 
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Figure 25: Non-Surviving Innovations per Type11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following tables and graph represent the final part of our sample analysis, before looking at 
the results of the actual survey. They show the variation on four important controlling variables: 
age of the innovation, the size of the organization, the level of government the organization is 
located in, and the age of the organization. As a proxy for the age of the innovation we used the 
year the innovation was awarded. 
Table 13: Organizational Size 
Country Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
< 25 FTEs 8 (10.5%) 41 (49.4 %) 5 (21.7 %) 2 (6.5 %) 0 (0 %) 7 (43.8 %) 63 (25.6 %) 
25-100 FTEs 13 (17.1%) 7 (8.4 %) 2 (8.7 %) 14 (45.2 %) 5 (31.3 %) 3 (18.8 %) 44 (17.9 %) 
100-250 FTEs 12 (15.8%) 6 (7.2 %) 4 (17.4 %) 7 (22.6 %) 4 (25.0 %) 2 (12.5 %) 36 (14.6 %) 
250-500 FTEs 14 (18.4%) 3 (3.6 %) 3 (13.0 %) 4 (12.9 %) 1 (6.3 %) 0 (0 %) 25 (10.2 %) 
> 500 FTEs 29 (38.2%) 25 (30.1 %) 9 (39.1 %) 4 (12.9 %) 6 (37.5 %) 4 (25.0 %) 77 (31.3 %) 
Total 76 (100%) 82 (100 %) 23 (100 %) 31 (100 %) 16 (100 %) 16 (100 %) 246 (100 %) 
 
  
                                                             
11 The information on the age of the innovations has been provided for all countries, with the exception of 
France. This information will be added at a later stage. 
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Table 14: Organizational Age 
Country Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
< 10 years 17 (23 %) 37 (45.1 %) 10 (43.5 %) 5 (16.1 %) 1 (6.3 %) 5 (31.3 %) 75 (30.9 %) 
10-25 years 29 (39.2%) 20 (24.4 %) 4 (17.4 %) 25 (80.6 %) 8 (50.0 %) 8 (50.0 %) 94 (38.7 %) 
25-50 years 12 (16.2%) 20 (24.4 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 2 (12.5 %) 1 (6.3 %) 36 (14.8 %) 
> 50 years 16 (21.6%) 5 (6.1 %) 9 (39.1 %) 1 (3.2 %) 6 (31.3 %)  2 (12.5 %) 37 (15.2 %) 
Total 74 (100%) 82 (100 %) 23 (100 %) 31 (100 %) 16 (100 %) 16 (100 %) 243 (100 %) 
 
Time is an obvious and important factor in determining the sustainability of innovations. 
If all our surviving innovations would only be one or two years old, we could hardly talk 
about sustainability. However, the following graph shows that our sample consists of 
innovations which go back as far as twelve years.  
 
Preliminary Figure 26: Age of Innovations12  
 
 
 
The blue lines in this graph indicate the age of the surviving innovations anno 2015. The 
red lines on the other hand indicate the age of the non-surviving innovations at the time 
of their termination. In this figure we see that all cases which did not survive were 
terminated before they were 7 years of age. The following graph shows us that the non-
surviving innovations are not all located at the very beginning of our time-span, as one 
could think was an easy explanation for their termination.  
                                                             
12 The information on the age of the innovations has been provided for all countries, with the exception of 
France. This information will be added at a later stage. 
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Preliminary Figure 27: Year of Award of Non-Surviving Innovations13 
 
 
This graph shows that the awards which have been terminated have come from recent 
years as well. A logical explanation for the non-survival of an innovation would be that 
they are simply old, surpassed by newer ideas and methods. However, this was clearly 
not the cause. Something else must have been in play. 
Finally, we present a short overview of the level of government in which the innovations 
took place. This concludes our overview of the sample’s main characteristics. In the next 
section, we continue with a closer look at the FAL-model in the surveyed organizations. 
Table 15: Level of Government of Innovation 
Country Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
Local
14
 
 
17 (23 %) 37 (45.1 %) 10 (43.5 %) 5 (16.1 %) 1 (6.3 %) 5 (31.3 %) 75 (30.9 %) 
Regional
15
 
 
29 (39.2%) 20 (24.4 %) 4 (17.4 %) 25 (80.6 %) 8 (50.0 %) 8 (50.0 %) 94 (38.7 %) 
Federal/ 
National 
12 (16.2%) 20 (24.4 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 2 (12.5 %) 1 (6.3 %) 36 (14.8 %) 
Total 
 
74 (100%) 82 (100 %) 23 (100 %) 31 (100 %) 16 (100 %) 16 (100 %) 243 (100 %) 
  
                                                             
13 The information on the age of the innovations has been provided for all countries, with the exception of 
France. This information will be added at a later stage. 
14 Local: Municipal-, City- or (for Belgium: provinces) 
15 Regional: Provincial, Country-level. For Belgium: Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels-region. Includes 
Scotland, England, Northern-Ireland and Wales for the UK. 
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 Findings per item 4.3.
Having asked 50 questions of our respondents, we gathered a lot of information on innovation-
related topics and factors. A full overview of our methodological choices and the theories and 
literature on which we based our questioning, can be found in chapter 3 of this research report. 
A copy of the survey can be found in annex III, as well as the results/responses, broken down per 
country, in annex I. 
Given our sample size and the skewed nature of the dependent dimension (survival/non-
survival of the innovations), it is difficult to use statistical methods on our results. However, we 
were able to find a statistically significant difference, using a Mann-Whitney rank test, between 
the surviving and non-surviving innovations for a number of our items. We are thus able to say 
that organizations where the innovation did survive, are characterized by: 
Table 16: Most important correlating survey items 
p.16 FAL 
Dimension 
Characteristic p. 
*** L …a culture of adversarial debate and openness for constructive 
criticism. 
0.005 
*** L …encouraging experimentation and alternative ways of getting 
work done. 
0.003 
** L …not penalizing responsible staff members if a creative attempt 
to solve a problem fails. 
0.021 
** A …employees who feel responsible for the performance of the 
organization. 
0.028 
** A …a culture of transparency about results towards external 
stakeholders. 
0.034 
*** F …staff members who express their concerns, ideas and 
suggestions about the functioning of the organization. 
0.003 
** F …the feedback information from staff members having great 
impact on the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
0.019 
** F … the feedback information from customers having great impact 
on the strategic decisions made by the organization.  
0.017 
** F …the reports from the ombudsman institution having a great 
impact on the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
0.028 
 
These result give an interesting insight into the factors that might contribute to the success and 
sustainability of innovations. With the Mann-Whitney test it is not possible to speak about 
causality, but that makes these correlations none the less interesting. 
In the light of our proposed FAL-model, it is also worth noting that factors from all three 
dimensions are statistically relevant for explaining differences between the non-surviving 
innovations and the surviving innovations. The fact that ‘only’ two factors of the Accountability-
                                                             
16 ** p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
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dimension are mentioned as statistically significant might be easily explained because fewer 
items in our survey concerned that particular dimension.  
Besides the above mentioned correlations between survey items and the two dependent groups, 
all 50 items tell us something interesting about the characteristics of public organizations who 
have been awarded for their innovative efforts in recent years. We highlight the three most 
interesting findings below. For a complete overview, we direct you to annex I of this research 
report.  
First, even in organizations who have been awarded for their innovations in the past, innovation 
seems hardly a structured and methodized effort. The answers on the following two items show 
that a structured approach for organizing and evaluating an innovation is the case in only a small 
minority of our surveyed organizations.  
Table 17: My organizations has a formal process for conducting and evaluating experiments or new ideas. 
Country Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
Highly inaccurate 14 (18.4%) 12 (14.5%) 2 (8.7%) 1 (3.2%) 2 (12.5%) 0 (0.0%) 31 (12.7%) 
Inaccurate 26 (34.2%) 34 (41.0%) 10 (43.5%) 1 (3.2%) 3 (18.8%) 1 (6.3%) 75 (30.6%) 
Neither accurate 
nor inaccurate 
18 (23.7%) 14 (16.9%) 6 (26.1%) 17 (54.8%) 5 (31.3%) 6 (37.5%) 66 (26.9%) 
Accurate 13 (17.1%) 17 (20.5%) 5 (21.7%) 8 (25.8%) 2 (12.5%) 7 (43.8%) 52 (21.2%) 
Highly accurate 3 (3.9%) 4 (4.8%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (12.9%) 3 (18.8%) 2 (12.5%) 16 (6.5%) 
 
Table 18: My organization has formal procedures to ensure that lessons learned in the course of a project 
are passed along to others doing similar tasks. 
Country Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
Highly inaccurate 5 (6.7%) 7 (8.5%) 1 (4.3%) 1 (3.2%) 1 (6.3%) 0 (0.0%) 15 (6.2%) 
Inaccurate 22 (29.3%) 27 (32.9%) 9 (39.1%) 1 (3.2%) 2 (12.5%) 1 (6.3%) 62 (25.5%) 
Neither accurate 
nor inaccurate 
25 (33.3%) 20 (24.4%) 7 (30.4%) 11 (35.5%) 7 (43.8%) 6 (37.5%) 76 (31.3%) 
Accurate 20 (26.7%) 18 (22.0%) 5 (21.7%) 11 (35.5%) 4 (25.0%) 7 (43.8%) 65 (26.7%) 
Highly accurate 3 (4.0%) 10 (12.2%) 1 (4.3%) 7 (22.6%) 2 (12.5%) 2 (12.5%) 25 (10.3%) 
 
The combination of the results from these two items shows that structured evaluation, 
especially from experiments and innovations is still far from standard practice. Only 27% have a 
formal process in place to evaluate experiments, whilst only 37% have a formal process in place 
for overall organizational learning. The lack of such procedures seriously inhibits the learning 
and improvement potential of public organizations, and can form a serious barrier to sustainable 
social innovation.  
Finally, we found some surprising results concerning the assignment of an ombudsman to 
French and Slovakian public organizations. As can be seen from the following table, the response 
was extremely skewed towards a clear ‘No’: 93% for France and 93% for Slovakia. There is no 
logical explanation for this strong divergence from the other four countries. Perhaps this 
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question was misunderstood by many respondents, thinking that the question focused on a 
particular ombudsman for their own organization, rather than a national one within whose 
jurisdiction they fell. Or, more worryingly, the respondents were simply not aware of an 
Ombudsman whose jurisdiction did extend to their organization, and figured that there wasn’t 
one.  
Table 19: Is there an Ombudsman assigned to your organization? 
Country Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
No 26 (37.7%) 70 (93.3%) 10 (50.0%) 12 (46.2%) 14 (93.3%) 9 (57.1%) 140 (63.9%) 
Yes 43 (62.3%) 5 (6.7%) 10 (50.0%) 14 (53.8%) 1 (6.7%) 6 (42.9%) 79 (36.1%) 
 
 FAL-Model 4.4.
As we explained in the second chapter of this research report, we expect the organizations with 
surviving innovations to score high on our FAL-dimensions. In order to measure these 
dimensions, the survey was designed to indicate the scores of each organization on these 
dimensions, varying between the worst possible score and 1 (best possible score). When we 
rescale these scores into three categories (Low – Middle – High), we can create a truth table, 
with all the possible combinations for the three dimension-scores. The rescaling took place 
considering the mean, plus or minus the standard deviation. Or, in more analytical terms: 
 
 
 
We expect most of the non-surviving innovations to be in the lower categories of this truth table, 
as these organizations have lower scores on Feedback, Accountability and Learning, thereby 
forming barriers for sustainable social innovation.  
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Table 20: FAL Truth Table 
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When we analyse the score of all our respondents, and assign them to a category, we get the 
following results: 
Table 21: Variation of FAL over Surviving and Non-Surviving Cases 
FAL 1 0 
H 29% 19% 
M 46% 44% 
L 25% 46% 
 
As we expected, the majority of the non-surviving innovations fall into the lower categories, 
whilst for the surviving innovations the opposite holds true. This indicates that organizations 
with strong feedback loops, strong accountability mechanisms and strong, entrenched learning 
processes seem to produce more sustainable social innovations. The question remains, however, 
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how 19% of the non-surviving cases fall into the high category, and how 25% of the surviving 
cases fall into the low category. This has everything to do with our sample. As explained in the 
chapter on methodology, we used award winning organizations as our sample/proxy for the 
measurement of innovations. This means that we are investigating the top segment of 
innovating public administrations. So even though the organizations fall into the Low-category, 
their scores are actually still rather high. We could visualize this with the following graph: 
Figure 28: Innovation sample, versus innovation population 
 
In the blue box are the organizations who score ‘H’ on our FAL-model. The lower organizations 
are positioned on this line, the bigger the proportion of disappeared, non-sustainable 
innovations. This, again, is confirmed by our findings as presented above. Future research 
should look at organizations who did not win an award and see if they significantly differ from 
the organizations we have investigated in this research project. How is the ration 1-0 for those 
cases? How do those cases score on the FAL-dimensions? Nonetheless, our research findings 
support our thesis that Feedback, Accountability and Learning form important factors in causing 
social innovations to be successful and sustainable. Both from our single items and our 
aggregated FAL-scores we extract the picture of Feedback loops, Accountability mechanisms and 
Learning processes as pushing innovations forward and making them longer lasting and thus 
more worthwhile. 
 Conclusion 4.5.
Following the results of our research on the preceding pages, one might be tempted to propose 
the following formula: 
FAL  Sustainable Innovations 
However, even though we found strong evidence that sustainable innovations correlate with 
single items on all three variables as well as with the aggregate score in our FAL-model, we do 
realize that the FAL-model does not and will not explain all variation, let alone predict the 
success of an innovation coming from an organization with a particular FAL-score. There are 
other factors which can (strongly) influence the process in which the FAL-dimensions lead to 
sustainable innovations. We can, for example, think of the role Ombudsmen and SAIs play in 
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influencing an organization’s feedback information and learning processes. We might call these 
factors ‘X’, and translate them into the following formula: 
FAL, X  Sustainable Innovations 
Finally, there may be factors which lead to sustainable innovations, which all together have 
nothing to do with the factors we consider in our FAL model. Think of a regime change, a 
(financial) crisis or a political scandal. These factors can lead to enormous, radical change in 
policy, processes and products, and will hence be considered social innovations. We can label 
these factors, exogenous of FAL or X, as ‘Y’, and translate them into the following formula: 
((FAL, X) or Y)  Z 
We consider the FAL-model to be part of an INUS-condition. A factor in an INUS-condition is an 
Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the 
result. Z is the dependent variable, in our case: sustainable social innovations. X is another 
necessary but insufficient part of the formula, potentially able to influence FAL, whilst Y is an 
exogenous factor which can determine Z, whatever FAL or X-value. In the next chapter we will 
further elaborate on the particulars of this INUS-condition, as we will try to complete the 
formula by finding out what the X and Y will be. We will therefore now focus on the qualitative 
part of our research, as we report on our findings on the influence of Ombudsmen and SAIs on 
social innovation.  
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 The effect of Ombud- and Audit reports on Social 5.
Innovation 
Wouter van Acker & Geert Bouckaert (KU Leuven)  
Based on country-specific research by: 
- Wouter van Acker & Wout Frees (Belgium & the Netherlands) (KU Leuven) 
- Carmen Cavulescu & Ani Matei (France & Romania) (SNSPA) 
- Juraj Nemec & Colin Lawson (Slovakia & the United Kingdom) (UMB) 
In this chapter we shall present the main results of our qualitative research into the role of 
Ombudsmen and Audit Offices in starting sustainable social innovations. First, we will explain 
how these external organizations fit within our FAL-model, after which the research sample is 
described. Finally, we will lay out the main thread of our findings on barriers and promotors of 
social innovation through Ombudsmen and Audit Offices. The individual country reports can be 
found in annexes at the end of this report.  
 Ombudsmen, Audit Offices and the FAL-model 5.1.
In the last chapter we examined our survey of award winning public sector innovations in six 
countries: Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Romania and the United Kingdom. Our 
results indicate that still active award winning innovations are characterized by a higher score in 
our Feedback-Accountability-Learning model, than innovations which have disappeared. 
However, we also noted in our first chapter that the FAL-model alone cannot explain or predict 
the sustainability of all innovations in the public sector. The FAL-model is part of an INUS-
condition. More specifically, the FAL-model is an Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition 
which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result. Or, in the form of a formula: ((FAL, X) or 
Y)  Sustainable Innovations (1). ‘X’ are factors who can, in combination with FAL, explain a 
sustainable innovation, whilst ‘Y’ can explain for sustainable innovations without FAL and X 
altogether. We will again use the example of the starting of a fire to explain the mechanisms 
behind this INUS-condition: 
A burning cigarette (FAL) can explain for the start of a fire (Necessary), but only in combination 
with (Insufficient) the presence of flammable materials (X). However, the fire that was observed 
could also have been caused by a gas explosion (Y), with which the cigarette and flammable 
materials had nothing to do. 
This means that FAL can explain for sustainable innovations, but only in the presence of external 
factors to kick start their feedback loops and learning processes. Within this chapter we will 
investigate whether Ombudsmen and Audit Offices fulfil the ‘X’, and if they actually are 
promotors of social innovation. We expect that, when organized effectively and efficiently, 
Ombudsmen and Audit Offices can kick start innovations in the organizations they scrutinize. By 
investigating the processes, products and workings of governmental organizations, they are able 
to give external feedback, propose changes, and in this way influence the FAL-process already in 
place within the respective organizations. The influence of Ombudsmen and Audit Offices on 
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social innovation is dependent on various factors. We can summarize these factors into nine 
categories, all connected to a dimension in the FAL-model, as showed by the following table: 
  
 
 
 
 Table 22:  Influence of Ombudsmen and SAIs on Social Innovation 
 
 
 X  
Countries 
Feedback 
 
Follow-up 
Feedback 
 
(Exit) 
Discussion 
Accountability 
 
Media 
Pressure 
Accountability 
 
Parliamentary 
Pressure 
Learning 
Communication/ 
Collaboration 
Learning 
 
Trust/  
 Distrust 
Learning 
 
Reputation of 
Auditor: Role 
Learning 
 
Reputation of 
Auditor: 
Expertise 
Learning 
 
Audit 
Criteria 
Y 
Belgium           
France           
Netherlands           
Slovakia           
Romania           
United Kingdom           
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After our qualitative research and analysis we should be able to mark in this table which factors 
form enablers or barriers to social innovation in each country with either a ‘-‘ or a ‘+’. Or, more 
specifically, which factors interact with the FAL-model for each case, and thereby influence the 
probability for sustainable innovations.  
The question remains what ‘Y’ can be in our INUS-condition. ‘Y’ is a factor which in itself can 
account for sustainable innovations, completely independent of FAL or X. ‘Y’ in our case can be a 
number of external factors, such as a regime change (e.g. from a communist to a liberal state-
model) or a crisis (e.g. the impact of the financial crises on Ireland) which force organizations to 
change their processes, products and workings. These forces will lead to significant changes, 
regardless of how organizations score in the FAL-model, and regardless of the role and influence 
of Ombudsmen and Audit Offices. However, Ombudsmen and Audit Offices can also become the 
de facto ‘Y’-factor in our formula. This happens when an organization is legally obligated to 
implement the recommendations from Ombudsmen and/or Audit Offices. In that case, 
sustainable innovation is no longer influenced by the FAL-score or, for example, media pressure: 
the recommendations will be followed, regardless.  
 Sample of Ombudsmen and Audit reports 5.2.
To investigate the influence of ‘X’ on social innovation, we investigated a total of 58 cases for the 
six countries in our work package: 16 from Ombudsmen, and 42 from Supreme Audit Offices 
(SAIs). We will mention the investigated organizations in tables on the following pages, but 
beyond this will treat them anonymously. Choosing our cases was a balancing exercise between 
two important criteria. First of all, the particular reports that were chosen had to be published 
far enough in the past for the scrutinized organizations to implement the recommendations, but 
recent enough to limit the effect of personnel turnover, which could obstruct our research 
efforts. Second, the reports had to focus on performance measures for a considerable policy, 
process or product, instead of just focusing on the legality of an organization’s conduct or on the 
mediation for one citizen. Besides these necessary criteria, we also focused on several local 
issues (in Slovakia and the UK) concerning the recent European trend of devolving powers and 
responsibilities away from the national or federal level towards regions and municipalities. 
Finally, following the description of work for our work package, we specifically looked at a 
number of cases from the public utility sector. The audit organizations investigated also differ 
per country. For France, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Romania the choices were relatively easy: 
there is one SAI and a national Ombudsman. In the federal systems of Belgium and the United 
Kingdom, however, the audit landscape is more scattered. Instead of still focusing on only the 
federal/national audit organizations (e.g. NAO for the UK and the federal Ombudsman for 
Belgium), we chose to include sub-national or regional actors as well, to better reflect the audit 
landscape in these countries. Based on these criteria, we chose the following reports as our 
cases:  
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Table 23: Slovak Ombud- and Audit Cases 
Slovakia 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI Municipalities Banovce and Bebravou Waste Management 2007-2008 
SAI Zilina, City transport organization Public Transport 2011 
SAI Municipality Raslavice Waste Management 2011 
SAI Municipality Huncovce Waste Management 2011 
SAI Municipality Druzstevna pri Hornade Waste Management 2011 
SAI Municipality Helpa Waste Management 2011 
SAI Municipality Spissky Stiavnik Waste Management 2011 
Ombudsman Ministry of the Interior Electronic Voting 2010 
 
 
Table 24: British Ombud- and Audit Cases 
United 
Kingdom 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
NAO Ministry of Justice Financial Management 2011 
NAO 
Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs 
Financial Management 
2011 
PAC The BBC Trust Investment Policy 2014 
PHS 
Ombudsman 
Planning Inspectorate Compensation for Citizens 2012 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Boat Dwellers 2013 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Home Care 2011 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Community Assets 2012 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Use of Consultants 2011-2012 
OSC Bath and North East Somerset Transportation of Students 2012 
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Table 25: Romanian Ombud- and Audit Cases 
Romania 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI 
National Agency on Fiscal 
Administration 
Collection of Taxes 2012 
SAI 
National Agency on Fiscal 
Administration 
Anti-Corruption Policies 2012 
SAI National Company for Forests Patrimony 2013 
SAI 
Romanian Radio Broadcasting 
Company 
General  2012 
SAI Romanian Television Company General 2012 
SAI 
National Authority for Administration 
and Regulation in Communication 
Performance Measurement 2012 
SAI 
National Company of Highways and 
National Roads 
Regional Infrastructure 2012 
SAI 
National Company of Highways and 
National Roads 
National Infrastructure 2012 
SAI Ministry of Education Management of Public Funds 2013 
SAI National Chamber of Pensions IT Policy 2011 
Ombudsman National Union of Veterans General 2009 
Ombudsman Ministry of Education Transport of Students 2013 
Ombudsman 
National Authority for Persons with 
Disabilities 
Safety of Persons with 
Disabilities 
2013 
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Table 26: French Ombud- and Audit Cases 
France 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI 
Council for the Environment and 
Sustainable Development 
Transport Safety 2012 
SAI 
Ministries of Finance, Employment 
and Social Affairs 
Social Security 2011 
SAI 
Ministries of Social Affairs, Health and 
Finance 
Anti-Smoking Policies 2012 
SAI 
Ministry for the Environment, 
Sustainable Development and Energy 
Renewable Energy 2013 
SAI 
Ministry of Education (Higher 
Education and Research) 
Sport 2013 
SAI 
Ministry of Culture and 
Communication 
Museums 2011 
SAI 
Council for the Environment and 
Sustainable Development 
Biofuels 2012 
Ombudsman Ministry of the Interior Police 2011 
Ombudsman 
Ministry for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Health 
Vaccination Policy 2010 
Ombudsman 
Ministry for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Health 
Accidents at Work 2010 
Ombudsman Public Prosecutor Retirement Policy 2010 
Ombudsman Public Prosecutor 
Policy on the Settling of 
Fines 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27: Belgian Ombud- and Audit Cases 
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Belgium 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI Flemish Employment Bureau HR Policy 2011 
SAI Tax Inspection Bureau 
Organization and 
Functioning 
2010 
SAI 
Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Penitentiary Institutions 
HR Policy 2010 
SAI Agency for the European Social Fund Use of Resources 2010 
Federal 
Ombudsman 
Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Penitentiary Institutions  
Complaint Reports on 
Prisoner’s Rights 
2009-2012 
Flemish 
Ombudsman 
Flemish Tax Collecting Agency 
General Annual  
Complaints Report 
2006-2013 
Flemish 
Ombudsman 
De Lijn (Public Transport) 
General Annual  
Complaints Report 
2009-2012 
Flemish 
Ombudsman 
Flemish Agency for Housing 
General Annual  
Complaints Report 
2010-2011 
 
 
Table 28: Dutch Ombud- and Audit Cases 
Netherlands 
Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of 
Audit 
SAI DNB: National Bank Stability of Banks 2011 
SAI Ministry of Economic Affairs European Procurements 2012 
SAI Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Tariff Regulations for the 
Energy Market 
2009 
SAI Ministry of Finance Evaluation of Subsidies 2011 
SAI ProRail (Railway Infrastructure) Use of Funds 2011 
SAI Ministry for Health and Sports Online Medical Care  2009 
Ombudsman Social Security Agency Anti-Fraud Policies 2010 
Ombudsman Inter-Provincial Network Child Welfare 2010 
 
Before continuing in discussing our results, it is necessary to point out some difficulties in the 
research process which have influenced the generalizability and the firmness of our conclusions. 
In Slovakia, the Supreme Audit Office was not willing to cooperate with our research, besides 
some, rather superficial, e-mail contact. In the Netherlands, the Supreme Audit Office did 
eventually grant us permission to hold interviews with its staff, but only after a lengthy delay. 
For both groups of cases we only have data available from the organizations under scrutiny. 
Although it was not possible to incorporate them into this research report, the data from the 
Dutch SAI will soon follow in a future working paper. One of the scrutinized organizations in the 
Netherlands didn’t want to participate as well. In line with the last mentioned case, the 
organizations under scrutiny in the UK turned out to be very unwilling to cooperate. However, 
when this became apparent, our working package had progressed too far to focus on other cases. 
The observations in these three cases are nonetheless highly interesting. They show a particular 
perception of the relationship between SAIs, Ombudsmen and the administration of a particular 
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country. And perceptions, as we will see, play an important role in the potential influence of an 
Ombudsman or SAI on social innovation.  
 Implementation rate 5.3.
 
First, we look at the implementation rate among the organizations that have been scrutinized. 
We see both great differences between reports and between countries.  
One remark ought to be made concerning the Belgian cases. For all four Ombudsmen cases, only 
the recommendations on which the Ombudsman and the investigated organization do not find 
agreement ended up in their annual report. It is therefore logical that the non-implementation 
rate is rather high for these reports. However, this also means that many recommendations are 
already carried out, without being published in the annual review. Finally, it is rather stunning 
that, even though they have not been agreed upon before the annual review is published, there is 
still a considerable part that is actually implemented.  
Second, concerning the Slovak cases, we should clarify that the recommendations which were 
followed are compliance findings. Recommendations coming from performance audits are 
hardly, if never, followed.  
To see which factors (partly) explain these differences, we have to look closer at the 
observations made through the interviews. In the chapter on our methodology we lay a link 
between the literature and the formed interview protocol. The structure of our interview 
protocol is added as annex IV.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29: Implementations Complete Sample 
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Overview 1 - Implemented17 0 - Not Implemented18  Total 
Netherlands 19 7  26 
Belgium 28 3819  66 
Slovakia 16 30  46 
Romania 55 020  55 
France 124 021  124 
UK 47 9  56 
Total 289 84  373 
 
Table 30: Implementation Belgium 
Belgium 1 – Implemented 0 - Not Implemented22  Total 
Case 1 2 4  6 
Case 2 0 8  8 
Case 3 8 4  12 
Case 4 2 8  10 
Case 5 8 3  11 
Case 6 3 2  5 
Case 7 3 4  7 
Case 8 2 5  7 
Total 28 38  66 
 
  
                                                             
17 ‘Implemented’ means: fully implemented, partially implemented, implemented by different solution, in the process 
of being implemented, etc. 
18 ‘Not implemented’ means: Doesn’t agree with diagnosis or solution, requires political decision, lack of resources for 
implementation, etc. 
19 The not implemented recommendations in Belgium are inflated, because the Ombudsman reports only contain the 
recommendations on which both parties could not agree. It is therefore logical that a large number will not be 
implemented. All recommendations that are agreed upon do not appear in the reports. 
20 The SAI and Ombudsman in Romania and France have legally binding recommendations, hence the extremely low 
number of recommendations which haven’t been implemented. 
21 The SAI and Ombudsman in Romania and France have legally binding recommendations, hence the extremely low 
number of recommendations which haven’t been implemented. 
22 The not implemented recommendations in Belgium are inflated, because the Ombudsman reports only contain the 
recommendations on which both parties could not agree. It is therefore logical that a large number will not be 
implemented. All recommendations that are agreed upon do not appear in the reports. 
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Table 31: Implementation France 
France 1 – Implemented 0 - Not Implemented23 Total 
Case 1 6 0 6 
Case 2 58 0 58 
Case 3 6 0 6 
Case 4 8 0 8 
Case 5 4 0 4 
Case 6 23 0 23 
Case 7 9 0 9 
Case 8 1 0 1 
Case 9 3 0 3 
Case 10 3 0 3 
Case 11 1 0 1 
Case 12 2 0 2 
Total 124 0 124 
 
Table 32: Implementation the Netherlands 
Netherlands 1 – Implemented 0 - Not Implemented  Total 
Case 1 2 0  2 
Case 2 2 2  4 
Case 3 3 2  5 
Case 4 5 0  5 
Case 5 3 0  3 
Case 6 3 2  5 
Case 7 4 2  0 
Case 8 1 1  2 
Total 23 9  32 
 
Table 33: Implementation Slovakia 
Slovakia 1 – Implemented 0 - Not Implemented  Total 
Case 1 3 1  4 
Case 2 0 1  1 
Case 3 0 8  8 
Case 4 2 6  8 
Case 5 2 6  8 
Case 6 1 7  8 
Case 7 8 0  8 
Case 8 0 1  1 
Total 16 30  46 
 
  
                                                             
23 The SAI and Ombudsman in Romania and France have legally binding recommendations, hence the extremely low 
number of recommendations which haven’t been implemented. 
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Table 34: Implementation the United Kingdom 
United 
Kingdom 
1 – Implemented 0 - Not Implemented  Total 
Case 1 7 0  7 
Case 2 5 0  5 
Case 3 2 0  2 
Case 4 4 7  11 
Case 5 14 1  15 
Case 6 5 0  5 
Case 7 5 0  5 
Case 8 4 1  5 
Case 9 1 0  1 
Total 47 9  56 
 
Table 35: Implementation Romania 
Romania 1 – Implemented 0 - Not Implemented24  Total 
Case 1 4 0  4 
Case 2 4 0  4 
Case 3 3 0  3 
Case 4 5 0  5 
Case 5 3 0  3 
Case 6 5 0  5 
Case 7 4 0  4 
Case 8 6 0  6 
Case 9 9 0  9 
Case 10 5 0  5 
Case 11 2 0  2 
Case 12 3 0  3 
Case 13 2 0  2 
Total 55 0  55 
 
 Results  5.4.
As explained in chapter 3 on our methodology, we can divide ‘X’ into six different categories, all 
connected with a particular FAL-model dimension: 
- Feedback: 
 Following up on the implementation of recommendations 
 Exit meetings, or otherwise discussions with the scrutinized organizations on 
findings, conclusions and recommendations 
 
- Accountability: 
 Media pressure 
 Parliamentary pressure 
                                                             
24 The SAI and Ombudsman in Romania and France have legally binding recommendations, hence the extremely low 
number of recommendations which haven’t been implemented. 
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- Learning: 
 A process characterized by cooperation and open, informal communication 
 A relationship characterized by trust or distrust 
 Clear and appropriate audit criteria 
 The perceived role of the audit organization: watchdog or advisor? 
 The perceived expertise of the audit organization on the topic under scrutiny 
 
 Feedback 5.4.1.
Following up on the implementation of recommendations differs strongly between countries, 
institutions, and even between cases for the same organization. In France and Romania, due to 
the legally binding character of their recommendations, follow-ups are most common, 
institutionalized and comprehensive. Slovakia finds its SAI and Ombudsman on the other side of 
the spectrum, where follow-ups are completely absent. Besides the fact that no follow-ups took 
place, there was also no infrastructure (documentation, archives) to make a follow-up possible. 
In Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK we find a more complex picture. In the Netherlands, the 
audit organizations do follow-up on the implementation, but not in the form of an official ‘follow-
up audit’. In the UK, the practice of follow-ups differs strongly between organizations. Although 
this practice is routinized for the NAO, the other investigated organizations do not have 
institutionalized processes and procedures surrounding this. In Belgium, the practice differed 
strongly between cases and institutions. The Ombudsmen both stated that most of the follow-
ups take place through constant communication with the scrutinized organization, instead of 
specific follow-up research. In the Belgian SAI, the amount of follow-up differs starkly between 
reports, implying that either only certain parts of the organization have an institutionalized 
culture surrounding follow-ups or that follow-ups only take place for certain high priority 
audits. 
Although the practice of follow-ups differs strongly between countries, organizations and 
between cases, all interviewees on the auditors’ side stressed the potential value of them. 
Follow-ups, and an accompanying continued dialogue, hold the scrutinized organizations 
responsible for their actions after the audit has been concluded and delivers new opportunities 
for feedback and learning within the organization. All of the interviewees whose organizations 
do not have a default process of follow-up audits have declared that more attention should be 
given to this in the future. On the Auditee side of our interviews, the respondents were more 
hesitant towards the idea of standard follow-ups. It would further contribute to the already 
considerable amount of work and red tape accompanying audits and create an atmosphere of 
distrust, which might inhibit a good work relationship in the future. 
Closely related to continued dialogue is the concept of an ‘exit meeting’. In these meetings the 
auditors can present their findings, conclusions and recommendations to the audited 
organizations. The scrutinized organization, on their part, then have an opportunity to react to 
the findings, discuss parts with which they don’t agree with and/or correct certain factual 
mistakes. France and Romania have the strongest practices in this respect. Because the 
recommendations will be binding, it is important to negotiate them with the scrutinized 
organization. This negotiation will protect the auditor from making recommendations which 
aren’t in accordance with reality or for which there are simply not enough resources for 
implementation. In the four other countries, practices differ by organization. In Slovakia, such a 
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culture does not exist and the other three have a mixed culture concerning this topic. In Belgium, 
the Netherlands and the UK this practice is more mixed. Although many do organize them, they 
seem to be aimed at politeness and simple fact checking, instead of feedback. As one respondent 
declared: “these exit meetings are polite, and the organization can vent some of their frustration, 
but it is in no way a negotiation. Unless we have made some serious factual error, the 
recommendations will not be changed.” The added value of these meetings is therefore minimal. 
Many respondents who did not work with exit meetings at all did stress that they should work 
more with seminars and presentations to disseminate their findings to the scrutinized 
organization. The question remains whether these seminars and presentations will surpass the 
level of the exit meetings the other audit organizations are holding at this moment.  
 Accountability 5.4.2.
Both parliamentary (or municipal councils in the case of local audits) and media pressure are 
ways of holding organizations accountable for the implementation of recommendations and 
their performance in general. Our observations paint a more complex picture than these two 
factors’ fairly straightforward theoretical influence.  
First of all, there is a striking difference in media-strategies between SAIs and Ombudsmen. Most 
SAIs have a minimal media strategy: after the conclusion of an audit, the report is published 
online, and a press release is sent out to inform the press. One of our respondents clearly stated: 
We “do not generate media coverage in order to put pressure on the organizations being 
audited.” 
Ombudsmen make a more proactive use of media. As one respondent phrased it: “The media is a 
tool we use in all phases of our investigation. To put more pressure on organizations, but also in 
our research. Before opening an investigation we use popular media to look for people who have 
had problems concerning the topic of our research. It is a perfect way to create input, a sense of 
urgency, and ask for parliament’s attention.” Many respondents, including in ombudsman 
organizations, also noted that too aggressive a media strategy can also hurt the relationship with 
an organization needed for future cooperation. Instead of using media, it might be more effective 
to negotiate solutions outside of the limelight. The effect of media pressure however, seems to 
be rather limited. No matter how well-designed the media-strategy might be, media are usually 
simply not interested in technocratic reports by audit organizations. Even when there is media 
attention, as most auditee respondents told us, the political nature of the discussion makes the 
influence of media on the implementation negligible. Unless the SAI or Ombudsman’s 
conclusions form a serious scandal, the minister can usually just ignore media attention.  
Parliamentary pressure is, much like media attention, rather limited. Most parliamentary 
committees on the topics of audits pay very little to no attention to SAI and Ombudsmen reports. 
Even in countries where parliamentary commissions systematically discuss SAI and/or 
Ombudsman reports, the coalition/government usually has its affairs locked. Parliamentary 
pressure thus usually comes from the minority parties who are virtually powerless against the 
tight coalition agreements or single party majorities. Both factors point towards a very limited 
impact of parliamentary pressure on the implementation of recommendations made by 
Ombudsmen and SAIs. Finally, most SAIs and Ombudsmen try to keeps relationships with 
parliamentarians close and warm. However, much emphasis is put on the independent position 
of the audit organizations, which is paramount at all times. One respondent explained: “We try to 
talk to the committees as much as possible, and always offer to be a partner in discussing the 
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report. We can however never do anything unless there is unanimous support in parliament or 
the committee. As soon as one party disagrees, we decline. We do not want to be seen as 
partisan in even the slightest way.”  
One final, interesting note on both media and parliamentary pressure should be made: many 
respondents claimed that both pressures will not cause any influence as long as they occur 
independently of one another. When both occur simultaneously, or one occurs because of the 
other, they might form a significant pressure on the government, minister and department to 
speed up implementation of the recommendations. Whether parliamentary attention and 
pressure is created by media attention on the reports or the media pays attention to 
parliamentary discussions on the reports differs from case to case. In other words: both media 
and parliamentary attention are necessary but individually insufficient pressures to speed up 
implementation of recommendations.   
 Learning 5.4.3.
The first two factors which were summed up as influencing the learning processes of the 
organizations under scrutiny have been found to, perhaps not surprisingly, heavily correlate. 
However, it is hard to know if a relationship based on trust creates the possibility of a 
cooperative process based on open and informal communication, or the other way around. We 
did find that recommendations following such a process, combined with a relationship based on 
trust and cooperation, are better received by the scrutinized organization, with a consequential 
higher probability of implementation. During such processes many factual and contextual 
problems can be solved, before the recommendations are actually published. However, it is not a 
guarantee. Even if the process was characterized by an informal method of cooperation, the 
points of view of both sides can remain different. 
This last point is strongly correlated, in its part, on the audit criteria adopted by the SAI or 
Ombudsman. What norms does the audit organization use in controlling the respective 
organization? What is effective and efficient in this particular case? Does the SAI or Ombudsman 
take into account the political, international and financial context in which the organization 
under scrutiny operates? These question, most of the times, cannot be answered by the 
respondents from audited organizations. The lack of transparency surrounding these audit 
criteria can cause a lot of miscommunication, frustration, and eventually lead to 
recommendations that either don’t comply with reality or are seen as useless by the 
organization under scrutiny. This is one of the findings on which almost all auditees agree, and 
on which almost all auditors have a lot of room for improvement.  
The SAI and Ombudsman perceive themselves and are perceived rather differently. This is again 
an item for which there was a rather high degree of agreement throughout our six countries. The 
SAI and Ombudsman view themselves as controllers, with an advising function. The auditees 
either see them as strictly controllers (based on their past experience with audits) or as strictly 
advisors (based on the role they think auditors should have). A difference in the perception of 
the role the audit and its auditor has can, from the very start, strongly influence the process and 
relationship between the two sides. 
Another perception which strongly determines the auditee’s view of the process and its results 
is the expertise of the Ombudsman and SAI. We found that most respondents of audited 
organizations do not mind if the auditors make mistakes. Many see their policy field as complex 
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and difficult to navigate and understand that the auditors have to be all-round experts, with 
limited time and resources to get to know the policy field in depth. However, more frustration 
resides over the (perceived) lack of understanding of the context in which the organizations 
operate. The single most heard complaint, throughout the six countries, was the lack of 
sensitivity of the SAI or Ombudsman to the political, financial and other practical constraints 
that the audited organization has to deal with.  
The five factors which affect the Learning dimension in the organization under scrutiny are 
highly correlated. The process of collaboration, trust between the two organizations and the 
form and tone of communications are both the cause and the solution to problems regarding 
role- or expertise-perception and the lack of transparency with regards to criteria. There is also 
a clear overlap between these factors and the feedback factors: follow-ups and exit meetings. 
This means that these factors (cooperation and communication) can be seen as the core factors 
influencing the impact of SAIs and Ombudsmen on social innovation in the organizations under 
scrutiny.  
A possible explanation for the difference between implementation and non-implementation 
between countries lies in the question whether the audit-bodies take feasibility of 
recommendations into account. For the Netherlands, Belgium, Slovakia and the local cases of the 
UK (where non-implementation is highest), the auditors mentioned that they did not take 
feasibility into account. As one respondent put it: “If we think it is needed, that’s just the way it 
is. The feasibility of a recommendation does not change that.” For the other cases (Romania, 
France and the national cases for the UK) it was clear that feasibility had been taken into 
account. This would be a logical explanation for the high number of implementations for these 
cases. 
A final, but very noteworthy observation we found in two Ombudsman offices. Here the 
ombudsman deliberately incorporates recommendations he/she knows will not be accepted by 
the organization. However, it is seen as part of the role of an Ombudsman to start discussions 
and dialogues, first on processes, and eventually on perceptions and cultures surrounding topics 
of performance. Hence, by recommending something he/she knows will not be accepted, he/she 
hopes to kick start new learning and feedback processes, which will get the conversation going. 
This is seen as the first step towards future innovation.  
 Further observations 5.4.4.
Besides the former observations, we could draw a number of other conclusions, which are not as 
strongly related to our FAL-model. 
First, history matters. The regime change in Romania and Slovakia, although far back in the 
minds of many Western Europeans, is still a fresh memory with real impacts in policy and 
governance. The SAI and Ombudsman in Romania have not yet had a chance to create a firm and 
solid reputation, contributing to difficulties in their collaboration with scrutinized organizations. 
In Slovakia, the political culture, a remnant of pre-1990 politics, is still one which does not, or 
only scarcely, accept the outside influence of actors to policy. No matter how many policy 
recommendations these organizations implement, history is something that needs to be 
accounted for and which can only be dealt with in a delicate and case-by-case fashion. 
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Second, the attitude of the SAI differs significantly from that of its audit colleague, the 
Ombudsman. Perhaps not surprisingly, because of their different mandates and roles, the 
Ombudsman is a little more ‘rebellious’ than the SAI. The Ombudsman is more assertive in 
enlarging their role, scope of research and in starting research even though they don’t have the 
right to initiate research. When investigating one organization, Ombudsmen are not afraid to 
address all governmental organizations in their recommendations. Not having the right of 
initiating an investigation does not hinder an Ombudsman, as one of our respondents puts it: 
“We can always find a complaint about the topic we want to investigate. And one complaint is 
enough.” In addition, even though the law stipulates the role of the Ombudsman as a rights-
defender, they almost never limit themselves to this role. Performance, efficiency and 
effectiveness are just as easily used as criteria in trying to improve the administration.  
Third, a good relationship is not dependent on an unbalanced power-relationship. In the case of 
France and Romania, the SAI’s and Ombudsman’s recommendations are legally binding. One can 
expect the scrutinized organizations to view them as enemies, coming to change the processes 
and workings with binding powers. However, as we found in our interviews, the relationship 
between the scrutinized organizations and the two SAIs and two Ombudsmen is very good. 
Mutual respect for each other’s role, open communication, collaborative processes and 
negotiations about the recommendations can, apparently, supersede an unbalanced power-
relationship. 
Finally, it’s all about timing. Elections, negotiations at the EU level, the number of audits the 
organization has had in the last two years and the political situation are all time-specific factors 
which are a part of the oftentimes forgotten context in which scrutinized organizations have to 
operate. They should however be taken into account by audit organizations, if they want to 
propose reasonable and obtainable recommendations. However, many respondents of SAIs and 
Ombudsmen stated that the context is not their concern. Political or financial barriers don’t 
influence their conclusions as long as it is within reason: their expertise and norms simply lead 
them to a certain conclusion. Changing this opinion on the basis of a certain pragmatic context is 
not their job and it would diminish their reputation as independent organizations, conducting 
technical, factually based research. 
With these findings, combined with the more detailed country reports in the annexes, we can 
now fill in the table as proposed at the start of this chapter. On the following page, the countries 
for whom the factors determining X’s influence on the FAL-model within an organization is 
positive receive a ‘+’ for those respective factors. A ‘-' indicates a negative effect of the SAI and 
Ombudsman on creating and stimulating social innovation in the organizations under scrutiny. 
Finally, a ‘+/-‘ indicates rather stark differences between cases in these countries.  
  
 
Table 36: Influence of Ombudsmen and SAIs on Social Innovation
                                                             
25 Media and parliamentary pressure received a ‘+’ for all cases, under the conditions that both operate simultaneously. 
 X  
Countries 
Feedback 
 
Follow-up 
Feedback 
 
(Exit) 
Discussion 
Accountability 
 
Media 
Pressure25 
Accountability 
 
Parliamentary 
Pressure 
Learning 
Communication/ 
Collaboration 
Learning 
 
Trust/  
 Distrust 
Learning 
 
Reputation of 
Auditor: Role 
Learning 
 
Reputation of 
Auditor: 
Expertise 
Learning 
 
Audit 
Criteria 
Y 
Belgium +/- +/- + + +/- + +/- + -  
France + + + + + + +/- + - 
Binding 
Recommendations 
Netherlands +/- +/- + + +/- +/- +/- + -  
Slovakia - - + + - - - - -  
Romania + + + + + + +/- + - 
Binding 
Recommendations 
United Kingdom +/- +/- + + + + +/- + -  
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 Conclusions  5.5.
Before we draw any conclusions about the table above, we should reconsider what this 
information actually says. As mentioned before, we consider the SAIs and Ombudsmen to be a 
part of the following INUS-condition: 
((FAL, X) or Y)  Sustainable Innovations (1) 
This means that the FAL-model, within an organization, is necessary for the creation of 
sustainable innovations. However this FAL-model needs to be kick started, as it were, by ‘X’. ‘X’, 
in our case, consists of SAIs and Ombudsmen who audit the respective organizations and 
recommend improvements and innovations. The factors mentioned in the table are a part of X’s 
functioning and influence on the FAL-model. Hence, if one or more of the factors does not appear 
to be present in the processes and relationships surrounding audits, the factor X will not be able 
to kick start the FAL-model towards innovation efficiently, only partial, or not at all. 
Going back to the table, we see that Slovakia has the biggest number of barriers when it comes to 
social innovations through its SAI and Ombudsman, combined with the FAL-model. History 
might still be casting a shadow on this particular situation, together with a high politicization of 
the administration. France and Romania on the other hand seem to have the highest potential of 
kick starting innovations. This can be explained through the legally binding nature of their SAIs 
and Ombudsmen. This legally binding character in itself would be enough to implement social 
innovation, simply because the governmental organizations have to follow their 
recommendations. However, besides this legality of the recommendations, France and Romania 
also seem to have a fairly promising process and relationship with its auditees. Perhaps this can 
be explained by the closeness with which the organizations collaborate with the organizations 
under scrutiny, and the negotiations that precede the SAI’s and Ombudsman’s 
recommendations. 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK paint a more complex picture. The processes and practices 
differ strongly between their SAI and Ombudsman, but also between cases. This is particularly 
interesting since the same audit organization seems to have a different influence on some 
organizations’ FAL-model than on other organizations’. Processes and practices are, apparently, 
not consistent throughout time and throughout the audit organization. 
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 Conclusions, Policy Recommendations and Future 6.
Research 
Wouter van Acker & Geert Bouckaert (KU Leuven)  
 Conclusions & Policy Recommendations 6.1.
Even though our research was divided into two parts, one qualitative and one quantitative, and 
even though they concerned two rather different units of analysis, award winning innovations 
and Ombud- and Audit-organizations, all the work revolves around the same two concepts: 
change and innovation. We will present our conclusions per research goal (as mentioned in the 
description of work), and finally for the second focus of our research: feedback, accountability 
and learning. 
1. Make an inventory and analysis of databases on best EU practices for innovation  
 
After analysing the nature of public sector innovations in the six countries we covered, we found 
that by far the most innovations took place in the general administration of public organizations, 
in the public health sector and in the realm of social welfare. Public utility service innovations 
were extremely rare, even though many market mechanisms had been put in place over the last 
couple of years.  
Preliminary Figure 29: Innovation per Policy Area Combined Sample 
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Second, there seemed to be no clear link between who innovates: local, regional or national 
organizations. Finally, e-Government, participation and improving processes and quality are the 
most popular types of innovations. However, the focus of the awards should be taken into 
account here, not all awards take into account all types of innovation or all types of 
governmental organizations.  
Preliminary Figure 30: Type of Innovation Combined Sample 
 
 
 
2. Analyse the recommendations made by audit offices and ombudsmen 
3. To identify relevant drivers and barriers that explain if and why these 
recommendations have (or have not been) implemented 
 
The 70+ interviews we conducted both with Ombudsmen and SAIs, on the one hand, and the 
auditees, on the other, showed us that the processes and contexts surrounding audits can greatly 
influence the adoption of social innovations, and the way in which their recommendations are 
used within the FAL-structure of the organizations under scrutiny. The proper use of exit 
meetings, transparency about the criteria an auditor uses and explaining the reasons for its 
choice to investigate the particular organization or the particular topic, are but a few of the 
reasons why the reports of Ombud- and Audit-organizations are followed or not. Much depends 
on misconceptions and/or miscommunication, causing reluctance to accept the diagnosis the 
auditor proposes, as well as causing the auditor to draw false, or at least misinformed 
conclusions. We were able to form the following graph, showing the obstacles in the six 
countries when it comes to the promotion of social innovation through Ombud- and Audit 
reports.
  
 
 
Table 37: Influence of Ombudsmen and SAIs on Social Innovation 
                                                             
26 Media and parliamentary pressure received a ‘+’ for all cases, under the conditions that both operate simultaneously. 
 X  
Countries 
Feedback 
 
Follow-up 
Feedback 
 
(Exit) 
Discussion 
Accountability 
 
Media 
Pressure26 
Accountability 
 
Parliamentary 
Pressure 
Learning 
Communication/ 
Collaboration 
Learning 
 
Trust/  
 Distrust 
Learning 
 
Reputation of 
Auditor: Role 
Learning 
 
Reputation of 
Auditor: 
Expertise 
Learning 
 
Audit 
Criteria 
Y 
Belgium +/- +/- + + +/- + +/- + -  
France + + + + + + +/- + - 
Binding 
Recommendations 
Netherlands +/- +/- + + +/- +/- +/- + -  
Slovakia - - + + - - - - -  
Romania + + + + + + +/- + - 
Binding 
Recommendations 
United Kingdom +/- +/- + + + + +/- + -  
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4. To make policy recommendations in order to improve the use of accountability 
information for public service innovation 
 
After analysing the interviews and relevant documents, we formed the following policy 
recommendations concerning the impact of audits and ombud-investigations. 
 
To retain social innovations, Ombudsmen’s and SAIs’ audit activities should: 
1. …create a cooperative and transparent audit- or ombud-process. 
This will enhance the quality of the recommendations and the communication between the 
auditor/ombudsman and organization under scrutiny.  
2. …use exit meetings not only as a formal step, but as genuine, open dialogues. 
Only when exit meetings are a true open dialogue will there be an optimal learning opportunity for the 
organization under scrutiny, and only then can closed feedback loops foster innovation. 
3. …make the audit- and ombud criteria clear and transparent. 
The Ombud- and Audit organization has a framework from which it looks at an organization in search of 
improvements. When these criteria are known to the organization under scrutiny, the recommendations 
will be better understood and have greater impact.  
4. …make clear why the auditee has been chosen for an audit. 
When an organization under scrutiny knows why it has been selected for an audit or investigation, this 
creates a more cooperative and transparent process.  
5. …enhance the expediency of recommendations by looking at the legal, administrative and 
political feasibility. 
Recommendations which have been formulated in the light of their feasibility will have a greater impact 
on the organizations under scrutiny and their innovations. 
6. …be aware of the influence of discussions in the media about audit- and ombud-reports. 
The content and way to communicate with a broader public should get high attention.  
7. …be aware that combined media and parliamentary attention is functional.  
Our analysis shows that parliamentary and media attention foster the implementation of 
recommendations when this attention happens simultaneously.  
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The literature posed two fairly straightforward questions about successful innovations: what explains 
the success or sustainability of innovations, and what happens to innovations after they are initiated? 
In this research project we further explored the influence of feedback loops, accountability 
mechanisms and learning processes, together referred to as the FAL-model, on the sustainability of 
innovations. We regard these factors to be the fertile ground for policy recommendations to turn into 
sustainable and successful social innovations. Without these factors, policy recommendations which 
do not possess a legally binding character are bound to be ineffective.  
As the literature showed us through a substantive literature review, the start of an innovation can be 
attributed to three factors: Feedback, Accountability and Learning. We investigated whether these 
three factors also contributed to the innovations’ successful and sustainable life after their initiation 
through the following logic:  
 
 
Realizing that these three factors form too simple a concept to truly describe the reality of social 
innovation, we looked for a more complex causal model. This model started by adding factors which 
can influence the way the FAL-model works within an organization:  
 
Finally, there are exogenous factors which can, on their own, explain sustainable social innovations. 
Including these factors in our causal model led us to the adoption of the following INUS-condition:  
 
 
Investigating the FAL-model in about 250 good practice cases brought us to several conclusions. Our 
survey showed us that several factors are statistically correlated to the survival of an innovation. 
Although it is not possible to speak about causality here, it is relevant to mention these factors once 
more in the policy recommendations. What is more relevant to our initial research question is the 
correlation we found between the survival of innovations and the score the respective organizations 
had on our FAL-dimensions. We found that organizations with an unsustainable innovation tended to 
have lower FAL-scores, indicating the importance of Feedback, Accountability and Learning as factors 
in sustaining the life of an innovation. 
To retain social innovations, public organizations should focus on: 
Learning processes 
1. …creating a culture of adversarial debate and openness for constructive criticism. 
Learning can take place when current mindsets clash with new information, refuting earlier held 
positions. Adversarial debates are a crucial platform for such information to start changing minds. 
2. …encouraging experimentation and alternative ways of getting work done. 
Innovation entails, by definition, changes and doing things differently. Experimentation, as controversial 
as it may be in the public sector, forms a great way to test ideas and new methods, before going all in.  
3. …not penalizing responsible staff members if a creative attempt to solve a problem fails. 
FAL  Z 
(FAL, X)  Z 
 
((FAL, X) or Y)  Z 
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A key characteristic of experimentation is that it can fail. If the chances of being penalized are 
substantial when an experiment fails, people will cease to look for innovative ways to improve the status 
quo.  
Accountability mechanisms 
4. …employees who feel responsible for the performance of the organization. 
Employees with a sense of responsibility are part of an internal accountability system.  
5. …a culture of transparency about results towards external stakeholders. 
Transparency is an essential requirement for accountability. Since accountability supports innovation, 
transparency supports innovation too. 
Feedback loops 
6. …staff members who express their concerns, ideas and suggestions about the functioning of 
the organization. 
In line with recommendation 1, there needs to be a platform where the adversarial debates can actually 
influence the people who make strategic decisions. 
7. …staff members’ feedback information which has a significant impact on the strategic 
decisions made by the organization. 
Once such a platform is created, decision makers should take this feedback information into account 
when making strategic decisions. 
8. …customers’ feedback information which has a significant impact on the strategic decisions 
made by the organization. 
Besides civil servants, both ombudsmen and customers (through ombudsmen or independently) have a 
lot to say about a public organization’s functioning. Such critiques should be embraced as learning 
opportunities for every organization. Often both ombudsmen and customers/citizens know what they’re 
talking about, and may bring in fresh ideas. 
9. …the reports and recommendations from ombudsmen institutions have a significant impact on 
the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
However, the size and nature of our sample should be a reason for caution. Our sample is rather small, 
consisting of only around 250 cases for our survey and a little over 70 interviews. As mentioned 
before, getting people to talk about innovations is a hard thing to do. As Pollitt, Bouckaert and Löffler 
found in 2007, people soon forget the details about an innovation, even though it was initiated only a 
couple of years earlier. This seriously hampered our response rate, especially from organizations 
whose innovations had disappeared. Personnel turnover, a lack of institutional memory, together with 
the blaming and shaming that goes hand in hand with (‘failing’) public innovations, restrain people 
from cooperation, even under the condition of anonymity. The same goes for the cooperation of 
Ombudsmen and SAIs, together with their auditees. Here as well, the institutional memory fades fast 
when auditors or employees leave and people do not like to be ‘controlled’, as respondents put it, on 
the functioning of their audit processes or on their compliance with relevant, well thought out 
recommendations.  
 
 
 Future Research 6.2.
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Any research is limited in its resources and time, and all research results in more questions than it had 
aimed to answer. Ours is no exception to this. 
Further research should focus on a number of things: 
- Develop a database of submitted innovations to awards, in order to investigate their FAL-
score; 
Our research sample consisted of organizations who are the top public organizations. Since they have 
received awards we can assume their score in our FAL-model will be higher than the average public 
organization. Investigating organizations who have applied for awards, but were not submitted to the 
finals can give us a more complete picture. 
- Adapt a more process tracing focused approach to the life stories of disappeared innovations, 
in order to include more than one FAL-cycle, as was done in this research; 
Our survey only had a small number of questions concerning the life stories of the innovations. To really 
know how these have developed over time we need a more in-depth look, possibly through process 
tracing, document analysis and qualitative interviews with directly and indirectly concerned parties. 
- Create a more comprehensive database on European innovations, including all EU-member 
states and other European countries; 
The database we were able to construct, after an immense effort in obtaining the necessary materials, is 
still insufficient for making an assessment of innovation throughout Europe. Our research only focused 
on six EU member states; an in-depth analysis of the case sheets will take many additional hours, 
especially if all 28 member states are taken into account. 
- Comparing how cultural factors determine the strength or content of the FAL-structure 
between different (for example OECD) countries; 
We treated our six countries of research as equal when investigating their culture surrounding feedback, 
accountability and learning. We realize, however, that those concepts can be culturally dependent, and 
learning in one country might work in different ways than in other countries. Future research needs to 
strongly pay attention to these differences and the different ways FAL can take form and influence 
innovations. 
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Annex I – Survey Items 
 
 
 
My organization is characterized by a culture of adversarial debate and openness for constructive criticism. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 3 1 2 0 0 7 
% within Country 1,3% 3,6% 4,3% 6,5% 0,0% 0,0% 2,9% 
Inaccurate Count 3 6 0 2 1 2 14 
% within Country 3,9% 7,2% 0,0% 6,5% 6,3% 12,5% 5,7% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 9 7 2 8 4 3 33 
% within Country 11,8% 8,4% 8,7% 25,8% 25,0% 18,8% 13,5% 
Accurate Count 30 31 15 16 9 6 107 
% within Country 39,5% 37,3% 65,2% 51,6% 56,3% 37,5% 43,7% 
Highly accurate Count 33 34 5 3 2 5 82 
% within Country 43,4% 41,0% 21,7% 9,7% 12,5% 31,3% 33,5% 
Total Count 76 83 23 31 16 16 245 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
Within my organization, people are usually comfortable talking about problems, disagreements and differences in opinion.  
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 2 1 1 1 0 0 5 
% within Country 2,6% 1,2% 4,3% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 2,0% 
Inaccurate Count 5 12 0 1 1 0 19 
% within Country 6,6% 14,5% 0,0% 3,2% 6,3% 0,0% 7,8% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 11 8 3 7 4 0 33 
% within Country 14,5% 9,6% 13,0% 22,6% 25,0% 0,0% 13,5% 
Accurate Count 46 37 14 19 6 6 128 
% within Country 60,5% 44,6% 60,9% 61,3% 37,5% 37,5% 52,2% 
Highly accurate Count 12 25 5 3 5 10 60 
% within Country 15,8% 30,1% 21,7% 9,7% 31,3% 62,5% 24,5% 
Total Count 76 83 23 31 16 16 245 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization encourages productive conflict and debate during internal discussions. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 6 1 2 0 0 10 
% within Country 1,4% 7,5% 4,3% 6,5% 0,0% 0,0% 4,2% 
Inaccurate Count 16 18 2 4 0 0 40 
% within Country 21,9% 22,5% 8,7% 12,9% 0,0% 0,0% 16,7% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 20 21 7 5 3 2 58 
% within Country 27,4% 26,3% 30,4% 16,1% 18,8% 12,5% 24,3% 
Accurate Count 31 25 10 18 7 7 98 
% within Country 42,5% 31,3% 43,5% 58,1% 43,8% 43,8% 41,0% 
Highly accurate Count 5 10 3 2 6 7 33 
% within Country 6,8% 12,5% 13,0% 6,5% 37,5% 43,8% 13,8% 
Total Count 73 80 23 31 16 16 239 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Within my organization, well-established perspectives and assumptions are never challenged or questioned.  
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly accurate Count 0 5 0 4 5 0 14 
% within Country 0,0% 6,3% 0,0% 12,9% 31,3% 0,0% 5,8% 
Accurate Count 5 14 2 16 7 1 45 
% within Country 6,7% 17,5% 8,7% 51,6% 43,8% 6,3% 18,7% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 12 18 5 7 4 0 46 
% within Country 16,0% 22,5% 21,7% 22,6% 25,0% 0,0% 19,1% 
Inaccurate Count 46 37 11 3 0 9 106 
% within Country 61,3% 46,3% 47,8% 9,7% 0,0% 56,3% 44,0% 
Highly inaccurate Count 12 6 5 1 0 6 30 
% within Country 16,0% 7,5% 21,7% 3,2% 0,0% 37,5% 12,4% 
Total Count 75 80 23 31 16 16 241 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
My organization is characterized by a tendency to avoid risks.  
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly accurate Count 7 15 2 4 0 0 28 
% within Country 9,2% 18,1% 8,7% 12,9% 0,0% 0,0% 11,5% 
Accurate Count 23 25 4 17 5 3 77 
% within Country 30,3% 30,1% 17,4% 54,8% 33,3% 18,8% 31,6% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 18 11 7 8 6 3 53 
% within Country 23,7% 13,3% 30,4% 25,8% 40,0% 18,8% 21,7% 
Inaccurate Count 21 24 9 2 2 7 65 
% within Country 27,6% 28,9% 39,1% 6,5% 13,3% 43,8% 26,6% 
Highly inaccurate Count 7 8 1 0 2 3 21 
% within Country 9,2% 9,6% 4,3% 0,0% 13,3% 18,8% 8,6% 
Total Count 76 83 23 31 15 16 244 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization encourages experimentation and alternative ways of getting work done.  
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 4 1 2 0 0 8 
% within Country 1,3% 4,9% 4,3% 6,5% 0,0% 0,0% 3,3% 
Inaccurate Count 13 5 2 2 3 1 26 
% within Country 17,1% 6,2% 8,7% 6,5% 18,8% 6,3% 10,7% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 22 18 2 9 6 1 58 
% within Country 28,9% 22,2% 8,7% 29,0% 37,5% 6,3% 23,9% 
Accurate Count 34 35 8 14 5 4 100 
% within Country 44,7% 43,2% 34,8% 45,2% 31,3% 25,0% 41,2% 
Highly accurate Count 6 19 10 4 2 10 51 
% within Country 7,9% 23,5% 43,5% 12,9% 12,5% 62,5% 21,0% 
Total Count 76 81 23 31 16 16 243 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
 
If a creative attempt to solve a problem fails, the responsible staff members are penalized. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly accurate Count 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
% within Country 1,4% 2,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,3% 
Accurate Count 2 2 0 7 1 0 12 
% within Country 2,7% 2,5% 0,0% 22,6% 6,3% 0,0% 5,0% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 9 8 2 9 2 1 31 
% within Country 12,2% 10,1% 8,7% 29,0% 12,5% 6,3% 13,0% 
Inaccurate Count 38 34 14 13 8 8 115 
% within Country 51,4% 43,0% 60,9% 41,9% 50,0% 50,0% 48,1% 
Highly inaccurate Count 24 33 7 2 5 7 78 
% within Country 32,4% 41,8% 30,4% 6,5% 31,3% 43,8% 32,6% 
Total Count 74 79 23 31 16 16 239 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization has a formal process for conducting and evaluating experiments or new ideas. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 14 12 2 1 2 0 31 
% within Country 18,4% 14,5% 8,7% 3,2% 12,5% 0,0% 12,7% 
Inaccurate Count 26 34 10 1 3 1 75 
% within Country 34,2% 41,0% 43,5% 3,2% 18,8% 6,3% 30,6% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 18 14 6 17 5 6 66 
% within Country 23,7% 16,9% 26,1% 54,8% 31,3% 37,5% 26,9% 
Accurate Count 13 17 5 8 2 7 52 
% within Country 17,1% 20,5% 21,7% 25,8% 12,5% 43,8% 21,2% 
Highly accurate Count 3 4 0 4 3 2 16 
% within Country 3,9% 4,8% 0,0% 12,9% 18,8% 12,5% 6,5% 
Total Count 76 83 23 31 16 16 245 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
My organization systematically keeps records and archives to document past experiences. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 6 8 3 0 0 0 17 
% within Country 7,9% 9,6% 13,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 6,9% 
Inaccurate Count 13 10 8 0 0 0 31 
% within Country 17,1% 12,0% 34,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 12,7% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 14 11 2 3 5 4 39 
% within Country 18,4% 13,3% 8,7% 9,7% 31,3% 25,0% 15,9% 
Accurate Count 29 38 8 20 3 7 105 
% within Country 38,2% 45,8% 34,8% 64,5% 18,8% 43,8% 42,9% 
Highly accurate Count 13 14 2 8 8 5 50 
% within Country 17,1% 16,9% 8,7% 25,8% 50,0% 31,3% 20,4% 
Total Count 76 83 23 31 16 16 245 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization has monitoring systems that allow it to monitor a wide spectrum of performances and to compare those performances with the stated goals and objectives. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 5 14 2 1 0 0 22 
% within Country 6,7% 17,5% 8,7% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 9,1% 
Inaccurate Count 9 24 6 2 2 0 43 
% within Country 12,0% 30,0% 26,1% 6,5% 12,5% 0,0% 17,8% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 11 11 5 4 3 2 36 
% within Country 14,7% 13,8% 21,7% 12,9% 18,8% 12,5% 14,9% 
Accurate Count 30 27 10 20 7 9 103 
% within Country 40,0% 33,8% 43,5% 64,5% 43,8% 56,3% 42,7% 
Highly accurate Count 20 4 0 4 4 5 37 
% within Country 26,7% 5,0% 0,0% 12,9% 25,0% 31,3% 15,4% 
Total Count 75 80 23 31 16 16 241 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
My organization has formal procedures to ensure that lessons learned in the course of a project are passed along to others doing similar tasks. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 5 7 1 1 1 0 15 
% within Country 6,7% 8,5% 4,3% 3,2% 6,3% 0,0% 6,2% 
Inaccurate Count 22 27 9 1 2 1 62 
% within Country 29,3% 32,9% 39,1% 3,2% 12,5% 6,3% 25,5% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 25 20 7 11 7 6 76 
% within Country 33,3% 24,4% 30,4% 35,5% 43,8% 37,5% 31,3% 
Accurate Count 20 18 5 11 4 7 65 
% within Country 26,7% 22,0% 21,7% 35,5% 25,0% 43,8% 26,7% 
Highly accurate Count 3 10 1 7 2 2 25 
% within Country 4,0% 12,2% 4,3% 22,6% 12,5% 12,5% 10,3% 
Total Count 75 82 23 31 16 16 243 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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In my organization, people are too busy to invest time in the improvement of work processes. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly accurate Count 9 9 3 1 0 0 22 
% within Country 11,8% 10,8% 13,0% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 9,0% 
Accurate Count 8 23 0 5 2 1 39 
% within Country 10,5% 27,7% 0,0% 16,1% 12,5% 6,3% 15,9% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 17 15 9 11 5 2 59 
% within Country 22,4% 18,1% 39,1% 35,5% 31,3% 12,5% 24,1% 
Inaccurate Count 41 30 10 7 8 11 107 
% within Country 53,9% 36,1% 43,5% 22,6% 50,0% 68,8% 43,7% 
Highly inaccurate Count 1 6 1 7 1 2 18 
% within Country 1,3% 7,2% 4,3% 22,6% 6,3% 12,5% 7,3% 
Total Count 76 83 23 31 16 16 245 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
Despite the workload, people in my organization find time to reflect on past performances.  
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
% within Country 0,0% 1,2% 0,0% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,8% 
Inaccurate Count 6 13 2 1 1 0 23 
% within Country 8,0% 15,7% 8,7% 3,2% 6,3% 0,0% 9,4% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 17 18 3 4 1 0 43 
% within Country 22,7% 21,7% 13,0% 12,9% 6,3% 0,0% 17,6% 
Accurate Count 45 36 16 22 9 11 139 
% within Country 60,0% 43,4% 69,6% 71,0% 56,3% 68,8% 57,0% 
Highly accurate Count 7 15 2 3 5 5 37 
% within Country 9,3% 18,1% 8,7% 9,7% 31,3% 31,3% 15,2% 
Total Count 75 83 23 31 16 16 244 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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The staff members of my organization have rather homogeneous educational backgrounds. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly accurate Count 0 5 0 1 3 0 9 
% within Country 0,0% 6,4% 0,0% 3,2% 18,8% 0,0% 3,8% 
Accurate Count 14 15 2 21 3 1 56 
% within Country 18,4% 19,2% 8,7% 67,7% 18,8% 6,7% 23,4% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 10 12 1 4 4 5 36 
% within Country 13,2% 15,4% 4,3% 12,9% 25,0% 33,3% 15,1% 
Inaccurate Count 39 30 11 3 3 5 91 
% within Country 51,3% 38,5% 47,8% 9,7% 18,8% 33,3% 38,1% 
Highly inaccurate Count 13 16 9 2 3 4 47 
% within Country 17,1% 20,5% 39,1% 6,5% 18,8% 26,7% 19,7% 
Total Count 76 78 23 31 16 15 239 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
If discrepancies between performances and goals are detected, my organization will take action in order to reduce these discrepancies. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 3 0 1 0 0 5 
% within Country 1,3% 3,7% 0,0% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 2,1% 
Inaccurate Count 3 9 1 1 0 0 14 
% within Country 4,0% 11,0% 4,3% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 12 18 4 1 4 2 41 
% within Country 16,0% 22,0% 17,4% 3,2% 25,0% 12,5% 16,9% 
Accurate Count 43 41 18 27 8 10 147 
% within Country 57,3% 50,0% 78,3% 87,1% 50,0% 62,5% 60,5% 
Highly accurate Count 16 11 0 1 4 4 36 
% within Country 21,3% 13,4% 0,0% 3,2% 25,0% 25,0% 14,8% 
Total Count 75 82 23 31 16 16 243 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization has a quality management system that systematically strives for continuous improvements throughout the entire organization. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 3 8 0 2 1 0 14 
% within Country 3,9% 9,9% 0,0% 6,5% 6,3% 0,0% 5,8% 
Inaccurate Count 7 24 8 3 1 2 45 
% within Country 9,2% 29,6% 34,8% 9,7% 6,3% 12,5% 18,5% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 14 24 5 3 3 3 52 
% within Country 18,4% 29,6% 21,7% 9,7% 18,8% 18,8% 21,4% 
Accurate Count 32 17 6 16 2 3 76 
% within Country 42,1% 21,0% 26,1% 51,6% 12,5% 18,8% 31,3% 
Highly accurate Count 20 8 4 7 9 8 56 
% within Country 26,3% 9,9% 17,4% 22,6% 56,3% 50,0% 23,0% 
Total Count 76 81 23 31 16 16 243 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
My organization regularly evaluates whether or not the existing organizational goals and objectives are still appropriate. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 
% within Country 1,3% 1,2% 0,0% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 1,2% 
Inaccurate Count 4 15 0 1 1 0 21 
% within Country 5,3% 18,1% 0,0% 3,2% 6,3% 0,0% 8,6% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 14 11 6 2 4 0 37 
% within Country 18,4% 13,3% 26,1% 6,5% 25,0% 0,0% 15,1% 
Accurate Count 33 47 16 21 6 9 132 
% within Country 43,4% 56,6% 69,6% 67,7% 37,5% 56,3% 53,9% 
Highly accurate Count 24 9 1 6 5 7 52 
% within Country 31,6% 10,8% 4,3% 19,4% 31,3% 43,8% 21,2% 
Total Count 76 83 23 31 16 16 245 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization has access to learning platforms that allow (public) organizations to share knowledge and experiences with other (public) organizations. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 2 3 0 1 1 0 7 
% within Country 2,8% 3,8% 0,0% 3,2% 6,3% 0,0% 3,0% 
Inaccurate Count 8 25 1 3 2 2 41 
% within Country 11,3% 31,3% 4,5% 9,7% 12,5% 12,5% 17,4% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 5 5 2 9 1 0 22 
% within Country 7,0% 6,3% 9,1% 29,0% 6,3% 0,0% 9,3% 
Accurate Count 40 33 15 17 9 11 125 
% within Country 56,3% 41,3% 68,2% 54,8% 56,3% 68,8% 53,0% 
Highly accurate Count 16 14 4 1 3 3 41 
% within Country 22,5% 17,5% 18,2% 3,2% 18,8% 18,8% 17,4% 
Total Count 71 80 22 31 16 16 236 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
My organization shares its knowledge and experience with other (public) organizations. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
% within Country 0,0% 2,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,8% 
Inaccurate Count 3 7 1 1 0 1 13 
% within Country 4,1% 8,5% 4,3% 3,2% 0,0% 6,3% 5,4% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 6 5 0 4 4 1 20 
% within Country 8,1% 6,1% 0,0% 12,9% 25,0% 6,3% 8,3% 
Accurate Count 46 45 13 18 12 9 143 
% within Country 62,2% 54,9% 56,5% 58,1% 75,0% 56,3% 59,1% 
Highly accurate Count 19 23 9 8 0 5 64 
% within Country 25,7% 28,0% 39,1% 25,8% 0,0% 31,3% 26,4% 
Total Count 74 82 23 31 16 16 242 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization learns from the experiences of other (public) organizations. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% within Country 0,0% 1,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 
Inaccurate Count 2 5 0 2 0 0 9 
% within Country 2,7% 6,0% 0,0% 6,5% 0,0% 0,0% 3,7% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 11 9 2 4 4 1 31 
% within Country 14,7% 10,8% 9,1% 12,9% 25,0% 6,3% 12,8% 
Accurate Count 45 50 12 20 10 11 148 
% within Country 60,0% 60,2% 54,5% 64,5% 62,5% 68,8% 60,9% 
Highly accurate Count 17 18 8 5 2 4 54 
% within Country 22,7% 21,7% 36,4% 16,1% 12,5% 25,0% 22,2% 
Total Count 75 83 22 31 16 16 243 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
My organization has an obligation to report about its performances to a higher authority. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 5 0 0 0 0 6 
% within Country 1,3% 6,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,4% 
Inaccurate Count 3 15 0 1 2 1 22 
% within Country 3,9% 18,1% 0,0% 3,2% 12,5% 6,3% 9,0% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 3 9 2 2 2 2 20 
% within Country 3,9% 10,8% 8,7% 6,5% 12,5% 12,5% 8,2% 
Accurate Count 33 36 13 11 5 6 104 
% within Country 43,4% 43,4% 56,5% 35,5% 31,3% 37,5% 42,4% 
Highly accurate Count 36 18 8 17 7 7 93 
% within Country 47,4% 21,7% 34,8% 54,8% 43,8% 43,8% 38,0% 
Total Count 76 83 23 31 16 16 245 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization has the opportunity to explain and justify its conduct towards this higher authority. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 4 0 0 0 0 5 
% within Country 1,3% 4,9% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,1% 
Inaccurate Count 2 12 0 1 1 3 19 
% within Country 2,7% 14,6% 0,0% 3,2% 6,3% 20,0% 7,9% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 5 11 3 5 2 3 29 
% within Country 6,7% 13,4% 13,0% 16,1% 12,5% 20,0% 12,0% 
Accurate Count 43 38 14 13 8 4 120 
% within Country 57,3% 46,3% 60,9% 41,9% 50,0% 26,7% 49,6% 
Highly accurate Count 24 17 6 12 5 5 69 
% within Country 32,0% 20,7% 26,1% 38,7% 31,3% 33,3% 28,5% 
Total Count 75 82 23 31 16 15 242 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
This higher authority has the possibility to penalize my organization for failing to achieve stated goals or expected performance standards. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 4 0 2 1 1 9 
% within Country 1,4% 4,9% 0,0% 6,5% 6,3% 6,3% 3,8% 
Inaccurate Count 7 22 3 0 3 2 37 
% within Country 9,7% 27,2% 13,0% 0,0% 18,8% 12,5% 15,5% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 17 22 6 5 6 2 58 
% within Country 23,6% 27,2% 26,1% 16,1% 37,5% 12,5% 24,3% 
Accurate Count 36 24 11 13 5 5 94 
% within Country 50,0% 29,6% 47,8% 41,9% 31,3% 31,3% 39,3% 
Highly accurate Count 11 9 3 11 1 6 41 
% within Country 15,3% 11,1% 13,0% 35,5% 6,3% 37,5% 17,2% 
Total Count 72 81 23 31 16 16 239 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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In general, the people of my organization feels responsible for the performance of the organization. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 3 0 1 0 0 5 
% within Country 1,4% 3,6% 0,0% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 2,1% 
Inaccurate Count 2 7 1 0 0 0 10 
% within Country 2,7% 8,4% 4,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 4,1% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 10 9 3 1 6 1 30 
% within Country 13,5% 10,8% 13,0% 3,2% 37,5% 6,3% 12,3% 
Accurate Count 45 40 15 23 7 8 138 
% within Country 60,8% 48,2% 65,2% 74,2% 43,8% 50,0% 56,8% 
Highly accurate Count 16 24 4 6 3 7 60 
% within Country 21,6% 28,9% 17,4% 19,4% 18,8% 43,8% 24,7% 
Total Count 74 83 23 31 16 16 243 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
Towards external stakeholders, my organization is very transparent about its results. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 3 2 0 1 0 0 6 
% within Country 4,0% 2,4% 0,0% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 2,5% 
Inaccurate Count 6 12 2 0 0 0 20 
% within Country 8,0% 14,5% 9,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 8,2% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 17 12 6 2 2 2 41 
% within Country 22,7% 14,5% 27,3% 6,5% 12,5% 12,5% 16,9% 
Accurate Count 31 43 12 21 8 7 122 
% within Country 41,3% 51,8% 54,5% 67,7% 50,0% 43,8% 50,2% 
Highly accurate Count 18 14 2 7 6 7 54 
% within Country 24,0% 16,9% 9,1% 22,6% 37,5% 43,8% 22,2% 
Total Count 75 83 22 31 16 16 243 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Does your organization have an ombudsman institution assigned to it? 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 No Count 26 70 10 12 14 8 140 
% within Country 37,7% 93,3% 50,0% 46,2% 93,3% 57,1% 63,9% 
Yes Count 43 5 10 14 1 6 79 
% within Country 62,3% 6,7% 50,0% 53,8% 6,7% 42,9% 36,1% 
Total Count 69 75 20 26 15 14 219 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
Does your organization have an external audit office assigned to it? 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 No Count 20 50 4 18 7 5 104 
% within Country 27,0% 64,1% 19,0% 60,0% 43,8% 31,3% 44,3% 
Yes Count 54 28 17 11 9 11 130 
% within Country 73,0% 35,9% 81,0% 36,7% 56,3% 68,8% 55,3% 
Total Count 74 78 21 30 16 16 235 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which it receives attention from your external audit office: Compliance with laws and regulations 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Receives no attention Count 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
% within Country 2,0% 0,0% 0,0% 8,3% 0,0% 0,0% 1,6% 
Receives a little attention Count 1 3 2 0 0 0 6 
% within Country 2,0% 11,5% 12,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 4,9% 
Receives moderate attention Count 3 5 2 1 0 2 13 
% within Country 5,9% 19,2% 12,5% 8,3% 0,0% 18,2% 10,6% 
Receives moderate to much attention Count 16 4 7 0 0 2 29 
% within Country 31,4% 15,4% 43,8% 0,0% 0,0% 18,2% 23,6% 
Receives very much attention Count 30 14 5 10 7 7 73 
% within Country 58,8% 53,8% 31,3% 83,3% 100,0% 63,6% 59,3% 
Total Count 51 26 16 12 7 11 123 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Please indicate the extent to which it receives attention from your external audit office: Accuracy and reliability of financial statements 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Receives no attention Count 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
% within Country 0,0% 4,0% 0,0% 8,3% 0,0% 0,0% 1,6% 
Receives a little attention Count 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
% within Country 2,0% 4,0% 6,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,4% 
Receives moderate attention Count 2 4 0 0 0 1 7 
% within Country 3,9% 16,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 9,1% 5,6% 
Receives moderate to much attention Count 10 4 5 0 0 2 21 
% within Country 19,6% 16,0% 31,3% 0,0% 0,0% 18,2% 16,9% 
Receives very much attention Count 38 15 10 11 9 8 91 
% within Country 74,5% 60,0% 62,5% 91,7% 100,0% 72,7% 73,4% 
Total Count 51 25 16 12 9 11 124 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which it receives attention from your external audit office: Performances and proper management 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 
 
Receives no attention Count 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 14,3% 0,0% 0,8% 
Receives a little attention Count 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 
% within Country 2,1% 7,7% 5,9% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 3,3% 
Receives moderate attention Count 12 6 6 1 0 1 26 
% within Country 25,0% 23,1% 35,3% 9,1% 0,0% 9,1% 21,7% 
Receives moderate to much attention Count 19 9 6 4 2 4 44 
% within Country 39,6% 34,6% 35,3% 36,4% 28,6% 36,4% 36,7% 
Receives very much attention Count 16 9 4 6 4 6 45 
% within Country 33,3% 34,6% 23,5% 54,5% 57,1% 54,5% 37,5% 
Total Count 48 26 17 11 7 11 120 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization encourages staff members to express their concerns, ideas and suggestions about the functioning of the organization. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
% within Country 1,3% 2,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,2% 
Inaccurate Count 4 9 1 1 1 0 16 
% within Country 5,3% 11,0% 4,3% 3,2% 6,3% 0,0% 6,6% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 9 15 3 3 3 0 33 
% within Country 11,8% 18,3% 13,0% 9,7% 18,8% 0,0% 13,5% 
Accurate Count 40 36 14 19 9 8 126 
% within Country 52,6% 43,9% 60,9% 61,3% 56,3% 50,0% 51,6% 
Highly accurate Count 22 20 5 8 3 8 66 
% within Country 28,9% 24,4% 21,7% 25,8% 18,8% 50,0% 27,0% 
Total Count 76 82 23 31 16 16 244 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
The feedback information from staff members is discussed and assessed by our managers in regular meetings.  
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 4 0 1 0 0 6 
% within Country 1,4% 5,1% 0,0% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 2,5% 
Inaccurate Count 9 13 1 1 2 0 26 
% within Country 12,2% 16,5% 4,3% 3,2% 12,5% 0,0% 10,9% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 9 24 8 2 4 2 49 
% within Country 12,2% 30,4% 34,8% 6,5% 25,0% 13,3% 20,6% 
Accurate Count 38 30 10 20 5 5 108 
% within Country 51,4% 38,0% 43,5% 64,5% 31,3% 33,3% 45,4% 
Highly accurate Count 17 8 4 7 5 8 49 
% within Country 23,0% 10,1% 17,4% 22,6% 31,3% 53,3% 20,6% 
Total Count 74 79 23 31 16 15 238 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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The feedback information from staff members has great impact on the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 
 
Highly inaccurate Count 2 5 0 2 1 0 10 
% within Country 2,7% 6,2% 0,0% 6,5% 6,3% 0,0% 4,1% 
Inaccurate Count 12 13 5 1 2 0 33 
% within Country 16,2% 16,0% 21,7% 3,2% 12,5% 0,0% 13,7% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 23 29 13 4 4 1 74 
% within Country 31,1% 35,8% 56,5% 12,9% 25,0% 6,3% 30,7% 
Accurate Count 34 26 4 17 5 8 94 
% within Country 45,9% 32,1% 17,4% 54,8% 31,3% 50,0% 39,0% 
Highly accurate Count 3 8 1 7 4 7 30 
% within Country 4,1% 9,9% 4,3% 22,6% 25,0% 43,8% 12,4% 
Total Count 74 81 23 31 16 16 241 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
How often does your organization organize a customer satisfaction survey? 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Never Count 5 13 1 3 0 2 24 
% within Country 7,4% 18,8% 4,5% 10,3% 0,0% 13,3% 11,0% 
Less than once every five years Count 10 10 1 3 0 1 25 
% within Country 14,7% 14,5% 4,5% 10,3% 0,0% 6,7% 11,5% 
At least once every five years Count 18 12 3 4 2 0 39 
% within Country 26,5% 17,4% 13,6% 13,8% 13,3% 0,0% 17,9% 
At least once every two years Count 13 8 2 3 1 0 27 
% within Country 19,1% 11,6% 9,1% 10,3% 6,7% 0,0% 12,4% 
At least once a year Count 22 26 15 16 12 12 103 
% within Country 32,4% 37,7% 68,2% 55,2% 80,0% 80,0% 47,2% 
Total Count 68 69 22 29 15 15 218 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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The feedback information from customers is discussed and assessed by our managers in regular meetings.  
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 
 
Highly inaccurate Count 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 
Inaccurate Count 4 16 1 1 2 1 25 
% within Country 5,8% 21,6% 4,3% 3,2% 12,5% 6,3% 10,9% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 12 10 5 4 2 2 35 
% within Country 17,4% 13,5% 21,7% 12,9% 12,5% 12,5% 15,3% 
Accurate Count 33 36 14 18 6 7 114 
% within Country 47,8% 48,6% 60,9% 58,1% 37,5% 43,8% 49,8% 
Highly accurate Count 20 12 3 7 6 6 54 
% within Country 29,0% 16,2% 13,0% 22,6% 37,5% 37,5% 23,6% 
Total Count 69 74 23 31 16 16 229 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
The feedback information from customers has great impact on the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
% within Country 1,4% 0,0% 0,0% 3,2% 6,3% 0,0% 1,3% 
Inaccurate Count 4 9 4 1 1 0 19 
% within Country 5,6% 11,8% 18,2% 3,2% 6,3% 0,0% 8,2% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 16 14 4 7 7 2 50 
% within Country 22,5% 18,4% 18,2% 22,6% 43,8% 12,5% 21,6% 
Accurate Count 31 43 11 16 3 7 111 
% within Country 43,7% 56,6% 50,0% 51,6% 18,8% 43,8% 47,8% 
Highly accurate Count 19 10 3 6 4 7 49 
% within Country 26,8% 13,2% 13,6% 19,4% 25,0% 43,8% 21,1% 
Total Count 71 76 22 31 16 16 232 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Does your organization have an internal audit office? 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 No Count 22 62 6 11 4 7 112 
% within Country 29,3% 74,7% 26,1% 35,5% 25,0% 43,8% 45,9% 
Yes Count 53 21 17 20 12 9 132 
% within Country 70,7% 25,3% 73,9% 64,5% 75,0% 56,3% 54,1% 
Total Count 75 83 23 31 16 16 244 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
My organization systematically screens and assesses the feedback information obtained from this ombudsman institution. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 11,1% 0,0% 0,0% 1,4% 
Inaccurate Count 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
% within Country 2,6% 20,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,9% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 5 1 0 2 1 0 9 
% within Country 12,8% 20,0% 0,0% 22,2% 50,0% 0,0% 13,0% 
Accurate Count 23 1 5 4 1 3 37 
% within Country 59,0% 20,0% 62,5% 44,4% 50,0% 50,0% 53,6% 
Highly accurate Count 10 2 3 2 0 3 20 
% within Country 25,6% 40,0% 37,5% 22,2% 0,0% 50,0% 29,0% 
Total Count 39 5 8 9 2 6 69 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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How would you describe the complaint management system of your organization?  
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Non-existent Count 0 5 1 1 1 0 8 
% within Country 0,0% 6,6% 4,5% 3,2% 7,1% 0,0% 3,5% 
Premature Count 8 17 2 1 1 3 32 
% within Country 11,0% 22,4% 9,1% 3,2% 7,1% 20,0% 13,9% 
Moderately mature Count 24 35 6 3 3 3 74 
% within Country 32,9% 46,1% 27,3% 9,7% 21,4% 20,0% 32,0% 
Mature Count 41 19 13 25 9 9 116 
% within Country 56,2% 25,0% 59,1% 80,6% 64,3% 60,0% 50,2% 
Total Count 73 76 22 31 14 15 231 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
The reports and recommendations from this ombudsman institution have great impact on the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 11,1% 0,0% 0,0% 1,5% 
Inaccurate Count 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 
% within Country 7,9% 20,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,9% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 11 1 2 2 1 0 17 
% within Country 28,9% 20,0% 25,0% 22,2% 50,0% 0,0% 25,0% 
Accurate Count 23 1 3 4 1 5 37 
% within Country 60,5% 20,0% 37,5% 44,4% 50,0% 83,3% 54,4% 
Highly accurate Count 1 2 3 2 0 1 9 
% within Country 2,6% 40,0% 37,5% 22,2% 0,0% 16,7% 13,2% 
Total Count 38 5 8 9 2 6 68 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Please indicate the extent to which it receives attention from your internal audit office: Compliance with laws and regulations 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Receives no attention Count 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 22,2% 1,6% 
Receives a little attention Count 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
% within Country 3,9% 10,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 3,2% 
Receives moderate attention Count 5 6 1 2 0 0 14 
% within Country 9,8% 31,6% 5,9% 10,5% 0,0% 0,0% 11,1% 
Receives moderate to much attention Count 22 5 8 4 0 1 40 
% within Country 43,1% 26,3% 47,1% 21,1% 0,0% 11,1% 31,7% 
Receives very much attention Count 22 6 8 13 11 6 66 
% within Country 43,1% 31,6% 47,1% 68,4% 100,0% 66,7% 52,4% 
Total Count 51 19 17 19 11 9 126 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which it receives attention from your internal audit office: Accuracy and reliability of financial statements 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Receives no attention Count 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 11,1% 0,8% 
Receives a little attention Count 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
% within Country 2,1% 10,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,4% 
Receives moderate attention Count 6 5 0 0 0 0 11 
% within Country 12,8% 25,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 8,9% 
Receives moderate to much attention Count 19 7 6 5 0 2 39 
% within Country 40,4% 35,0% 35,3% 26,3% 0,0% 22,2% 31,5% 
Receives very much attention Count 21 6 11 14 12 6 70 
% within Country 44,7% 30,0% 64,7% 73,7% 100,0% 66,7% 56,5% 
Total Count 47 20 17 19 12 9 124 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Please indicate the extent to which it receives attention from your internal audit office: Performances and proper management 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Receives no attention Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,6% 0,0% 11,1% 1,6% 
Receives a little attention Count 4 3 0 0 1 0 8 
% within Country 7,7% 15,0% 0,0% 0,0% 8,3% 0,0% 6,3% 
Receives moderate attention Count 9 6 3 0 3 0 21 
% within Country 17,3% 30,0% 17,6% 0,0% 25,0% 0,0% 16,4% 
Receives moderate to much attention Count 22 6 11 7 4 4 54 
% within Country 42,3% 30,0% 64,7% 38,9% 33,3% 44,4% 42,2% 
Receives very much attention Count 17 5 3 10 4 4 43 
% within Country 32,7% 25,0% 17,6% 55,6% 33,3% 44,4% 33,6% 
Total Count 52 20 17 18 12 9 128 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
 
The reforms in my organization are periodically subjected to evaluations. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 3,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 
Inaccurate Count 8 18 2 0 1 0 29 
% within Country 11,0% 24,0% 8,7% 0,0% 6,7% 0,0% 12,6% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 17 24 8 4 3 2 58 
% within Country 23,3% 32,0% 34,8% 13,3% 20,0% 13,3% 25,1% 
Accurate Count 37 30 11 19 5 8 110 
% within Country 50,7% 40,0% 47,8% 63,3% 33,3% 53,3% 47,6% 
Highly accurate Count 11 3 2 6 6 5 33 
% within Country 15,1% 4,0% 8,7% 20,0% 40,0% 33,3% 14,3% 
Total Count 73 75 23 30 15 15 231 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization systematically screens and assesses the feedback information obtained from its internal audit office. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Inaccurate Count 2 3 0 0 0 0 5 
% within Country 3,8% 14,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 3,9% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 5 2 2 1 1 1 12 
% within Country 9,6% 9,5% 11,8% 5,3% 9,1% 11,1% 9,3% 
Accurate Count 33 12 9 10 2 3 69 
% within Country 63,5% 57,1% 52,9% 52,6% 18,2% 33,3% 53,5% 
Highly accurate Count 12 4 6 8 8 5 43 
% within Country 23,1% 19,0% 35,3% 42,1% 72,7% 55,6% 33,3% 
Total Count 52 21 17 19 11 9 129 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
The audits (and recommendations) from this internal audit office have great impact on the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Inaccurate Count 1 5 0 0 0 0 6 
% within Country 1,9% 23,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 4,6% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 17 3 1 1 3 1 26 
% within Country 32,1% 14,3% 5,9% 5,3% 27,3% 11,1% 20,0% 
Accurate Count 27 10 10 6 0 6 59 
% within Country 50,9% 47,6% 58,8% 31,6% 0,0% 66,7% 45,4% 
Highly accurate Count 8 3 6 12 8 2 39 
% within Country 15,1% 14,3% 35,3% 63,2% 72,7% 22,2% 30,0% 
Total Count 53 21 17 19 11 9 130 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization systematically screens and assesses the feedback information obtained from its external audit office. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Inaccurate Count 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
% within Country 2,0% 3,7% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,6% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 0 2 0 1 0 1 4 
% within Country 0,0% 7,4% 0,0% 8,3% 0,0% 9,1% 3,2% 
Accurate Count 33 12 8 4 1 3 61 
% within Country 67,3% 44,4% 47,1% 33,3% 11,1% 27,3% 48,8% 
Highly accurate Count 15 12 9 7 8 7 58 
% within Country 30,6% 44,4% 52,9% 58,3% 88,9% 63,6% 46,4% 
Total Count 49 27 17 12 9 11 125 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
 
The audits (and recommendations) from this external audit office have great impact on the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Inaccurate Count 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
% within Country 2,0% 7,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,4% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 5 4 1 1 1 2 14 
% within Country 10,0% 14,8% 5,9% 8,3% 11,1% 18,2% 11,1% 
Accurate Count 29 11 11 4 0 3 58 
% within Country 58,0% 40,7% 64,7% 33,3% 0,0% 27,3% 46,0% 
Highly accurate Count 15 10 5 7 8 6 51 
% within Country 30,0% 37,0% 29,4% 58,3% 88,9% 54,5% 40,5% 
Total Count 50 27 17 12 9 11 126 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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My organization systematically screens and assesses the feedback information obtained from these evaluations. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 Highly inaccurate Count 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 3,3% 6,7% 0,0% 0,9% 
Inaccurate Count 9 18 1 0 0 0 28 
% within Country 12,5% 24,7% 4,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 12,3% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 18 20 8 4 2 2 54 
% within Country 25,0% 27,4% 34,8% 13,3% 13,3% 14,3% 23,8% 
Accurate Count 34 31 13 20 8 8 114 
% within Country 47,2% 42,5% 56,5% 66,7% 53,3% 57,1% 50,2% 
Highly accurate Count 11 4 1 5 4 4 29 
% within Country 15,3% 5,5% 4,3% 16,7% 26,7% 28,6% 12,8% 
Total Count 72 73 23 30 15 14 227 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
 
These evaluations (and their recommendations) have great impact on the strategic decisions made by the organization. 
 
Country 
Total Belgium France Netherlands Romania Slovakia UK 
 
 
Highly inaccurate Count 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
% within Country 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 3,3% 6,7% 0,0% 0,9% 
Inaccurate Count 8 15 2 0 1 0 26 
% within Country 11,1% 21,4% 8,7% 0,0% 6,7% 0,0% 11,6% 
Neither accurate nor inaccurate Count 18 23 6 7 2 2 58 
% within Country 25,0% 32,9% 26,1% 23,3% 13,3% 13,3% 25,8% 
Accurate Count 36 28 13 16 7 10 110 
% within Country 50,0% 40,0% 56,5% 53,3% 46,7% 66,7% 48,9% 
Highly accurate Count 10 4 2 6 4 3 29 
% within Country 13,9% 5,7% 8,7% 20,0% 26,7% 20,0% 12,9% 
Total Count 72 70 23 30 15 15 225 
% within Country 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Annex II – Factors of Learning, Accountability and 
Feedback 
 
Learning 
 
Concept Dimensions  
Cybernetics Single-loop learning Active measurement of a wide spectrum of performance 
Double-loop learning Questioning the appropriateness of the goals and objectives 
Deutero learning Institutionalized capacity to learn 
Individual cognitive 
learning & social 
learning 
Cognitive dissonance 
and confrontation of 
viewpoints 
General openness that encourages questioning, inquiry and 
constructive criticism 
Openness for feedback information, for alternative opinions 
and perspectives 
Tolerance for uncertainty: allowing cognitive dissonance 
The arousal of 
reflection and debate 
Internal platforms, arenas, forums to discuss and debate 
-Psychological 
safety  
-Defensive routines  
-Error/risk-
avoidance 
Tolerance for errors Sense of safety about making errors and discussing them 
openly 
No-blame culture 
Trust-based culture 
Organizational 
memory 
 
Knowledge 
management 
Organizational 
memory 
Archives 
Documentation of procedures 
Knowledge 
management 
Making tacit knowledge explicit 
Recording, conservation and retrieval of knowledge and 
experience 
Creating, acquiring, capturing, aggregating, codifying, 
sharing and using knowledge 
 
Exploitation vs. 
exploration 
Exploration Large variety of relevant skills and knowledge that can be 
exploited 
Personnel turnover 
Exploitation Focus on routinisation, refinement, reliability 
Focus on the elaboration of existing experiences and skills 
Inter-organizational 
learning 
Institutional 
arrangements to 
exchange experiences 
and knowledge 
Arenas for exchange of experiences 
Learning forums 
Motivation to share 
information 
Overall context of competition vs. collaboration 
Composition of the 
network 
Homogeneity vs. heterogeneity 
Absorptive capacity of 
the recipient 
Prior knowledge and skills, including shared language and 
technical knowledge 
Trust between the learning partners 
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Feedback 
Open system/organism 
metaphor 
Adaptiveness, alignment 
Autopoiesis Perception filter 
Closing off from impulses from outside in order to shield itself from 
excessive turbulence and complexity 
Closing off from impulses from outside after a period of adaptation and 
innovation 
Cybernetics/self-
regulation 
Clear performance goals and objectives 
Monitoring and comparing 
Corrective action 
Questioning the appropriateness of the goals and objectives 
Organizational locus of 
informational subsystems 
The necessity of an informational subsystem 
The optimal place for reporting intelligence 
Source of the feedback Staff – stakeholders – monitoring – policy evaluations – ombudsmen 
reports – (performance) audits – … 
Variety of sources 
Focus of the feedback Goal-seeking vs. goal-changing feedback (cf. single-loop vs. double loop 
learning) 
Internal design vs. relationship with the environment 
Functioning of a subsystem vs. functioning of the total system 
 
Accountability 
Who is held accountable? The organization as a whole – the senior civil servant – the individual civil 
servant – … 
To whom? To administrative superiors – to the minister, parliament, voters – to 
ombudsmen, auditors, inspectors, … – … 
About which aspect of the 
administrative 
performance? 
Legal compliance – financial correctness – efficiency and efficacy – … 
Nature of the obligation Formal obligation vs. voluntary 
Degree of publicness Discrete and behind closed doors vs. open or at least accessible to citizens 
and the general public 
The functions of 
accountability 
mechanisms 
Democratic control and oversight – integrity – learning and improvement 
The dysfunctions of 
accountability 
mechanisms 
Accountability overload: number of accountability mechanisms & 
conflicting expectations 
Focusing too harshly on mistakes and sanctions => perverted behaviour, 
window dressing, error- and risk-avoidance,… 
Systematically focusing on certain aspects, while ignoring others => tunnel 
vision and sub-optimization 
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Annex III – Survey Questions 
 
LEARNING Survey item 
Type of survey 
item 
Psychological 
safety & 
Transparenc
y &  Culture 
of 
adversarial 
debate and 
openness for 
alternative 
perspectives 
Q10.a 
My organization is characterized by a culture of adversarial 
debate and openness for constructive criticism. 
Five-point scale 
Q10.
b 
Within my organisation, people are usually comfortable 
talking about problems, disagreements and differences in 
opinion. 
Five-point scale 
Q10.c 
My organisation encourages productive conflict and debate 
during internal discussions. 
Five-point scale 
Q10.
d 
Within my organisation, well-established perspectives and 
assumptions are never challenged or questioned. 
Five-point scale  
Tolerance for 
errors, risk-
taking and 
experimentat
ion 
Q11.a My organization is characterized by a tendency to avoid risks. Five-point scale  
Q11.
b 
My organization encourages experimentation and alternative 
ways of getting work done. 
Five-point scale 
Q11.c 
If a creative attempt to solve a problem fails, the responsible 
staff members are penalized. 
Five-point scale  
Q11.
d 
My organisation has a formal process for conducting and 
evaluating experiments or new ideas. 
Five-point scale 
Time for 
reflection – 
slack 
learning 
Q12.c 
In my organisation, people are too busy to invest time in the 
improvement of work processes. 
Five-point scale  
Q12.
d 
Despite the workload, people in my organisation find time to 
reflect on past performances. 
Five-point scale 
Diversity of 
staff 
Q12.e 
The staff members of my organization have rather 
homogeneous educational backgrounds. 
Five-point scale  
Systematic 
knowledge 
management 
Q12.a 
My organisation systematically keeps records and archives to 
document past experiences. 
Five-point scale 
Q12.
b 
My organisation has formal procedures to ensure that lessons 
learned in the course of a project are passed along to others 
doing similar tasks. 
Five-point scale 
Q14.a 
My organisation has access to learning platforms that allow 
(public) organisations to share knowledge and experiences 
with other (public) organisations. 
Five-point scale 
Q14.
b 
My organisation shares its knowledge and experience with 
other (public) organisations. 
Five-point scale 
Q14.c 
My organisation learns from the experiences of other (public) 
organisations. 
Five-point scale 
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Deliberate 
measuremen
t practices & 
Disciplined 
analysis and 
interpretatio
n to identify 
and solve 
problems 
Q13.a 
My organisation has monitoring systems that allow it to 
monitor a wide spectrum of performances and to compare 
those performances with the stated goals and objectives. 
Five-point scale  
Q13.
b 
If discrepancies between performances and goals are 
detected, my organisation will take action in order to reduce 
these discrepancies. 
Five-point scale 
Q13.c 
My organisation regularly evaluates whether or not the 
existing organizational goals and objectives are still 
appropriate. 
Five-point scale 
Q13.
d 
My organisation has a quality management system that 
systematically strives for continuous improvements 
throughout the entire organisation. 
Five-point scale 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY Survey item 
Type of survey 
item 
Information and 
reporting 
Q15.a 
My organisation has an obligation to report about its 
performances to a higher authority. 
Five-point 
scale 
Debate, explanation 
and justification 
Q15.b 
My organisation has the opportunity to explain and 
justify its conduct towards this higher authority. 
Five-point 
scale 
Possibility of sanctions Q15.c 
This higher authority has the possibility to penalize 
my organisation for failing to achieve stated goals or 
expected performance standards. 
Five-point 
scale 
Responsibility for 
performance 
Q15.d 
In general, the people of my organisation feel 
responsible for the performance of the organisation. 
Five-point 
scale 
Transparency about 
performance 
Q15.e 
Towards external stakeholders, my organisation is 
very transparent about its results. 
Five-point 
scale 
Subject to ombudsman 
review 
Q20 
Does your organisation have an ombudsman 
institution assigned to it? 
Yes / No 
Subject to external 
audit 
Q25 
Does your organisation have an external audit office 
assigned to it? 
Yes / No 
Focus of external audit 
Q26.a 
Degree of attention for compliance with laws and 
regulations 
Five-point 
scale 
Q26.b 
Degree of attention for accuracy and reliability of 
financial statements 
Five-point 
scale 
Q26.c 
Degree of attention for performances and proper 
management 
Five-point 
scale 
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FEEDBACK Survey item 
Type of survey 
item 
Active 
search for 
and 
processing 
of feedback 
information 
From staff 
Q16.a 
My organisation encourages staff members to 
express their concerns, ideas and suggestions 
about the functioning of the organisation. 
Five-point 
scale 
Q16.b 
The feedback information from staff members is 
discussed and assessed by our managers in 
regular meetings. 
Five-point 
scale 
From 
customers 
Q17 
How would you describe the complaint 
management system of your organisation? 
Multiple choice 
Q18 
How often does your organisation organize a 
customer satisfaction survey? 
Multiple choice 
Q19.a 
The feedback information from customers is 
discussed and assessed by our managers in 
regular meetings. 
Five-point 
scale 
From 
ombudsme
n 
Q21.a 
My organisation systematically screens and 
assesses the feedback information obtained from 
this ombudsman institution. 
Five-point 
scale 
From 
internal 
audit 
Q22 
Does your organisation have an internal audit 
office? 
Yes / No 
Q23.a 
Degree of attention of internal audit office for 
compliance with laws and regulations 
Five-point 
scale 
Q23.b 
Degree of attention of internal audit office for 
accuracy and reliability of financial statements 
Five-point 
scale 
Q23.c 
Degree of attention of internal audit office for 
performances and proper management 
Five-point 
scale 
Q24.a 
My organisation systematically screens and 
assesses the feedback information obtained from 
its internal audit office. 
Five-point 
scale 
From 
external 
audit 
Q27.a 
My organisation systematically screens and 
assesses the feedback information obtained from 
its external audit office. 
Five-point 
scale 
From 
evaluation 
Q28.a 
The reforms in my organisation are periodically 
subjected to evaluations. 
Five-point 
scale 
Q28.b 
My organisation systematically screens and 
assesses the feedback information obtained from 
these evaluations. 
Five-point 
scale 
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Annex IV – Ombud- and Audit Factors 
Overview of factors 
Characteristics of the forum 
- Reputation (in the eyes of the actor) 
- Credibility (in the eyes of the actor) 
Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Morin (2001); 
Leviton & Hughes (1981) 
- Has sufficient resources Lonsdale (1999) 
- Has sufficient expertise to critically assess the information and/or to convert its 
judgment into powerful lessons for the administration 
Bovens et al. 
- Legal powers and institutional position 
o Power to impose sanctions or to coerce public managers into compliance? 
o Rights of access 
o Presence / absence of a specific parliamentary committee to consider the 
forum’s reports 
o Independence 
 Financial independence (human resources, reporting) 
 Substantive independence 
Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Bovens et al.; 
Lonsdale (1999); 
Johnston (1988); 
Gill (2011) 
 Ability to pick problem 
and time for the audit 
 
 o Reacting to complaints or ability 
to launch investigations on their 
own initiative? 
o Ability to carry out broad audit-
style investigations 
o Competence 
 Is the auditor also 
competent to evaluate 
‘policy’ or only ‘good 
administration’? 
o Competence 
 Which aspects of the 
administrative conduct is 
the ombudsman allowed to 
evaluate? 
- Selects policy-relevant issues 
o Are the issues chosen for 
investigation relevant for the 
actor, given its current 
priorities and concerns? 
 Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Weiss & Bucuvalas 
(1980); 
Leviton & Hughes 
(1981); 
Morin (2001) 
- Focus on 
o Accountability: democratic 
control and oversight 
o Detecting systemic failures and 
suggesting improvements 
- Focus on 
o Redressing individual grievances 
o Detecting systemic failures and 
suggesting improvements 
Gill (2011); 
Bovens et al. 
Characteristics of the relationship between forum and actor 
- Confrontation vs. cooperation 
o Confrontation 
 Outcomes (findings, conclusions, recommendations) are solely 
produced by the forum 
 Outcomes are unilaterally imposed by the forum 
o Cooperation 
 Outcomes follow from (informal) communication, cooperation, 
Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Morin (2001); 
Leviton & Hughes 
(1981); 
Gill (2011); 
Hertogh (2001) 
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negotiation and consultation between the forum and the actor 
 Forum and actor behave like partners; absence of power relation 
- Climate of trust vs. distrust between forum and actor Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Gill (2011) 
Characteristics of the research 
- Technical aspects of the quality of 
the research 
o Good methodology? 
o Reliability of sources? 
o Presence of quality control? 
 Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Weiss & Bucuvalas 
(1980); 
 - The number of decisions reviewed 
o When few complaints are filed 
(for example: little contact with 
citizens, ombudsman is not 
known or hard to reach,…), the 
ombudsman is denied the 
opportunity to generate impact 
Gill (2011) 
Characteristics of the results (findings, conclusions, recommendations) 
- Congruence between values 
- The degree to which the recommendations match the repertoires of the actor 
o Arguments and recommendations based on overlapping repertoire 
elements are likely to be taken up by the actor 
Van der Meer (1999); 
De Vries (2000); 
Gill (2011) 
- The nature of decisions / recommendations (‘policy tension’) 
o The more existing policy is required to change, the greater the policy 
tension and the greater the likelihood that non-compliance will occur 
- Feasibility of recommendations / type of change put forward by the forum  
o Behaviour – rules – structures – purposes 
o Probability of acceptance decreases from changes in behaviour (highest 
probability of acceptance) to changes in purpose (lowest probability of 
acceptance) 
Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Johnston (1988); 
Gill (2011); 
Hertogh (2001) 
- Conformity with expectations; 
plausibility given prior knowledge 
 Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Weiss & Bucuvalas 
(1980) 
 - Consistency of decisions Gill (2011); 
Gill (2012) 
Characteristics of the reporting 
- Clarity and accessibility 
o Clarity of conclusions and recommendations: well-formulated, well-
motivated and easy to understand 
o Accessible language 
o Logical structure 
Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Leviton & Hughes 
(1981); 
Gill (2011); 
Hertogh (2001); 
Gill (2012) 
o Presence of executive summary  
- Guidance for action 
o Presence of recommendations 
Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Weiss & Bucuvalas 
(1980); 
- Timing 
o In time to influence the decision-making 
o At a time when media coverage is guaranteed (cf. Luck) 
 Other news? 
 Topic fashionable at the time? 
Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Van der Meer (1999); 
Leviton & Hughes 
(1981); 
Lonsdale (1999); 
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o Just before a change of senior personnel (cf. Luck) Morin (2001) 
- Dissemination and communication 
o Using a whole range of media (formal and informal communication) 
o Addressing a whole range of stakeholders 
o Communication tailored to the addressee 
 For example: thematic and context-specific publications 
Van Loocke & Put 
(2011); 
Lonsdale (1999); 
Gill (2011); 
Gill (2012) 
 o Analytical publications (not 
focusing on individual cases but 
on patterns and systemic 
failures) 
Characteristics of the relationship between the forum and the legislative and/or the executive branch 
- Presence / absence of a specific parliamentary committee to consider the 
forum’s reports 
- Mechanisms that ensure that the forum’s work is given consideration in the 
legislative and/or the executive branch 
- Presence / absence of strong networks with decision-makers 
Gill (2011); 
Lonsdale (1999) 
Vanlandingham (2006); 
Johnston (1988) 
Characteristics of the relationship between the forum and the media 
- In their dealings with the press, the forum is helped by the fact that it is seen as 
an official and independent carrier of what is often bad or scandalous news 
o Since the press is hungry for dramatic stories, this status may enhance 
publicity for the forum’s reports 
o However, the press will most likely not bring a balanced story, but will 
rather focus on the dramatic parts of the reports 
o The actors may respond best to careful and balanced messages 
o Therefore, the search for media coverage must be balanced with a need to 
avoid antagonizing those with whom they must maintain an ongoing 
relationship, the actors 
Johnston (1988); 
Lonsdale (1999) 
Follow-up activities 
- Systems to track whether or not recommendations are being accepted and/or 
implemented 
Johnston (1988) 
 
The structure of the interview protocol 
Dependent variables 
 Document 
analysis 
Interviews with 
members of the 
organisation 
under scrutiny 
Interviews with 
ombudsmen / 
auditors 
Degree of acceptance 
 
 QO.I.4  
Degree of implementation  QO.I.5 QF.I.1 
QF.I.2 
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Independent variables 
 Document 
analysis 
Interviews with 
members of the 
organisation 
under scrutiny 
Interviews with 
ombudsmen / 
auditors 
Feedback Provision, clarity and 
accessibility of feedback 
information 
DA.I.1 
DA.I.2 
DA.II.A 
QO.I.1 
QO.I.2 
QO.II.1 
QF.II.1 
QF.II.2 
 Active search for and 
processing of feedback 
information 
 QO.II.8 
QO.II.9 
 
Accountability  QO.II.4 
QO.II.5 
QO.II.6 
QO.II.11 
QO.II.12 
QO.II.13 
QF.II.6 
QF.II.7 
QF.II.8 
QF.II.9 
QF.II.11 
QF.II.12 
QF.II.13 
Learning  QO.II.8 
QO.II.9 
QO.II.10 
QF.II.10 
QF.II.13 
    
Culture  QO.II.10 QF.II.10 
Power relationships  QO.II.4 
QO.II.5 
QO.II.6 
QF.II.6  
QF.II.7 
QF.II.8 
QF.II.9 
Media attention  QO.II.2 
QO.II.3 
QF.II.3 
QF.II.4 
QF.II.5 
Economic incentives  QO.II.7  
    
Types of change and the probability of 
acceptance 
 QO.I.3 QF.II.15 
Reputation of the source of influence  QO.II.14 QF.II.14 
Autopoiesis  QO.II.15 
QO.II.16 
 
Investigation on own initiative   QF.II.16 
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Annex V – Country Report Belgium and the Netherlands 
1. Introduction 
This country report is divided into two parts: the first half concerns our research findings on Belgium, 
the second half focuses on the Netherlands. After briefly introducing the cases, and a short description 
on the respective SAI and Ombudsmen, we quickly move to the presentation of our results and the 
analysis of our findings.  
For each case we interviewed both the auditor and a respondent from the auditee side. Both 
respondents had to be directly involved in the audit-process for the respective report, which we 
accomplished for all cases. Further on in this report, we will refer to the cases in an anonymized way 
by numbering them and randomly shuffling their order. For the Dutch case, we already mentioned that 
the cooperation of the SAI was achieved too late to be incorporated into this document. This means 
that, thus far, we have realized two interviews on the audit side; namely those with the Ombudsmen. It 
would seriously damage the guarantees of anonymity for these respondents if we reported on the 
findings of these two interviews. Therefore we only focus on the auditee side of the Dutch cases. This 
means that we need to be careful not to make hasty judgments or draw too stark conclusions from the 
Dutch cases. A full analysis will be done in a working paper which will be published as soon as the 
other interviews have been conducted. Finally, one of the Dutch audited organizations was unwilling 
to participate. We therefore have to leave one line per table blank. 
2. Belgium 
Belgium, together with the United Kingdom, is one of the non-unitary states in our sample of European 
countries. We therefore decided to not only look at the federal level, but also pay considerable 
attention to the regional level. Our investigation focusses on the Federal Supreme Audit Institution, the 
Federal Ombudsman and the Flemish Ombudsman. In choosing our cases for the SAI, we made sure to 
also include reports it had published on regional audits in Flanders. The following table sums up the 
cases we investigated for Belgium: 
Belgium Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of Audit 
SAI Flemish Employment Bureau HR Policy 2011 
SAI Tax Inspection Bureau Organization and Functioning 2010 
SAI 
Federal Ministry of Justice and Penitentiary 
Institutions 
HR Policy 2010 
SAI Agency for the European Social Fund Use of Resources 2010 
Federal 
Ombudsman 
Federal Ministry of Justice and Penitentiary 
Institutions  
Complaint Reports on Prisoner’s 
Rights 
2009-2012 
Flemish 
Ombudsman 
Flemish Tax Collecting Agency 
General Annual  
Complaints Report 
2006-2013 
Flemish 
Ombudsman 
De Lijn (Public Transport) 
General Annual  
Complaints Report 
2009-2012 
Flemish 
Ombudsman 
Flemish Agency for Housing 
General Annual  
Complaints Report 
2010-2011 
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The Supreme Audit Institution 
Named in Dutch the ‘Rekenhof’ and in French the ‘Court des Comptes’, is a constitutionally established 
institution with the task of performing external audits on the financial and budgetary proceedings as 
well as the accountancy of the federal, communal and regional governments, together with the related 
institutions and provinces27.  Its organizational layout is rather different from other SAIs, since it is 
designed largely around the two most important languages in Belgium: Dutch and French. At the 
hierarchical top resides a ‘College’ of twelve members; six Dutch speaking and six French speaking. 
The College is then divided into two chambers, again according to language, with a president, four 
councilmen and a clerk. The longest residing chair and clerk will be the first chair and first clerk of the 
entire college.  
The tasks of the SAI can be described in more detail as follows28: 
- It subjects the operations of the federal government, the community and regional governments 
and the deputation of the provinces to an audit, a review of legality and a check on the proper 
use of public funds. The audits consider both the expenditures and the revenues; 
- It reports the results of the audits to the respective parliaments and provincial councils; 
- It controls the accounts of the general administration and those who are financially 
accountable to the state. 
The Ombudsmen 
Belgium recognises, in total, six ombudsmen (not including local ombudsmen or the ombudsmen for 
government-owned companies): two at the federal level, one for the German speaking community, one 
for the French speaking community, one for the Walloon region and one for both the Flemish region 
and Dutch speaking community. For our research, we focus on the Federal Ombudsman and the 
ombudsman responsible for the Flemish region and Dutch speaking community (hereafter called 
‘Flemish ombudsman’).  
The position of Federal Ombudsman is held by two persons: one French speaking and one Dutch 
speaking. Both are mandated by the Federal Chamber of Representatives and report to that same 
legislative body29. The federal ombudsman has the following tasks30: 
- S/he investigates complaints about the federal administration; 
- S/he investigates the workings of the federal administration which are directed to her/him 
by the chamber of representatives (hence the federal ombudsman does not have the right to 
initiate its own investigations); 
- S/he submits recommendations for improvement to the chamber or representatives; 
- S/he reports about its investigations to parliament; 
- S/he investigates reports of assumed violations of integrity within the federal administration. 
The Flemish Ombudsman was initially appointed by the Flemish government and had to report to the 
former as well. However, in 1998 this role was transferred to the Flemish Parliament, after which the 
                                                             
27 https://www.ccrek.be/NL/Voorstelling.html, visted on 15/02/2015. 
28
 Translated from “Evaluatie van het Nationale Integriteitssysteem: België”, Transparency International, 2012, p. 179. 
29 “Evaluatie van het Nationale Integriteitssysteem: België”, Transparency International, 2012, p. 165. 
30
 Paraphrased and translated from http://www.mediateurfederal.be/nl/de-federale-ombudsman/opdrachten/wat-doet-hij, 
visited on 15/02/2015. 
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Ombudsmen became a parliamentary ombudsman like its Federal colleague31. Its task can be summed 
up as follows32: 
- Investigating and mediating in complaints against the acts and workings of the Flemish 
administration and the administration of the Dutch speaking community; 
- Investigating and mediating reports of breaches of the code of ethics of Flemish 
parliamentarians; 
- Investigating reports of negligence, misconduct or criminal acts by personnel of the Flemish 
administration or the Dutch speaking community whilst carrying out professional tasks. 
Besides investigating complaints and reports of misconducts, the Ombudsman also has a duty to 
articulate and propose cross-cutting recommendations to improve the Flemish administration33 in its 
yearly report to parliament. For this research we focused on these yearly reports, since they contain 
the most performance related recommendations, instead of focusing on individual complaint-cases. 
Finally, like the Federal Ombudsman, the Flemish Ombudsman does not have the right to initiate its 
own investigations.  
3. The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, finding our relevant audit organizations was an easier task. Besides having a more 
straightforward structure and organization, there are one single SAI and one single ‘National 
Ombudsman’ at the national level. Both are ‘Higher Councils of State’, meaning that they have a 
constitutionally arranged independent position, at the same footing as the chamber of representatives 
and the senate.  
Unfortunately, because there were only a limited number of suitable Ombudsman reports available, 
the balance of cases has shifted to the side of the Supreme Audit Institution. As an overview, the 
following table shows our cases: 
Netherlands Organization under scrutiny Topic Year of Audit 
SAI DNB: National Bank Stability of Banks 2011 
SAI Ministry of Economic Affairs European Procurements 2012 
SAI Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Tariff Regulations for the 
Energy Market 
2009 
SAI Ministry of Finance Evaluation of Subsidies 2011 
SAI ProRail (Railway Infrastructure) Use of Funds 2011 
SAI Ministry for Health and Sports Online Medical Care  2009 
Ombudsman Social Security Agency Anti-Fraud Policies 2010 
Ombudsman Inter-Provincial Network Child Welfare 2010 
 
The Supreme Audit Institution 
The Dutch SAI (Algemene Rekenkamer, or simply AR) is responsible for the external audits of the 
national governmental level. Other audit organizations are responsible for the audits of the provinces, 
                                                             
31 “Burgers en Bestuur”, Schram, F., 2009 (p. 434), Politeia, Brussels: Belgium. 
32 Ibid., (p. 436) 
33 http://www.vlaamseombudsdienst.be/ombs/nl/dienst/onze_taken.html#taak3, visted on 15/02/2015. 
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municipalities and water authorities. Its board consists of three persons, one of whom is the president 
of the SAI34. As can be read in the 2011 report by Transparency International:  
“The (SAI) aims to audit and improve the regularity, efficiency, effectiveness and integrity with 
which the State and associated bodies operate. (…) The (SAI) is part of a comprehensive audit 
system whereby first of all a financial audit is carried out by the internal audit service of a ministry. 
In its audits the AR assesses independently whether there are sufficient safeguards in these internal 
audits. Based partly on this, the (SAI) determines the points which require its own investigation.”35  
This means that the Dutch SAI has a wider task than ‘only’ looking at the accountancy of the State’s 
financial statements. Performance, recommendations, and consequently innovation, lay directly in its 
scope of work. Organizations who have been granted more independence in carrying out their tasks 
(so called ZBO’s) are under the scope of the SAI.  
The Ombudsman 
The principal of the Ombudsman is the Dutch Chamber of Representatives (the ‘Tweede Kamer’). The 
Ombudsman reports to this Chamber and its Committees on a regular basis, including an annual 
report. The 2012 report by Transparency International gives a clear description of the Ombudsman’s 
responsibilities, from which it is immediately clear that these tasks go beyond mere handling of 
citizens’ complaints: “The National Ombudsman is an independent and impartial administrative body 
responsible for assessing the performance of public authorities and the lawfulness of their decisions 
and promoting citizens’ rights.”36 Recommendations in the realm of performance (and hence efficiency 
and effectiveness) are a concrete part of the Ombudsman’s task description. This makes it a very 
suitable actor for our research focus. 
4. Results 
After conducting a total of 16 interviews, eight on either side of the audit/investigation, we can 
present the following table with regards to the implementation of recommendations made in the 
chosen reports by the SAI, Federal Ombudsman and Flemish Ombudsman.   
Belgium 1 - Implemented37 0 - Not Implemented38  Total 
Case 1 2 4  6 
Case 2 0 8  8 
Case 3 8 4  12 
Case 4 2 8  10 
Case 5 8 3  11 
Case 6 3 2  5 
Case 7 3 4  7 
Case 8 2 5  7 
Total 28 38  66 
 
                                                             
34 “National Integrity System Assessment: the Netherlands”, Transparency International, 2012, p. 184. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., p. 165. 
37 ‘Implemented’ means: fully implemented, partially implemented, implemented by different solution, in the process of 
being implemented, etc. 
38 ‘Not implemented’ means: Doesn’t agree with diagnosis or solution, requires political decision, lack of resources for 
implementation, etc. 
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Netherlands 1 - Implemented 0 - Not Implemented  Total 
Case 1 2 0  2 
Case 2 2 2  4 
Case 3 3 2  5 
Case 4 5 0  5 
Case 5 3 0  3 
Case 6 3 2  5 
Case 7 4 2  0 
Case 8 1 1  2 
Total 23 9  32 
 
Why certain recommendations where implemented, whilst other weren’t, depends strongly on the 
respective cases. Many factors seemed to contribute to the acceptance of the recommendations and 
these factors differed strongly between the three institutions and between the reports within the 
institutions. We summarize our findings in tables, each focusing on a different factor we consider to be 
potentially influential according to the literature and with regards to its influence on the FAL-model, 
as explained previously in the opening chapter and the chapter on the influence of Ombudsmen and 
SAIs on social innovation. 
Communicative and Cooperative process  
Good, informal and intensive communication, together with a close collaboration between both parties 
during the audit will contribute to the ‘L’ in the FAL-model. It will start or intensify the learning 
processes in an organization under scrutiny. Second, exit meetings provide for a great feedback 
opportunity, where the organization under scrutiny can be confronted in a collaborative and more or 
less informal setting with the Ombudsman or SAI’s conclusions and recommendations. Our results on 
these three factors are the following: 
 
 
 
 
On the side of the auditors: 
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Belgium Communication Exit Meeting Relation/Collaboration 
Case 1 
No strategy, lot of informal 
communication ‘behind the scenes’ 
Continuous dialogue Good, are taken seriously 
Case 2 Informal and efficient Yes, just before the end Very informal 
Case 3 Mostly diplomatic communication Yes, but no negotiation Professional 
Case 4 
Commutation strategy only at the end of 
the process 
Yes, after every chapter that is 
finished 
Difficult at times, but 
usually ok 
Case 5 
Informal, besides from the start and end of 
the process 
Yes, purely for factual check Usually good 
Case 6 Structural and informal Continuous dialogue Very open and trusting 
Case 7 Informal Continuous dialogue 
Good, but organization is 
allergic for a hint of 
‘controlling’ 
Case 8 Informal and outside of the formal process Continuous dialogue Good 
 
 
On the side of the auditees: 
Belgium Communication Exit Meeting Relation/Collaboration 
Case 1 Open and correct Don’t know   
Case 2   Yes  Constructive 
Case 3 Good No Good, but fragile 
Case 4 Good, but too slow No Ok 
Case 5 Good 
Yes, but only at the very last, 
when the many factual mistakes 
led to frustration 
  
Case 6 Informal and direct Continuous Good 
Case 7 Informal Continuous Good 
Case 8 Informal Don’t know Ok, but fragile 
 
Netherlands Communication Exit Meeting Relation/Collaboration 
Case 1 
Started informal, turned formal when 
relationship worsened 
Yes 
Good at first, later it became 
more tense 
Case 2 Reasonably informal Yes 
From okay to bad in a later 
stage 
Case 3 Professional and good Yes, but this was insignificant 
Distrusting, felt criminally 
investigated 
Case 4 Good, but too formal Don’t know Difficult 
Case 5 
Was better at executing level than 
managing level 
Yes Professional 
Case 6 Open and informal No Good 
Case 7       
Case 8 
They only received a press release when 
the investigation was finished 
No Bad 
 
First of all, it is interesting to see that there are significant differences between the respondents on 
both sides. Where all auditors told us there were exit meetings, two of the Belgian respondents on the 
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auditees’ side declared there was no such meeting. This could mean that the auditor’s lied, but it is 
more likely that the auditees simply didn’t experience the exit meeting in the same way as the auditors 
did or as the auditors intended. Many auditors told us that the exit meeting is nothing but a statement 
of the conclusions and not in any way a platform for feedback, let alone negotiations about the 
recommendations. These cases do not form factors which can enforce the organization’s FAL-
structures and are therefore not promotors for social innovation. The cases with a continuous 
dialogue, on the other hand, offer a more promising picture. These cases constitute examples of a more 
collaborative process, where there is a genuine exchange of views and where feedback from one to the 
other side is a constant fact. These cases can form a great generator for learning processes and 
feedback loops in the organizations under scrutiny (as well as the SAIs and Ombudsmen themselves), 
in turn enforce the FAL-model in these organizations and consequentially become promotors of 
sustainable social innovation. 
Overall the cooperative and communicative process seems to have been implemented rather well, 
considering the above stated answers. However, there is a notable difference between the 
Relation/Cooperation category in Belgium and the Netherlands. When we compare the auditee’s side 
of the interviews, the Dutch respondents paint a more negative picture than their Belgian 
counterparts. It is hard to isolate a single factor to explain this difference. Certain processes became 
toxic after there were legal disputes about the rights of the auditor to view certain documents. After 
these disputes were settled, the relationship for the rest of the audit was battered. For the other cases, 
it is unwise to articulate any explanations or conclusions, since many of the auditor-side interviews 
still have to be conducted. 
Perception of Role, Relationship and Expertise  
Whether the organizations perceive their relationship as based on trust or distrust, cooperation or 
confrontation can influence their relationship from the get go. How an audit organization sees itself (as 
controller or advisor) determines its attitude towards the organization under scrutiny. Vice versa, the 
role the organization under scrutiny ascribes to the audit organization determines the former’s 
attitude towards the latter: cooperative and open, or defensive and closed? This, in turn, will influence 
the learning processes in the organization under scrutiny. If the feedback is perceived as an attack, the 
chance is small that learning processes will be kick started by Ombud- and Audit recommendations.  
On the side of the auditors: 
Belgium Role perception
39
 Perception of relationship
40
 
Case 1 3 4 
Case 2 3 4 
Case 3 1 3 
Case 4 2 2 
Case 5 2 4 
Case 6 4 5 
Case 7   4 
Case 8 3  
 
On the side of the auditees: 
                                                             
39 Likert scale: 1 – Controller  5 – Advisor 
40 Likert scale: 1 – Based on distrust and confrontation  5 – Based on trust and cooperation 
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Belgium Role perception Perception of relationship Expertise41 
Case 1 3  4 
Case 2 3  4 
Case 3 3 4 3 
Case 4 2 3 1 
Case 5 2 4 ? 
Case 6 4 4 5 
Case 7 5 4 4 
Case 8 4  4 
 
Netherlands Role perception
42
 Perception of relationship
43
 Expertise
44
 
Case 1 2 4 at the start, 2 in the end 2 
Case 2 2 2 4 
Case 3 2  2 
Case 4 2 2 4 
Case 5 2 3 3 
Case 6 3 4 3 
Case 7      
Case 8 2 1 4 
 
As can be seen in the tables, the perceptions of the auditor’s role do not differ that much, but there are 
strong differences between cases in the same audit organization. This implies that much depends on 
an auditor’s personal perception of his/her job and on the specific experience of the respondents on 
the auditees’ side. Overall, however, the perception on the side of the auditees is one of moderation: 
the auditors are seen as being both a controller and an advisor. The accountability culture in Belgium, 
at least concluding from our sample, seems to be rather mature. The auditees accept and respect the 
controlling role of the SAIs and Ombuds, but interpret their reports as advice, more than as directives. 
This means that the recommendations don’t influence the organizations learning processes as 
effectively as possible, but they do have a de facto influence as their recommendations are taken 
seriously. This is further enforced because the expertise of the auditors is perceived as relatively high 
in almost all audit cases. In only one case was the audit organization seen as being completely 
unaware of many of the workings of the field it was investigating, which seriously limited the quality 
of its recommendations. Furthermore, and perhaps more worryingly, this worsened the relationship 
between the respective organization and auditor, perhaps for the coming decade.  
The differences between the Netherlands and Belgium most profoundly lie in the auditees responses 
to the ‘Role perception’. In the Netherlands, the organizations under scrutiny see the audit 
organizations significantly more as controllers, instead of as advisors. This implies that they 
experience the audit organizations as controllers. Logically, the audited organizations would answer 
‘advisor’ because they want them to be advisors and would answer ‘controller’ because they’ve 
experienced them behaving as such. This perception could be an explanation for the relatively 
                                                             
41 Likert scale: 1 – Low reputation on expertise  5 – High reputation on expertise 
42 Likert scale: 1 – Controller  5 – Advisor 
43 Likert scale: 1 – Based on distrust and confrontation  5 – Based on trust and cooperation 
44 Likert scale: 1 – Low reputation on expertise  5 – High reputation on expertise 
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negative view of the relationships between the organizations under scrutiny and their auditor, 
discussed earlier. 
Media and Parliamentary pressure  
The media attention on Ombud- and Audit reports are often stated as important for the effectiveness 
of the recommendations in these reports. We found, however, a different reality through our 
interviews. 
 
 
On the side of the auditors: 
Belgium Amount of attention Impact Strategy 
Case 1 Little 
No, but working outside the 
spotlight brings them more results 
Only used as last resort 
Case 2 Little  Little to nothing   
Case 3 Little 
Little, but only for media savvy 
topics 
Minimal: press release 
Case 4 None Yes, but only for media savvy topics Minimal: press release 
Case 5 None 
No, but has impact on discourse and 
relationship with organization 
Minimal: press release, try to 
avoid media attention 
Case 6 None None 
Extensive strategy, but focus is 
on positive findings 
Case 7 Very little None, too technical 
Not hesitant to seek media 
attention, but focus on positive 
findings 
Case 8 None 
Sensitive for media attention, but 
does not affect implementation 
More and more conscious 
 
 
 
 
 
On the side of the auditees: 
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Belgium Amount of attention Impact 
Case 1 None Yes 
Case 2 A lot None 
Case 3 A little 
None, needs political attention 
too 
Case 4 None 
None, needs political attention 
too 
Case 5 A lot 
Yes, but doesn’t change 
attitudes in administration 
Case 6 None Yes 
Case 7 A little None 
Case 8 None Yes 
 
Netherlands Amount of attention Impact 
Case 1 Little Yes 
Case 2 Little Depends on Report/Area 
Case 3 Little Yes 
Case 4 
A lot 
Not unless combined with 
political attention 
Case 5 
None 
Not unless combined with 
political attention 
Case 6 None Possibly 
Case 7   
Case 8 None No 
 
First of all, most media seem rather uninterested in most of the ombud- and audit reports. Even when 
they do report on them, their influence is very limited. Only when the media attention generates 
parliamentary attention, can it cumulate in significant pressure to actually influence the 
implementation.  
Second, the auditors seem to be divided into two camps: one with an extensive media strategy, and 
one with a rather minimalistic strategy towards the media. The latter group stated that it intentionally 
wanted to avoid media attention, even though it (at least potentially) could influence the acceptance of 
its recommendations. The fact that the media always focusses on the negative parts of a report, even 
though the vast majority of findings were (very) positive, can seriously deteriorate its relationship 
with the organization under scrutiny. This group of auditors declared they would rather have a good, 
productive relationship with the auditees, than to try to influence the implementation of 
recommendations through brute force.  
After the above mentioned findings it is perhaps not surprising that parliamentary influence, on its 
own, was also regarded as rather insignificant with regards to implementation. 
On the side of the auditors: 
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Belgium Amount of attention Impact Strategy 
Case 1 Don’t know Usually not  No 
Case 2 
A lot, reports go straight to 
committees to be dealt with 
Not a lot Very ad hoc 
Case 3 None 
Yes, but implementation is at 
management level who don’t feel 
pressure from parliament 
No strategy 
Case 4 None Yes, creates extra attention in media No strategy 
Case 5 Yes, just as all other reports 
Yes, especially if media takes note of 
it 
Yes, want to be a partner in 
discussing the topic and report 
Case 6 
Reports are always talked 
about in committees where 
he/she is partner 
Differs per topic, only if media picks 
it up 
Close ties that are maintained 
Case 7 
Every report is discussed in 
parliament 
Yes   
Case 8 
Yes, discussed in 
parliament with him/her as 
partner 
Sometimes when the problems are 
exceedingly large  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the side of the auditees: 
Belgium Amount of attention Impact 
Case 1 Don’t know Depends on media attention 
Case 2 A little None 
Case 3 Don’t know Don’t know 
Case 4 A little None 
Case 5 A little Yes 
Case 6 Yes None 
Case 7 Don’t know Don’t know 
Case 8 A little None 
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Netherlands Amount of attention Impact 
Case 1 None Yes 
Case 2 None 
Not unless combined with 
media attention 
Case 3 None 
Not unless combined with 
media attention 
Case 4 Don’t know Don’t know 
Case 5 Yes None 
Case 6 None 
Not unless combined with 
media attention 
Case 7   
Case 8 None None 
 
The most obvious finding here is that the Dutch parliament seems to be focusing a lot less on the 
Ombud- and Audit reports than its Belgian and Flemish counterparts. Furthermore, the same link was 
found between the influence of parliamentary and media pressure. It remains to be seen, however, 
which of the two causes the other: does media attention trigger parliamentary pressure? Or will the 
media only focus on audit reports which gather political attention? 
Overall, it was clear for most respondents that coalition politics and the coalition agreement limit 
almost all parliamentary pressure, with the exception of scandals and crises. The audit organizations, 
some of which have a very close and intensive relationship with parliament, stated that trying to 
collaborate or influence parliament is very risky business. The worst thing that can happen to a SAI or 
Ombudsman is to be accused of partisanship, so they have to be very careful in their relations with 
parliament. However, trying to be a partner at the discussion of a specific report was universally 
considered to be a justified way of engaging with parliament.  
All in all, it can be said that media and parliamentary pressure are not being put to use by the audit 
organizations, sometimes for good reasons. To a large extent it is dependent on chance; parliament 
and the media simultaneously focusing on the same report or findings. This means, however, that the 
‘Accountability’ factor is not being tapped into by the audit organization, causing the FAL-structure in 
organizations to be partially paralyzed. However, this is done because the relationship (influencing the 
‘L’ and ‘F’ dimension in the FAL-model) with the organizations under scrutiny is seen as more 
important than the potential use of pressure through media and/or parliament.  
Finally, as a part of the factors influencing the learning process in the organizations under scrutiny, the 
audit criteria and the chosen subjects of investigation can be viewed, by the auditees, as either 
relevant or irrelevant. When the criteria are seen as irrelevant or the subject that has been chosen by 
the audit office for investigation is seen as irrelevant, the organization under scrutiny is unlikely to 
learn from its recommendations. When the criteria are unknown, it is harder for the organization to 
understand why an auditor has come to a certain conclusion, making it, again, harder to learn from the 
recommendations and conclusions. With regards to these issues, we found the following results 
amongst our sample:  
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Belgium Criteria used Subjects of investigation 
Case 1 Don’t know Very relevant 
Case 2 Don’t know Relevant 
Case 3 Don’t know Relevant 
Case 4 Don’t know Relevant 
Case 5 Don’t know Not relevant 
Case 6 Are suitable Relevant 
Case 7 Are suitable Relevant 
Case 8 Suitable but vague Don’t know 
 
Netherlands Criteria used Subjects of investigation 
Case 1 Criteria are not suitable Chosen for political reasons 
Case 2 Don’t know 
Should focus more on policies which 
can actually be influenced 
Case 3 Criteria are not suitable  
Case 4 Don’t know 
Should focus more on future 
challenges 
Case 5 Rather vague and general Relevant 
Case 6 Criteria are not suitable Relevant 
Case 7   
Case 8 Criteria are not suitable Not relevant 
 
This paints a rather grim picture for the influence of the first factor on the FAL-structure within the 
organizations under scrutiny. Most organizations said that the criteria were unknown and for the 
Dutch cases even unsuitable, making it harder for them to learn from the recommendations. It is also 
easier for the politically responsible minister to claim that the recommendations do not apply 
correctly to his/her organizations when the criteria used remain vague or in the dark.  
5. Conclusion 
Each of the investigated organizations has a certain score in our FAL-model. There are, to a greater or 
lesser extent, Feedback loops, Accountability mechanisms and Learning processes at work in all of 
these organizations. The question is, however, whether the Dutch and Belgian SAIs and Ombudsmen 
are able to strengthen these dimensions, in order to create a higher probability of sustainable 
innovation in the future. We found that there are a number of factors which diminish the potential role 
of the audit organizations in doing so. 
 In the Netherlands, the biggest problem, at least concluding from the auditees interviews, lie at the 
perception of the auditors’ role (controller), the lack of transparency of the criteria used by the 
auditors, and the overall relationship which is often perceived as bad. These factors reduce the 
potential impact which audit recommendations can have on the innovative potential amongst public 
sector organizations. In Belgium, on the other hand, whilst sharing some of the same problems as the 
Netherlands (most notably the transparency of the used criteria), it is the process of cooperation and 
the use of exit meetings which needs more attention. The FAL-model within the Belgian organizations 
under scrutiny is left untapped for a large extend because of the previous mentioned problems. 
However, it must also be said that the accountability culture in these two cases seems to be seasoned. 
The organizations have respect for the SAIs’ and Ombudsmen’s role and do usually appreciate their 
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feedback. The problem remains, however, that much of this feedback is being disregarded because the 
Feedback loops, Accountability mechanisms and Learning processes are not triggered enough.  
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Annex VI – Country Report Romania & France 
 
Analysis of reports and interviews related to the Court of Audit (Romania and France), 
Ombudsman (Romania) and Defenseur des Droits (France) 
 
The analysed reports were released by the Court of Audit (Romania and France), Ombudsman 
(Romania) and Defenseur des Droits (France) over the last 5 years and aimed to audit or improve 
the regulation of important areas of social innovations (efficient administration of taxes, reducing 
corruption, maintaining the natural patrimony, assessing the performance of public institutions, 
improving social conditions, etc.), public policies or administrative innovation by improving and 
extending the legislative and institutional framework. 
This Annex presents the analysed reports. 
DA I.1; DA.I.2  
Most reports were accompanied by explicit or implicit recommendations designed to contribute to 
the improvement of activities, which represent the object of the reports within a medium term. 
In synthesis, for the 25 documents analysed, the state of the recommendations is as follows: 
  
 178 
 
Table 1: Presenting and listing the recommendations 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RO_CA_01 
x - - - - 4 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
RO_CA_02 
x - - - - 4 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
RO_CA_03 
x - - - - 3 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
RO_CA_04 
x - - - - 5 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
 
RO_CA_05 
x - - - - 3 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
RO_CA_06 
x - - - - 5 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
RO_CA_07 
x - - - - 4 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
RO_CA_08 
x - - - - 6 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
RO_CA_09 
x - - - - 9 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
RO_CA_10 
x - - - - 5 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
RO_DD_01 
- - - x - 2 Recommendations 
are not listed 
RO_DD_02 
- - - x - 3 Recommendations 
are not listed 
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RO_DD_03 
- - - x - 2 Recommendations 
are not listed 
FR_CA_01 
x - - - - 6 Recommendations 
are listed by a 
numbering-
system 
FR_CA_02 
- - x - - 58 Recommendations 
are listed by a 
numbering-
system 
FR_CA_03 
x - - - - 6 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
FR_CA_04 
x - - - - 8 Recommendations 
are listed by a 
numbering-
system 
FR_CA_05 
x - - - - 4 Recommendations 
are listed by a 
numbering-
system 
FR_CA_06 
- - x - - 23 Recommendations 
are listed by a 
numbering-
system 
FR_CA_07 
x - - - - 9 Recommendations 
are listed by 
bullet-points 
FR_DD_01 
- - - x - 1 Recommendations 
are not listed 
FR_DD_02 
- - - x - 3 Recommendations 
are not listed 
FR_DD_03 
- - - x - 3 Recommendations 
are not listed 
FR_DD_04 
- - - x - 1 Recommendations 
are not listed 
FR_DD_05 
- - - x - 2 Recommendations 
are not listed 
 
We note that the modalities for presenting and listing the recommendations are specific to each 
institution. There is, however, some similarity, though not on the whole, between the reports of the 
Courts of Audit in Romania and France. 
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For the Ombudsman and the Defenseur des Droits, the recommendations are presented implicitly in 
the contents of each report/proposal and are not clearly outlined; most of them have a normative 
character. 
DA.II.1  
Concerning the institution targeted by each recommendation, the reports analysed reveal a great 
diversity of approaches. 
For the reports of the Courts of Audit, the recommendations often take into consideration the 
norms, procedures, institutions from the respective public entity. 
On the other hand, for the other two institutions – the Ombudsman, the Defenseur des Droits – the 
proposals and recommendations also target other institutions which have a connection with the 
policy area of the recommendation. 
Table 2 presents the institutions targeted by recommendations. 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
RO_CA_01 
2 1 - 1 - It takes into consideration 
the interoperability of the 
central and local structures 
RO_CA_02 
2 1 - 1 - The civil associations, 
citizens are also targeted. 
RO_CA_03 
- 1 1 1 - It includes cooperation with 
numerous central 
institutions 
RO_CA_04 
4 - - - - Strengthening the 
relationship and 
communication with the 
citizens 
RO_CA_05 3 - - - - - 
RO_CA_06 5 - - - - - 
RO_CA_07 3 - 1 - - - 
RO_CA_08 
4 1 1 - - It also intends a 
governmental intervention 
for reorganisation 
RO_CA_09 
5 2 1 1 - It aims to evaluate the 
impact of specific activities 
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in society 
RO_CA_10 
2 2 1 - - Two recommendations 
have strategic character 
RO_DD_01 
1 1 - - - Also specialised local 
organizations are targeted 
RO_DD_02 
2 1 - - - It also addresses local 
government 
RO_DD_03 
1 1 - - - It also addresses local 
government 
FR_CA_01 3 1 1 1 - - 
FR_CA_02 
22 10 10 16 - It targets several national 
public institutions 
FR_CA_03 
3 3 - - - It also targets international 
institutions 
FR_CA_04 3 1 2 2 - - 
FR_CA_05 
1 1 1 1 - It targets civic 
organizations 
FR_CA_06 13 - 3 7 - - 
FR_CA_07 
4 1 2 2 - It targets various actors 
with projects in the field 
FR_DD_01 - - 1 - - - 
FR_DD_02 2 1 - - - - 
FR_DD_03 - 2 1 - - - 
FR_DD_04 - 1 - - - - 
FR_DD_05 1 1 - - - - 
 
We note the fact that most recommendations (48%) even take into consideration the institutions 
themselves, as administrations responsible for the respective topic. It is worth mentioning that only 
15% of recommendations are addressed directly or indirectly to the legislative branch, while 18.5% 
of recommendations are addressed both to the ministers responsible or a combination of the above-
mentioned actors. 
1. Interview questions for the organization under scrutiny 
 
QO.I: At the level of the individual recommendations 
The concrete results indicated by respondents are presented in Annex 2. 
A global analysis of the responses provides the following conclusions: 
- The level of specificity and concreteness of the recommendations is average (3.4) (on a 
scale of 1 through 5), with a difference between the Romanian institutions (2.77) and the 
French institutions (4.08). 
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- The level of clarity and ease of comprehending the recommendations is also average (3.76), 
with a significant difference between Romania (3.31) and France (4.08). 
- The degree of change induced by recommendations is also average (3.00), with some 
difference between Romania (2.92) and France (3.08). 
QO.I.4: 
Most respondents highlighted that the activities of the audit are comprehensive and target, for the 
period analysed, aspects of substance and details connected with the objectives of the audit. 
Referring to the audits of the Courts of Audit, all respondents revealed the fact that the diagnostic at 
the foundation of the recommendation represents the object of negotiation between the two parties 
and that eventual litigations are solved and made compatible by specialized bodies of the Courts of 
Audit. 
Concerning the recommendations of the Ombudsman or Defenseur des Droits, they are also 
mediated between the two organizations. The modalities of implementing the recommendations are 
generally determined on the basis of legislation or amendments with specific provisions. Within the 
analysed context, mediation between the organizations consists of achieving, through cooperation 
and negotiation, a procedural framework for implementing the recommendations that is agreed 
upon and acknowledged by both organizations. 
QO.I.5: 
The recommendations received are compulsory for the beneficiary organization. After receiving 
them in their final version, the beneficiary organization draws up and submits a detailed plan of 
measures to apply the recommendations. 
The plan is agreed upon by both parties and is then implemented. 
Periodically, usually annually, reports are submitted concerning their accomplishments. There is 
also the possibility that sanctions are imposed on behalf of the auditor. 
Over 90% of respondents stated that they appreciated the good relationships between the auditor 
and audited institution. 
 
QO.II: At the level of the report & at the level of the organization 
QO.II.1:  
Communication and dissemination by the Ombudsman/Court of Audit is done through formal 
documents which, as previously mentioned, are subject to a process of negotiation. These 
documents also provide the modalities and channels for communication of the manner in which the 
recommendations will be implemented.  
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Media attention  
QO.II.2:  
Most respondents avoided respond concretely to this question. We may note that the level of 
interest of media was related to the topic analysed. 
In general, the reports of audit which received greater attention in the media were those reports 
targeted financial aspects – the level of receipt of taxes and charges, the accomplishment of 
objectives of major social interest – for which media published articles focused on the negative 
aspects. 
On the scale proposed in the interview, they could be scored at level 4. 
 QO.II.3: 
The respondents unanimously appreciated the role of media for a successful implementation of 
recommendations. In the situations previously mentioned, this was also considered an additional 
pressure for implementing the recommendations. 
Attention of the legislature 
  QO.II.4: 
In general, increased attention by Parliament for the reports/proposals of the Ombudsman and 
Defenseur des Droits was mentioned. 
From the 8 interviews, it resulted that in 6 situations the Parliament analysed the proposals and 
established the necessary legislative measures. In the other 2 situations, measures of a normative 
nature were established by other bodies. 
Concerning the reports of the Court of Audit, they, usually, had the objective of providing 
information to the specialized commissions of the Parliament.  
 QO.II.5: 
Parliamentary attention and the Parliament’s intervention are constantly expressed. The respondents 
do not consider it an additional pressure, it was rather considered as a situation of normality in their 
relationship with the specialized parliamentary commissions. 
Power relationships 
QO.II.6:  
The analysis of the documentation made available by the Ombudsman/auditor revealed each time 
that governmental bodies with projects in the field were notified. 
In the case of audit reports, the auditor transmits the formal report containing both the findings and 
the recommendations to the responsible ministry. 
All the organizations audited revealed the fact that the periodical reports concerning the 
implementation of recommendations are also transmitted to the responsible ministry. 
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For the reports/proposals of the Ombudsman and Defenseur des Droits, they provide the 
corresponding assignments for some ministries and central bodies. 
Pressure, as debated during the interviews, was considered functional in nature, aimed at facilitating 
the implementation of recommendations. 
 
Economic incentives 
QO.II.7: 
Economic incentives were the subject of discussion only in the situations where the 
recommendations necessitated additional funds.  
Those situations were found most often in the reports of the Ombudsman and Defenseur des Droits 
and they involved additional financial funds for covering the expenditure established by the 
respective regulation. 
Active search for and processing of feedback information by the organization under scrutiny 
QO.II.8:  
From this perspective, the most relevant preoccupations were identified at the Ombudsman and 
Defenseur des Droits, which, in the case of new regulations, check the whole jurisprudence from 
the respective field. 
In other situations, it was mentioned that the discussion of other recommendations could only be 
occasional and depended on the topics currently discussed in the organization. 
 
QO.II.9: 
Managers’ openness to different recommendations was noted as relevant, though not as a daily 
preoccupation. 
Learning culture within the organization under scrutiny 
QO.II.10: 
The attitude of the organizations audited was, in general, one of responsiveness towards those 
recommendations. We were unable to ascertain if this attitude was determined by obligations 
enforced by law or the effect of a process of internalizing the values imposed by the respective 
recommendations. 
In general, in all the organizations, the final report of audit is discussed in various departments of 
the organization and the most effective modalities for achievement are searched for. 
Characteristics of the relationship between auditor /ombudsman and the organization under 
scrutiny 
QO.II.11: 
The judgements were diverse, with the prevailing responses coming from those which perceived 
these bodies as a watchdog (in the case of Court of Audit) or as an advisor (in the case of 
Ombudsman). 
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A separate distinction should be made for the reports of the Court of Audit of France, where most 
topics targeted several important public policies. As such, it had the opportunity to exert a larger 
advisor role. 
The results of the quantitative assessment are presented in Annex 2. 
QO.II.12: 
None of the situations revealed a relationship based on distrust and confrontation. 
For this question, the responses varied, but for the Ombudsman and Defenseur des Droits, a 
majority of responses expressed trust and good mutual understanding. 
These differentiated responses are justified by respondents and the nature of the reports, which in 
the case of Court of Audit of Romania, mainly targeted financial aspects. 
Annex 2 presents the quantitative responses of the organizations interviewed. 
QO.II.13: 
The process of elaboration and finalization of the public report involves, in a mandatory way, the 
consultation of the audited organizations or beneficiaries. 
Reputation of the auditor/ombudsman in the eyes of the organization under scrutiny 
QO.II.14: 
The responses differ for Romania and France. 
The more profound justification, deduced by us, relates to the history of the institution, which in the 
case of Romania has undergone contradictory transformations over the last decades, these do not 
yield a high level of reputation. 
There were no observed subjective views originating from conflicts, which could have led to a lower 
appreciation of the reputation of the respective bodies. 
The results in Annex 2 reveal an average credibility of 3.15 for Romania and 4.75 for France. 
Others 
QO.II.15: 
For most audit actions, the Court of Audit of Romania uses a system of indicators of performance, 
agreed to by the central specialized bodies. The interviews highlighted different preoccupations 
between the Courts of Audit in Romania and France. More specifically, the Romanian Court of 
Audit is focused on auditing performance, while the French Court of Audit is focused on auditing 
public policies. 
The instruments used are traditional and take into consideration the detailed historical financial 
context.  
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QO.II.16: 
For Romania, the Court of Audit has a periodical program of performance audit for the central 
institutions. Other topics/themes revealed by the public, and which indicate a violation of law,   can 
also be audited. 
2. Interview questions for the ombudsmen/auditors 
QF.I: At the level of the individual recommendations 
The recommendations made by the Ombudsman/Auditor may be classified in several categories 
related to their contents and modalities for implementation. 
In most cases the Ombudsman/Auditor indicated, directly or indirectly, the solutions for solving the 
identified problems. These can be synthetized as follows: 
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RO_CA_01 1 1 1 1 - - - - - - - 
RO_CA_02 2 - - - 1 1 - - - - - 
RO_CA_03 1 - - - - 1 1 - - - - 
RO_CA_04 1 1 1 - 1 - - - - - - 
RO_CA_05 1 1 1 - - - - - - - - 
RO_CA_06 1 1 3 - - - - - - - - 
RO_CA_07 1 1 1 - - - - 1 - - - 
RO_CA_08 2 1 2 - - - - 1 - - - 
RO_CA_09 1 1 2 - - - - - 3 1 1 
RO_CA_10 2 - - 1 - - - - 2 - - 
RO_DD_01 - - - - - 2 - - - - - 
RO_DD_02 - - - - - 3 - - - - - 
RO_DD_03 - - - - - 2 - - - - - 
FR_CA_01 1 - - 1 - 1 - - 1 2 - 
FR_CA_02 - - - - 1 13 - - 13 18 21 
FR_CA_03 1 - - - 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 
FR_CA_04 1 - - 1 - 1 - - 1 2 2 
FR_CA_05 - - 1 - - 1 - - 2 - - 
FR_CA_06 3 4 2 - - 12 - - - 1 1 
FR_CA_07 1 1 1 - 4 - - - - - 2 
FR_DD_01 - - - - - 1 - - - - - 
FR_DD_02 - - - - - 3 - - - - - 
FR_DD_03 - - - - - 3 - - - - - 
FR_DD_04 - - - - - 1 - - - - - 
FR_DD_05 - - - - - 2 - - - - - 
 
We note that most recommendations describe: “completing the actual normative framework” 
(26%), “budgetary and fiscal measures” (15%), “new organizational structures” (13%). 
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QF.II: At the level of the report & at the level of the organization 
 
Communication and dissemination by the ombudsman/audit institution 
QF.II.1:  
All institutions analysed have strategies for communication and dissemination, containing specific 
mandatory procedures and disseminate results of the reports/proposals according to the provisions 
of special laws. 
QF.II.2: 
Concerning the Courts of Audit, the reports show that the objective of negotiations between the 
parties is afterwards officially communicated. 
The Ombudsman and Defenseur des Droits publish the reports and proposals in official publications 
(Official Bulletin). 
Media attention 
QF.II.3: 
Special situations of communication did not emerge in the interviews. Media institutions have 
access to the usual informational resources (websites, newsletters, etc.). 
QF.II.4: 
The reports show that the objectives of interviews have been diversely reported by media. The 
greatest media impact related to reports concerning taxes and charges, building transit 
infrastructure, public policies concerning the fight against smoking, and public sports programmes. 
QF.II.5: 
Media attention is most often focused on the findings of reports from the Court of Audit and 
towards provisions and new regulations proposed by Ombudsman/Defenseur des Droits. 
Pressure may emerge only related to the institutions audited and from those which benefit from the 
new regulations proposed. 
 Attention of the legislature 
QF.II.6:  
The connections with the Parliament are substantiated by legal provisions contained in the 
documents of organisation and operation of the respective institutions. Special consultations are 
arranged with parliamentary committees when reports or recommendations aimed at public policies 
are expected to have a high impact on society. 
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QF.II.7:  
The discussion of reports by the parliamentary commissions depends on the priorities of their 
activities. However, all reports are transmitted to the specialized commissions of the Parliament. 
QF.II.8: 
The attention of the Parliament imposes an active and responsible behaviour within the audited 
organizations. In special cases, the Court of Audit or Ombudsman (Defenseur des Droits) informs 
the Parliament concerning the modality of implementing the recommendations. 
Power relationships 
QF.II.9:  
The responsible ministries play an active role with the Court of Audit or Ombudsman (Defenseur 
des Droits) only in the cases when they themselves are audited or benefit from the proposals of the 
Ombudsman (Defenseur des Droits). The respondents did not reveal situations of pressure on behalf 
of any public authority. 
Learning culture within the organisation under scrutiny 
QF.II.10:  
The Court of Audit analyses the feedback of the audited institutions by means of periodic reports 
established by joint agreement or by new audits. Taking into consideration the compulsory 
character of recommendations and modalities established by common agreement for 
implementation, responsiveness is a given. 
Differentiation emerges in the degree and compliance of the measures undertaken to implement the 
recommendations. Divergent opinions emerged in several cases but only during the initial stage and 
they were solved according to procedures established by law. 
Characteristics of the relationship between auditor/ombudsman and the organisation under 
scrutiny 
QF.II.11: 
Annex 3 presents the quantitative evaluations of the respondents. 
Predominantly the characteristic of a watchdog are assigned to the Courts of Audit and the 
characteristic of advisor are assigned to Ombudsman (Defenseur des Droits). 
The respondents from the Court of Audit (Romania) revealed that in the last years their 
preoccupations have increasingly focused on counselling with a view on improving performance, 
identifying weaknesses, etc. 
Comparatively analysing the quantitative responses of this relationship in the perspectives of 
auditor/audited, we note a higher appreciation for and shift towards the quality of counselling. 
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QF.II.12: 
The consultation is compulsory and therefore it has been achieved in all situations. 
QF.II.13: 
The cooperation and availability of members of the audited organization are based on legal 
obligations. In general, the audits and period for audit are communicated ahead of time to provide 
an opportunity for the audited organization to organize its activities in order to respond to all the 
requirements. 
Reputation of the auditor/ombudsman in the eyes of the organization under scrutiny 
QF.II.14: 
Concerning the Court of Audit of Romania, reputation was often connected to financial control and 
to measures addressing law breaking. The last decade brought about major changes in its objectives, 
which were reoriented towards auditing and counselling. 
The Courts of Audit are recognized in the political, administrative and economic spheres as a 
“guardian” enforcing the law of finance and efficient use of public money. 
The quantitative evaluations are presented in Annex 3. 
Types of change and the probability of acceptance 
QF.II.15: 
Most respondents supported the feasibility of the recommendations, justifying that they are based 
both on the experience and expertise of auditor as well as good knowledge of the audited institution. 
In fact they are accepted by the audited institution. 
For the Ombudsman (Defenseur des Droits), the feasibility of proposals is based on previous 
agreements with the responsible institutions (finance, health) and on the guarantee to support them 
after the approval of the proposal. 
The ability to launch investigation on own initiative 
QF.II.16: 
The respondents’ responses were affirmative. 
The Ombudsman in Romania commented on the fact that the law enables its intervention in many 
situations, with the condition that situations involve real problems requiring an improvement of the 
legal or procedural framework. 
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List of reports 
Romania 
Code Name of report 
 
Year 
Organization under scrutiny 
Court of Audit 
RO_CA_01 
Collection of taxes and charges due to the 
public budget for the period 2007-2010  
2012 National Agency for Fiscal 
Administration 
RO_CA_02 
Identification of  vulnerabilities of the 
administration and control system of taxes 
and charges enabling the facts of corruption 
2012 National Agency for Fiscal 
Administration 
RO_CA_03 
Patrimony situation of the forestry fund in 
Romania, during the period 1990 - 2012 
2013 National Company of Forests - 
ROMSILVA 
RO_CA_04 
Romanian Radio broadcasting company 
(2012) 
2012 Romanian Radio broadcasting 
company 
RO_CA_05 Romanian Television Company (2012) 
2012 Romanian Television Company 
RO_CA_06 
Accomplishment of revenues and their use 
during the period 2007-2011  
2012 National Authority for 
Administration and  
Regulation in Communication 
RO_CA_07 
National Company of Highways and National 
Roads in Romania and its specific activity for 
the national roads (2012) 
2012 National Company of 
Highways and National Roads 
RO_CA_08 
Building and maintaining the highways 
during the period 2005-2010  
2012 National Company of 
Highways and National Roads 
RO_CA_09 
Evaluating the academic and administrative 
management in managing the public funds 
allocated to higher education for the 
research activity 
2013 Ministry of National Education 
RO_CA_10 
Implementing and using the IT system at the  
National Chamber of Pensions and other 
rights of social security 
2011 National Chamber of Pensions 
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Ombudsman 
RO_DD_01 
Special Report on the rights of war veterans, 
war widows and unmarried widows of war 
veterans 
2009 National Union of Veterans 
RO_DD_02 
Special Report on the transport of pupils 
from the rural environment 
2013 Ministry of National Education 
RO_DD_03 
Special Report on protection of persons with 
disabilities 
2013 National Authority for persons 
with disabilities 
 
France 
Code Name of report 
 
Period 
Organization under scrutiny 
Court of Audit 
FR_CA_01 
La sécurité des navires et de leurs 
équipages : des résultats inégaux, un 
contrôle inadapté 
2012 Conseil général de 
l’environnement et du 
développement durable 
FR_CA_02 
Rapport sur l’application des lois de 
financement de la sécurité sociale 
2011 
 
Ministères chargés de 
l’économie et du budget 
Ministere du Travail, de la 
Formation professionnelle et 
du Dialogue social 
Ministère des Affaires sociales 
et de la Santé 
FR_CA_03 Les politiques de lutte contre le tabagisme 
2012 Ministère des Affaires Sociales 
et de la Santé 
Ministères chargés de 
l’économie et du budget 
 
FR_CA_04 
La politique de développement des 
énergies renouvelables 
2013 
 
Ministère de l'Ecologie, du 
Développement Durable et de 
l'Energie 
FR_CA_05 
Sport pour tous et sport de haut niveau : 
pour une réorientation de l’action de l’État 
2013 Ministère de l'Éducation 
nationale, de l'Enseignement 
supérieur et de la Recherche 
 
FR_CA_06 
Les musées nationaux après une décennie 
de transformations 2000 – 2010 
2011 Ministere  de la Culture et la 
Communication 
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FR_CA_07 
Évaluation d’une politique publique : la 
politique d’aide aux biocarburants 
2012 Conseil général de 
l’environnement et du 
développement durable 
Defenseur des Droits 
FR_DD_01 
Conditions de taille minimale pour l'accès 
aux concours de la gendarmerie 
2011 
 
Ministère de l’Intérieur 
FR_DD_02 
Indemnisation des sapeurs pompiers 
vaccinés contre l’hépatite B avant l’arrêté 
du 29 mars 2005 
(clôture en satisfaction de la proposition de 
reforme07-P053) 
2010 Ministère du Travail de la 
Formation professionnelle et 
du Dialogue social 
 
Ministère des Affaires sociales 
et de la Santé  
FR_DD_03 
Droit d’action contre l’employeur des 
marins dépendant de l’ENIM victimes d’un 
accident du travail ou d’une maladie 
professionnelle  
(Proposition de réforme 10-R019) 
2010 Ministère du Travail de la 
Formation professionnelle et 
du Dialogue social 
Ministère des Affaires sociales 
et de la Santé  
FR_DD_04 
Extension aux fonctionnaires RQTH du droit 
à un départ anticipé en retraite (Proposition 
de réforme 11-R010) 
2010 Ministère de la Fonction 
Publique 
 
FR_DD_05 
Règlement des amendes pour 
contraventions au code de la route traitées 
par le contrôle sanction automatisé  
(clôture en satisfaction de la proposition de 
réforme 09-R005) 
2009 Ministère publics  
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Quantitative evaluations of responses at questions: QO.I.1- QO.I.3, QO.II.11- QO.II.12; QO.II.14 
 
  
 QO.I.1 QO.I.2 QO.I.3 QO.II.11 QO.II.12 QO.II.14 
RO_CA_01 2 4 4 2 2 3 
RO_CA_02 3 3 3 1 3 2 
RO_CA_03 4 4 4 3 4 3 
RO_CA_04 2 3 3 2 3 3 
RO_CA_05 3 4 2 2 2 3 
RO_CA_06 4 4 2 1 4 4 
RO_CA_07 2 3 3 2 3 3 
RO_CA_08 2 2 3 1 4 2 
RO_CA_09 3 3 4 1 3 3 
RO_CA_10 2 2 2 2 4 3 
RO_DD_01 3 3 2 4 4 3 
RO_DD_02 3 4 3 4 4 5 
RO_DD_03 3 4 3 5 4 4 
FR_CA_01 5 5 3 3 4 4 
FR_CA_02 5 5 4 4 5 5 
FR_CA_03 3 4 3 4 4 5 
FR_CA_04 4 4 3 5 4 5 
FR_CA_05 3 4 3 5 5 4 
FR_CA_06 5 4 4 4 4 5 
FR_CA_07 3 4 3 5 4 4 
FR_DD_01 5 5 3 5 5 5 
FR_DD_02 5 4 3 5 4 5 
FR_DD_03 3 4 2 4 5 5 
FR_DD_04 4 4 3 5 5 5 
FR_DD_05 4 4 3 5 5 5 
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Quantitative evaluations of responses at questions QF.II.4, QF.II.11, QF.II.14 
  
 QF.II.4 QF.II.11 QF.II.14 
RO_CA_01 4 3 2 
RO_CA_02 4 3 2 
RO_CA_03 3 3 2 
RO_CA_04 3 4 3 
RO_CA_05 2 3 3 
RO_CA_06 2 4 3 
RO_CA_07 2 4 4 
RO_CA_08 2 3 4 
RO_CA_09 2 3 3 
RO_CA_10 2 3 4 
RO_DD_01 1 4 4 
RO_DD_02 1 5 5 
RO_DD_03 1 4 4 
FR_CA_01 1 3 3 
FR_CA_02 1 4 4 
FR_CA_03 2 4 4 
FR_CA_04 1 4 3 
FR_CA_05 2 4 4 
FR_CA_06 1 4 3 
FR_CA_07 1 5 4 
FR_DD_01 1 5 5 
FR_DD_02 1 4 4 
FR_DD_03 2 5 5 
FR_DD_04 1 5 5 
FR_DD_05 1 5 5 
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Annex VII – Country Report Slovakia 
1. Introduction 
LIPSE Working Paper No.1, entitled “Social innovation in the public sector: A conceptual 
framework” (Bekkers et al, 2013) provides the overall framework for this concrete part of the 
project’s research. It describes the concept of social innovation and relates this to the public sector 
context. Furthermore, it identifies numerous potential drivers and barriers for public sector 
innovation. These drivers and barriers have been ordered according to three main dimensions: the 
innovation environment, the innovation process, and the adoption of innovation. Figure 1 provides a 
schematic overview of the identified potential drivers and barriers.  
 
Figure 1 Framework of potential drivers and barriers for public sector innovation  
 
Source: Bekkers, Tummers, Stuijfzand, & Voorberg, 2013, p. 28.  
 
In the following text we focus on reports and recommendations made by two selected 
accountability mechanisms – the Supreme Audit Office (SAO) and the Ombudsman – in the Slovak 
Republic. The goal is to assess the potential contribution of these accountability arrangements to the 
anchoring of social innovation in the public sector (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 The role of accountability arrangements in social innovations 
Feedback loops (accountability 
mechanisms such as ombudsmen and 
audit offices) 
     → Organizational learning 
  
The general hypothesis is that accountability mechanisms such as ombudsmen and audit offices, if 
organized in an appropriate way and if well respected, can generate feedback loops through which 
organizational learning can occur. These learning processes may, in turn, increase the likelihood 
that innovations are anchored. Relevant questions to be answered are:  
- Which accountability and feedback mechanisms are in place and how are these mechanisms 
organized: Do the Slovak SAO and Ombudsman function in such a way that organizational learning 
can occur?  
- Does this lead to the institutionalization of certain innovations? If not, or if in very limited scale, 
what are the purposes? 
 
2. Research methodology 
To be able to respond to our research questions we decided to follow a five step research design: 
1. Defining the sample of SAO and Ombudsman reports to be analysed. 
2. Content analysis of selected SAO and Ombudsman reports. 
3. Selection of cases for in-depth research and interviews. 
4. Interviews. 
5. Summarising results. 
SAO 
Concerning the SAO, all audit protocols are available on the SAO website. We decided to check all 
reports published during the 2007 – 2011 period (and 2014 to obtain information on if the SAO 
practice has improved). The titles of all reports for this period (about 120 - 150 reports annually) 
were screened and reports with titles indicating that a performance audit was delivered were 
selected. All selected reports were analysed in-depth using a content analysis method. This analysis 
showed to us that many so-called performance audits are in reality just compliance audits and that 
very few real performance audits with effective recommendations are produced by the Slovak SAO 
(Annex 2). On this basis we selected three performance audits for detailed investigation: 
1. SAO combined performance and compliance audit report Banovce and Bebravou 
(performance proposals in the area of waste management): report published in 2009. 
2.  SAO combined performance and compliance audit report City transport enterprise Zilina 
(performance proposals for public transport organisation): report published in 2011. 
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3. SAO performance audit on separation of waste published in 2011. For this report we 
investigated the situation in the following five municipalities: Raslavice, Huncovce, 
Druzstevna pri Hornade, Helpa, and Spissky Stiavnik. 
For each of these reports we interviewed the responsible person on the side of the audited body. On 
the side of the SAO we were able to realise only one interview, with the director of the section 
responsible for performance auditing – Slovak law does not allow auditors to speak about audits 
without a special permit (see section on SAO legal foundation). A total of 10 interviews were 
realised. 
Ombudsman 
Similarly, on the Ombudsman website it is possible to find and download all reports. Two types of 
reports are published: annual reports and specialised reports. Because the number of reports was 
limited, we applied a content analysis method on all of them – see Annex 1. On this basis we 
selected one issue (mentioned in several reports): the possibility of electronic voting from abroad. 
For this issue we conducted two interviews – one with the Ombudsman and one with the head of 
department for elections at the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic.  
 
3. General characteristics of the Slovak SAO and Ombudsman 
Characteristics of the Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic
45
:  
VISION: 
The development of the Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic as an independent and a 
flexible institution which supports optimal use of public resources and significantly contributing to 
more effective public finance in accordance with legislation of the European Union and the Slovak 
Republic. 
MISSION: 
The improvement of the quality and efficiency of independent auditing activities, as well as internal 
control systems through the bodies, employees and optimally distributed network of regional offices 
in mutual support and co-operation with other audit institutions and also contributing to 
transparency and responsibility of government, public administrations and territorial self-
government resulting in better management    of public means and property. 
KEY VALUES:  
 Facilitating sound and effective management of public means and public property and 
providing both the National Council of the Slovak Republic, other interested subjects 
including the general public with objective information on findings ascertained during 
performance of audits.  
                                                             
45 This section is taken directly from: http://www.nku.gov.sk/en/web/sao 
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 Strengthening the position of the Office within the INTOSAI and EUROSAI structures and 
further enhancement of bilateral and multilateral co-operation with the supreme audit 
institutions (hereinafter referred to as the "SAI") both in Europe and the world. 
 Adapting and implementing the European Implementation Guidelines for the INTOSAI 
Auditing Standards up to the conditions in the Slovak Republic. 
 Performing high quality auditing activities independently, economically, efficiently and 
effectively. 
 Improving performance and responsibility of both auditors and other employees, as well 
also the incentives; taking care of their personal and professional development, 
strengthening their pride and loyalty to both their work, and the Office and improving the 
working environment of the Office. 
The legal basis for the SAO’s functioning is the “Act of the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic No 39/1993 Coll. of Laws on the Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic as 
amended by Act No 458/2000 Coll. of Laws, Act No 559/2001 Coll. of Laws, Act No 385/2004 
Coll. of Laws, Act No 261/2006 Coll. of Laws, Act No 199/2007 Coll. of Laws, Act No 659/2007 
Coll. of Laws and Act No 400/2009 Coll. of Laws.” The core relevant parts of this law are as 
follows
46
: 
Article 2: Scope of competence of the Office 
(1) The Office shall audit the management of: 
a) budgetary funds approved under the law by the National Council of the Slovak Republic or by 
the Government of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the “Government”)1), 
b) property, property rights, funds, obligations and claims of state, public law institutions, the 
National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic, municipalities, upper-tier territorial units, legal 
entities with capital participation of the State, legal entities with capital participation of public law 
institutions, legal entities with capital participation of the National Property Fund of the Slovak 
Republic, legal entities with capital participation of municipalities, legal entities with capital 
participation of upper-tier territorial units, legal entities established by municipalities or legal 
entities established by upper-tier territorial units1b), 
c) property, property rights, funds and claims provided to the Slovak Republic, legal entities or 
natural persons under development programmes or for other similar reasons from abroad, 
d) property, property rights, funds, claims and obligations, for which the Slovak Republic has 
assumed guarantee, 
e) property, property rights, funds, claims and obligations of legal entities carrying out activities in 
the public interest. 
Article 3: The Office shall carry out audits with regard to compliance with generally binding legal 
regulations, the economy, effectiveness and efficiency. 
                                                             
46 This section is extracted from: http://www.nku.gov.sk/documents/10272/98328/xact_on_sao_sr.pdf 
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Article 13: 
(2) The Office may make recommendations to audited entities and to relevant bodies on how to deal 
with weaknesses and shortcomings identified during the exercise of its competence. 
Article 20:  
(1) The Office shall inform on any weaknesses and shortcomings identified by the audit the 
authority acting on behalf of the State in relation to the activities of the audited entity. Any 
weaknesses and shortcomings identified in the activities of state administration authorities shall be 
communicated to the competent authority of the state administration. Any weaknesses and 
shortcomings identified in the activities of central bodies of the state administration shall be 
communicated to the Government through the Prime Minister. 
(2) The authority to which weaknesses and shortcomings identified by the audit have been 
communicated by the Office shall be obliged, within the scope of its competence and within the time 
period specified by the Office, to ensure removal of the identified weaknesses and shortcomings and 
to submit, without delay, to the Office a written report thereof. 
The SAO is one of the most active Slovak CAF participants and it received two national prizes for 
its quality management system. The latest financial and HRM data about the SAO are provided by a 
2012 annual report. According to this report, in 2012 the SAO employed 290 persons, of which 278 
were civil servants. Its 2012 budget was 7,785,243 EUR. The organisational structure consists of 6 
sections (four audit delivering sections, a section for economy and informatics and a strategic 
section) and the SAO has 8 satellite offices, one in each region.  
 
Characteristics of the Ombudsman of the Slovak Republic (www.vop.gov.sk) 
The website of the Slovak Ombudsman (Public Defender of Rights) is less comprehensive than the 
SAO website and does not include a mission or vision statement. Instead it just provides links to the 
main legal documents and descriptions of activities.  
The scope and scale of the rights and responsibilities of the Slovak Public Defender of Rights 
(Ombudsman, www.vop.gov.sk) are defined by the Article 151a of the Slovak Constitution, core 
parts follow
47
: 
(1) The Public Defender of Rights is an independent body which in the scope and in manner laid 
down by a law protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and legal entities in 
the proceedings, before public administration bodies and other public bodies, if activities, decision 
making or inactivity of the bodies are  inconsistent with legal order. In cases laid down by a law the 
public defender of rights can participate in calling the persons acting in public bodies to 
responsibility, if the persons have violated fundamental right or freedom of natural persons and 
legal entities. All public power bodies shall provide the public defender of rights with needed co-
action. 
                                                             
47 This description is taken directly from : http://www.vop.gov.sk/constitutional-grounds-of-the-institution 
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(2) The public defender of rights can apply the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic for 
commencement of proceedings according to Art. 125, if fundamental right or freedom 
acknowledged for natural person or legal entity is violated by a generally binding legal regulation.  
(3)  The public defender of rights shall be elected by the National Council from among the 
candidates proposed by at least 15 members of the National Council for a term of office of 5 years. 
A person, who can be elected as public defender of rights, must be a citizen of the Slovak Republic 
who can be elected as member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and has reached the 
age of 35 years by the day of election.  The public defender of rights may not be a member of a 
political party or political movement, 
(6) Details of the election and recall of the public defender of rights, his competence, conditions of 
execution of the function, manner of legal protection, and on presentation of proposals for 
commencement of proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic according to 
Art.  130 sect. 1, lett. f) and on application of rights of natural persons and legal entities shall be 
specified by law. 
In 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman employed 28 civil servants; of this, 24 directly participate in 
professional investigations. It also employed 12 administrative staff. The 2014 approved budget 
was 1,117,770 EUR, from this more than approximately 800,000 EUR were for salaries.  
 
 4. Does the Slovak SAO function in such a way that organizational 
learning can occur?  
As indicated above, the Slovak SAO is a CAF user and for its quality initiatives it has received 
several awards. The representatives of the SAO are very proud of the quality of their audit activities 
– the interviewed director felt that the functioning of the SAO was excellent. However, the reality is 
very different, as our research and other sources indicate. The interview at the SAO already 
revealed several major problems, particularly: 
 Before 2011 there was no mechanism in place to archive performance 
recommendations (without archiving it is rather difficult to follow implementations). 
 This is not the case for recommendations from performance audits. According to our 
interview with the director at the SAO, recommendations from performance audit 
are archived for only three years; neither audited bodies nor the SAO follows them 
afterwards.  
 Since 2011 performance recommendations are also archived, but there is no system 
in place to tract if any implementation actually happened. So reports may include 
certain, in some cases even important proposals, but no one from the SAO monitors 
the results. 
 The director is very much of the opinion that the SAO’s role is one of a watchdog. 
Our content analysis clearly documents that the qualification of SAO auditors to deliver 
performance audits is rather different: we may state that the SAO investigates the right cases 
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(because of a number of controls, public sector performance is thoroughly investigated by the SAO) 
but not always with the right criteria. First, many audits officially considered compliance and 
performance audits are just compliance audits. When checking performance audits (the 
performance parts of audits) we were able to find few excellent reports and also several reports with 
major deficiencies. We can quote from two reports to highlight the lack of qualification of auditors: 
“The city purchased cars for the lowest price. This means that economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness are secured.”  
“For each audited university we randomly selected an area for economic evaluation. In UKF Nitra 
we found that there was no exact paper evidence of the presence of staff in their offices.”  
The main principles for communicating SAO findings are prescribed by law. Draft reports must be 
discussed with audited bodies in joint meetings. Audited bodies must sign the final protocol (with 
the right to provide statements). Management (elected) bodies of audited organisations shall discuss 
SAO reports at regular meetings. SAO reports have full access to the Parliament. The SAO also has 
one special department for communication with media and public.  
The positive finding is that there is some potential for the establishment of a learning loop – all 
interviewed organizations indicated that SAO proposals in our three selected cases are factual and 
helpful. Unfortunately, the number of performance audits with these types of proposals is still rather 
limited (of more than a hundred analysed performance reports, maybe ten have this character). 
5. Does the Slovak Ombudsman function in such a way that 
organizational learning can occur?  
According to the legislation indicated above, the core role of the Ombudsman is to act upon a 
complaint of a person or legal entity or on his/her own initiative in cases where fundamental 
rights and freedoms were infringed contrary to the legal order or principles of the democratic 
state and the rule of law in relation to the activities, decision-making or inactivity of a public 
administration body. This legislative environment means that the main role of the Ombudsman has 
an ex-post character and the chance to cover all problems is limited (the capacities of the 
Ombudsman for their own initiatives are limited).  
However, the Ombudsman also states on their website that the role of the office is also to improve 
public sector functioning – so some space for innovative proposals exists: 
“I wish the state would function for the people and in terms of democratic principles of good 
governance. I consider it very important and accordingly I would also like to markedly contribute 
to improving the operation of the public administration bodies. I will devote my energy and time 
above all to make our country a really good place for life and to make people feel better here.” 
   
                                                          JUDr. Jana Dubovcová, Public Defender of Rights 
 
The analysis of Ombudsman reports (see annex) indicates that a standard part of these reports are 
recommendations. Most of these recommendations have a basic defensive or organisational 
character, but some of them may serve as motivation for public sector innovation. However, we 
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have to mention that the Ombudsman does not have a sufficiently proactive communication 
strategy, especially concerning innovative proposals. All proposals are reported through two basic 
channels:  
- annual regular reports –  submitted to Parliament 
- extraordinary specific reports on its own initiative – with the right to move this document 
forward to be discussed in Parliament  
Findings and proposals may be, but must not be, discussed with the bodies involved – all this 
depends on the Ombudsman’s discretion (the Ombudsman also stressed that even in cases when she 
wants to discuss some issues, it is rather difficult to find a real partner – particularly the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Work is not open for such communications).  One employee of the Ombudsman 
Office is responsible for the contact with media, but the effectiveness of such efforts varies case by 
case. 
All the findings above indicate that there is a relative potential for establishment of learning loop on 
the basis of Ombudsman recommendations. The Ombudsman is ready to serve in this direction, as 
our interview shows (our interviews with the Ombudsman seemed to serve as a tool to strengthen 
this mechanisms), but a lot depends on the willingness of responsible public bodies.  
6. What is the real impact of the Slovak SAO and Ombudsman on 
public sector innovations? 
The responses from the eight interviewed organisations do not provide a very optimistic picture 
concerning the level of implementation of SAO and Ombudsman recommendations.  
Concerning the SAO, only in one case (Helpa) did the mayor state that all recommendations were 
welcomed and fully implemented (however, our ‘cross-check’ indicated that his statements were 
not fully accurate, just ‘overly positive’ – for example the municipality does not have the data 
needed to assess the level of separation and such data are not part of the program’s budget). In other 
investigated cases respondents mentioned partial or zero implementation – the main excuse was 
financial constraints. 
Another question is if SAO recommendations were the main (or at least an important) reason for 
changes. If we look at our cases: 
- changes in the public transport system in Zilina are result of project conditions financed by 
EU funds, not an SAO report (no impact); 
- improved separation of waste at the municipal level is mainly the result of new stricter EU 
legislation, setting legal requirements for recycling (SAO reports might play some role, but 
they are not the dominant factor for changes); 
- new system of heating in Banovce also cannot be directly connected with SAO 
recommendations (SAO reports might play some role, but they are not the dominant factor 
for changes). 
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Municipalities do not screen SAO reports as a source of new ideas and innovations. For them, the 
SAO is a watchdog, controlling details of their actions and not a partner helping them to improve 
local democracy and local public services. 
From the point of view of costs and benefits in the form of real impacts of SAO audits on public 
administration innovation, we cannot be very positive. From several hundred reports (see annex) 
only very few include real recommendations with innovative potential and in most cases even this 
rather limited innovative feedback loop is neglected by audited bodies. 
Concerning Ombudsman our research indicates that innovative proposals by Ombudsman are not 
realised at all. 
To summarise, we may argue that the impact of the SAO and Ombudsman on public innovations 
via effective feedback learning loops is rather limited because of the character of both institutions 
(perceived as controllers) and the general political environment (politicisation of the public 
administration system – especially with regard to the Ombudsman). The following section explains 
additional problems in this direction. 
 
7. Selected barriers limiting the chance for effective feedback 
loop to support innovations (with focus on local level) 
The previous section argues that the SAO and Ombudsman impact on public innovation are rather 
limited because of the character and capacities of these bodies. Beyond these factors, analysed 
above, our research as well as existing data also reveal other reasons for the rather limited quality of 
the feedback loop for innovations in this area. We have to stress the following aspects: 
1. Limited absorption (implementation) capacity on the side of addressed organisations. 
2. Difficult Slovak environment, characterised by a lack of accountability and responsibility. 
3. Over-politicisation of public life and the role of the media. 
Absorption capacity 
The problem of absorption capacity includes several dimensions, but the best visible issue is 
territorial fragmentation. Local governments not only feel that the SAO and Ombudsman are just 
controllers and they have doubts about the capacity of the SAO to control and advise, but in most 
cases they do not have sufficient financial and human capacities for improving and implementing 
interesting recommendations. This situation is the result of too much fragmentation on the level of 
municipal government. Slovakia has 5.5 million inhabitants, but almost 3,000 municipalities, most 
of them below 1,000 inhabitants. Such small units have problems handling basic daily tasks of 
municipal life and their internal innovative capacity and absorption capacity for handling external 
innovation inputs is close to zero. 
The absorption capacity (for positive performance suggestions) by larger public sector bodies is 
also limited, as our cases show (Zilina has almost 100,000 inhabitants) and the main purpose is 
described in the following text. 
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Accountability and responsibility 
The second, regions specific problem – lack of accountability and responsibility – is well described 
by Vesely, 2013, as well as other sources. According to the existing theory (see, for example, 
Stiglitz, 1989) elected politicians may serve the public but also their own private interests. In the 
Slovak condition the second choice is rather frequent – and rent-seeking officials do not normally 
deliver innovations to improve administrative and public services (though in cases where 
innovations are costly and related firms may benefit, the situation can be different). 
The study by Pavel (2009) clearly shows that because of the low level of accountability, Slovak 
public bodies frequently do not correct mistakes found by SAO controls – if clear problems are not 
reflected, it is difficult to imagine that performance proposals would be. 
Politicisation 
The Slovak public sector is clearly over-politicised. The SAO and Ombudsman can serve as 
interesting examples. The SAO has been rather popular with the current and previous governments 
(the current president of the SAO’s term ended three years ago and a new president has still not 
been elected by Parliament; no political party cares about this). We can propose one reason for this: 
for many years the SAO did not initiate investigations of any major top level scandal. 
On the other hand, the reputation of the SAO, as evaluated by external experts, it is not very high. A 
lot is already visible from our content analysis and from interviews. In 2012, the SAO was reviewed 
by Transparency International (part of a large project on CEE countries). It scored relatively high in 
global figure, but the lowest scores were for following indicators: 
“To what extent does the audit institution provide effective audits of public expenditure?” 
“To what extent is the SAO effective in improving the financial management of government?” 
The scores for auditors by interviewed representatives of audited bodies is also quite low – all of 
them see the SAO as a watchdog, auditors not able to work on the basis of trust and understanding. 
The average mark for the SAO’s reputation in terms of credibility and expertise by this group is 3 
(with 7 as maximum). 
Concerning the Ombudsman, its position is rather different. The Ombudsman stated during the 
interview that:  
“Political support can bring more openness of Parliament to the suggested changes”.  
Because the Ombudsman criticised several actions of the current government, she is “persona non 
grata” today for the governing coalition with a clear majority in the Parliament. The fact that the 
Ombudsman did not receive space for her requested interventions in the programmes of recent 
Parliamentary sessions is clear documentation of the current antagonistic relations between the 
coalition government and the Ombudsman office (see, for example, Pravda, 30. 1. 2014: 
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/306921/).  
The Ombudsman also stated:  
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“The Public Defender of Rights is expected to be the eyes and ears of Parliament.  (However)…  
The Public Defender of Rights is perceived by the institutions more like the control institution and 
the primary reaction is to defend”. 
Role of media 
The role of the media reflects the situation in today’s society. The media are ready to spread 
information about negative issues, scandals (‘boulevard’ media approach), but not so much on 
positive performance – such information does not create sufficient attention. Slovakia does not have 
any really investigative and independent daily or weekly (most journals belong to two owners). This 
situation is mentioned by the Ombudsman: 
“Practical experience indicates that if some specific and unique issue is detected – the solution of 
such an issue is much quicker compared to an issue which requests systematic change. It is much 
more difficult.”  
 
 
8. Conclusions 
The theory expects that accountability mechanisms, like SAO and Ombudsman activities may 
create feedback loops supporting public innovations. This report checks the concrete situation of the 
Slovak Republic. On the basis of the comprehensive set of data reviewed, interviews and general 
knowledge, we can state that such feedback loops almost do not function in the Slovak reality and 
we also provide certain explanations of why. 
Changes on many levels are necessary to make this feedback loop effective – particularly 
improvement of performance audit capacity at the SAO level, less politicisation of the public 
administration in the country and better absorption/implementation capacity by public bodies 
responsible for innovations. 
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Annex VIII – Country Report United Kingdom 
 
Learning, Innovation, Anchoring and Auditing In UK Government and Public 
Sector Accountability 
LIPSE: Report on UK Work Package 3 – Mapping and Analysis of the 
Recommendations of Ombudsmen, Audit Offices and Others 
 
Dr Colin W Lawson, Department of Economics, University of Bath, UK. 
The author is grateful to staff of the National Audit Office, the Committee on Public Accounts, the 
Planning Inspectorate, and to Councillors of Bath and North East Somerset authority, and the staff of 
their Policy Development and Scrutiny office for invaluable assistance in this research. 
1. Introduction 
The LIPSE project is focussed on what can be learnt about social innovation in the public sector. 
Specifically it concentrates on what encourages innovation, and what retards it – in other words: 
drivers and barriers. Innovation in this context is broadly defined as a process that involves the 
development and implementation of new ideas that make “a substantial difference to an organisation’s 
understanding of the needs it is addressing and the services it delivers. Hence innovation is seen as the 
process of bringing in something new that breaks the existing practice and routines” (Lewis et al. 
2014, p.8). 
Work Package 3 concentrates on accountability procedures. If properly organised and implemented 
these procedures can generate feedback loops that may lead to organisational learning. This may 
involve innovation, and the continued operation of the feedback mechanism may help to anchor the 
innovation in the organisation`s repertoire.  
Two questions naturally arise. First, what are the accountability mechanisms that operate in the UK 
public sector? Second, do their activities naturally give rise to feedback mechanisms that might lead to 
and institutionalise innovations? If the answer to the second question is negative, or is usually 
negative then a further question naturally arises: is this an intended result or does it involve a failure 
of institutional design or operation? 
In the UK there are a range of organisations that fulfil accountability functions. We chose to look at 
some of the key ones at a national level: the Committee of Public Accounts (PAC), the National Audit 
Office (NAO), and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). To complement these 
national actors we chose to study the relatively recently introduced local government system of 
Scrutiny and Overview. These institutions are described below in Section 3, along with the Local 
Government Ombudsman which is included because the two ombudsmen are increasingly cooperating 
to resolve disputes and undertake investigations. 
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After a brief description of our methodology the rest of this paper tries to answer a series of important 
questions given the limited evidence from our nine national and local case studies. These questions 
are: 
 Do audit and scrutiny foster learning institutions? 
 Are auditors watchdogs or advisors? 
 Does media pressure accelerate implementation? 
 Why are recommendations accepted? 
A brief summary concludes. 
2. Research methodology  
The research methodology we used involved five stages: 
1. Choosing the reports for analysis. 
2. Analysing the reports’ contents. 
3. Selecting cases for in-depth interviews. 
4. Applying questionnaires. 
5. Summarising results. 
Choosing the reports to analyse involved finding reports that had clear recommendations for change. 
In auditing terms we were looking more for performance audits than for compliance audits. To test 
whether a recommendation has been implemented it helps if the recommendation is clear. But testing 
for implementation means that the report probably has to have been issued some years earlier. For 
even if an auditee agrees to implement a recommendation immediate compliance may be infeasible. 
But the passage of time can also mean the audit team has disbanded and left the audit organisation, 
making it impossible for us to interview them. This prevented us from completing a second PAC case 
study. 
The content analysis of the report helps to decide its importance for our purposes and can throw extra 
light on the issue of whether or not there is evidence of feedback loops between the two parties. It can 
also suggest policy changes that may encourage innovation by the auditee. 
If the report is of some significance and enough time has passed for a sensible evaluation of whether 
its recommendations were adopted, then we set about collecting detailed evidence about the 
relationship between the auditor and auditee using an extensive questionnaire. This was achieved by 
face-to-face interviews or by email and telephone contact. We selected nine reports as case studies. 
We obtained information from eight auditors and two auditees. Thus auditees are significantly 
underrepresented, and this needs to be borne in mind when interpreting our findings. 
The results of the process are summarised to facilitate comparisons across countries and to draw 
conclusions from our range of case studies for the UK. It should be noted that although in many 
respects the UK is a highly centralised state it has devolved significant powers to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. Thus operating on behalf of Parliament the NAO scrutinises all central government 
spending, but excludes spending by devolved governments in the rest of the UK. This latter 
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expenditure is examining by Audit Scotland, the Wales Audit Office and the Northern Ireland Audit 
Office.  
 
 
3. Key institutions 
THE NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE 
The NAO and the PAC are the most important parts of the central government state-audit system in 
the UK and England. The NAO is completely independent of government and is tasked with examining 
public expenditure on behalf of Parliament, to whose Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) it reports. 
Its head, the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) has the right to examine and audit government 
and public body accounts, and is an Officer of the House of Commons. Neither he nor any of his staff of 
822 (2013-2014), most of whom are accountants, is a civil servant. The NAO is overseen by a 
parliamentary committee, the Public Accounts Commission. This body appoints the auditors for the 
NAO and considers and presents the estimated expenditure requirements of the NAO to Parliament. It 
also appoints non-executive members to the NAO’s board. 
In 2013-2014, the NAO certified 427 accounts for 355 organisations, so assuring £1 trillion of income 
and expenditure, and by its own account saving the government an estimated £1.1 billion. 67% of 
audited bodies agreed that that the NAO “improves their approach to financial management and 
control”. It produced 66 Value for Money (VFM) reports and 4 reports on local services. The PAC held 
60 hearings based on NAO work, and the government accepted 86% of PAC recommendations. 
The priorities of the NAO are to help government base its decisions on reliable comprehensive and 
comparable data, to improve its financial management and to help departments better understand the 
process and costs of delivering their services. “We define good value for money as the optimal use of 
resources to achieve the intended outcomes. Our role is not to question government policy objectives, 
but to provide independent and rigorous analysis to Parliament on the way in which public money has 
been spent to achieve those policy objectives” (http://www.nao.org.uk/about-us/what-we-do/value-
for-money-programme/what-is-a-value-for-money-study?/ accessed 27/01/2015). 
In trying to achieve its priorities the NAO aims to use the best available techniques and, where 
appropriate, to be innovative approaching the investigations. They may employ outside specialists and 
an investigation generally takes from 3 to 12 months. The investigation commonly uses financial and 
management analyses, document and literature reviews plus information from departmental and 
other staff, from practitioners and service users, and benchmarking with other organisations at home 
or abroad. The full VFM cycle is consistent with the introduction and anchoring of social innovation in 
the public sector and is summarised on the NAO website as follows: 
 C&AG decides what subjects to examine on the basis of advice from NAO teams. 
 The study team scopes the study and plans what methods will be most appropriate to deliver 
the study’s objectives. 
 The study team carries out the study to an agreed timetable and budget. 
 The study team drafts a report including a conclusion on value for money and 
recommendations for improvements. 
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 The factual content of the report is discussed (“cleared”) with the audited body. 
 The report is laid in the House of Commons and published. 
 The report is the basis for a hearing of the Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) which 
publishes its own report and recommendations. NAO staff assist with drafting this report. 
Only the more important reports lead to PAC hearings. 
 The Government responds formally to the PAC report, indicating what it will do to implement 
the committee’s recommendations. 
 The NAO assesses what action has been taken in response to each of the PAC’s reports and, 
where appropriate, may undertake a follow-up study to scrutinise the response in detail. 
The VFM process is itself subject to quality assurance through internal peer review and external 
independent expert review. The intention is that the finished review is the product of a robust 
methodology, and so has clear defensible conclusions, and that NAO recommendations will drive 
improvements in public service. 
The NAO summarises its accountability process in the following five steps: 
 Government requests and Parliament grants funds 
 C&AG audits accounts and examines spending and reports to Parliament 
 PAC session and report 
 Government response 
 NAO monitoring of government action and follow-up 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE 
The PAC was created in 1861 at the behest of the then prime minister W. E. Gladstone. It has long been 
one of the key scrutiny committees of the UK parliament. It currently comprises fourteen backbench 
members of parliament, whose political affiliations reflect the number of seats won by the various 
parties at the most recent General Election. In February 2015 there were eight Conservatives, five 
Labour members and one Liberal Democrat. As it was created to examine government finances it is 
logical that a Treasury minister sits on the committee. But by convention the minister does not 
normally attend its meetings, presumably to preserve the appearance of the penultimate auditee, the 
Treasury, not influencing the decisions of a key auditing body. The Chair of the Committee is elected by 
the Committee, and again by convention, to signal the independence of the Committee, it is normally a 
senior opposition politician. The Deputy Chair is normally a non-ministerial member of the governing 
party or coalition. 
The House of Commons appoints the PAC to examine “the accounts showing the appropriation of the 
sums granted to Parliament to meet the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid before 
Parliament as the Committee may think fit” (Standing Order No 148). Its focus is thus on the VFM 
reports of the NAO, and at its about sixty meetings a year it takes oral and written evidence from the 
senior civil servants, especially Permanent Secretaries and Accounting Officers, and other senior 
public employees. Its secondary focus is any serious financial issues arising from NAO financial audits 
of ministries and other public bodies. 
Apart from the public business of the Committee, its Chair has two very sensitive functions that are 
constitutionally significant but either secret or very rarely publicised. The secret function is to receive 
reports from the NAO on the financial management and progress on contracts for much of the UK’s 
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defence and intelligence budgets. The sensitive and rarely noted function is to deal with certain 
failures in financial management, accusations of corruption or conflicts of interest. The NAO may carry 
out confidential investigations and commonly the results are discussed solely by the PAC Chair and the 
C&AG (Dunleavy et al. 2009 p.15). 
As in the investigations of the NAO the PAC confines itself to questions of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. The PAC website defines economy as “the minimising of costs of resources used for an 
activity, having regard to appropriate quality”; efficiency is “the relationship between the output in 
terms of goods, services or other results and the resources used to produce them”; and effectiveness is 
“the relationship between the intended impact and the actual impact of an activity or product.”  
Any attempt to consider how policy was made or question whether it should have been different is 
vigorously rejected by the Government. Such questions are the concern of the Parliamentary select 
committees, not the PAC. As intended this prohibition is hard wired into the NAO’s behaviour. Here the 
influence of the Treasury is considerable and in this area derives from the fact that it is responsible for 
controlling public expenditure. So in a sense when the NAO carries out a VFM study on a ministry, the 
Treasury is also being audited, as is the Government. 
The PAC is a key part of the process of guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of 
government financial transactions. The Committee is assisted by the Comptroller and Auditor General 
who is present and available to give evidence at Committee meetings, and by his NAO staff. The NAO 
staff also assist the Committee with writing its reports, and provide it with briefings. As one of our 
NAO informants wrote, the PAC “takes our highest profile reports and questions witnesses from the 
government with questions arising.” 
In 2013-14 the PAC held 60 hearings based on NAO reports. The questioning can be vigorous and the 
performances of the PAC, and especially of its chair, can verge on the flamboyant. Few witnesses can 
relish the experience, especially as the language of the subsequent PAC reports can be more hard-
hitting than that of the original NAO reports. Unlike the latter the PAC reports are not shown to the 
auditees in advance of publication. The reports are adopted by the PAC after internal discussions – it is 
very rarely divided. 
Finally, the government is obliged to reply to PAC recommendations within two months, which it does 
in what is called a Treasury Minute. In fact over 90% of recommendations are adopted, and we discuss 
the reasons for this high proportion in a later section. 
PARLIAMENTARY AND HEALTH SERVICE OMBUDSMAN (PHSO) 
The first UK ombudsman, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, was created in 1967. 
The office and its powers were loosely based on Scandinavian practices. Originally it was designed to 
investigate complaints of unfair treatment or inadequate service by UK central government 
departments and certain agencies. But there were significant limitations to the scope of its inquiries. 
For example, section 4, schedule 2 of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 excluded personnel 
and commercial actions from investigation. 
At the time of its creation access to its complaints mechanism was and, somewhat controversially, still 
is through a complainant’s member of Parliament. In effect this means that the PHSO cannot conduct 
investigations into the central government on its own initiative, and that significantly weakens its 
power and effectiveness. This limitation was created in part to reflect the concern of the elected 
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members of Parliament that their role in dealing with their voters’ complaints in this area of state 
activity should not be removed. This access limitation was not extended to health complaints when in 
1973 the Ombudsman`s role was extended to the National Health Service, but neither was the existing 
access limitation abolished, then or subsequently, and the current Ombudsman has recently raised this 
issue again. The extension of Ombudsman powers into the health service continued under the Health 
Service Commissioners Act 1993, and in 1996 they were further extended to take in complaints about 
clinical judgements. Health complaints now form 80% of enquiries. 
The different access routes for complaints were somewhat confusingly reflected in the fact that 
ombudsmen have held the two separate posts of Health Service Commissioner and Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration simultaneously. The issue is now further complicated by the 
creation of local government Health Scrutiny Panels, partly in keeping with a desire to devolve some 
powers, and partly to reflect recent reforms in the National Health Service. 
In the PHSO’s view its work is part of the administrative justice system and accountable directly to 
Parliament. Their investigation of people’s complaints, they argue, gives people a voice and some 
power. It can recommend how organisations should remedy errors, for example by an apology or by 
paying compensation, and can ask them to produce action plans to do so. But although the PHSO’s 
decisions carry considerable weight it cannot enforce them. However it can report significant large or 
recurring maladministration issues to Parliament, which can hold the responsible organisation to 
account. The accepted practice is to implement the Ombudsman’s judgement. For example, in 2010-11 
more than 99% of individual recommendations were accepted. 
To access the PHSO’s complaints procedure, the applicant must show that the organisation they wish 
to complain about has been given a chance to put things right. Our case study organisation raises an 
important doubt about PHSO’s application of this provision. 
If an applicant can satisfy the PHSO that they can surmount this hurdle, and the PHSO conducts an 
investigation, then it can deploy some formidable legal powers. For example, in gathering evidence 
and examining witnesses it has the same authority as the High Court. Any attempt by the subject of the 
investigation to defy these powers may be a contempt of court.   
The Ombudsman’s “Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14: A voice for Change” reported that in 2012-
13 it had received 27,566 enquiries that had resulted in 2,199 investigations, six times more than in 
the previous year. Of those investigations 49 were conducted jointly with the Local Government 
Ombudsman (LGO, see below). 854 of the complaints were upheld. Its budget was £35 million, and it 
published 22 reports, including 6 with the LGO. It expected that by 2014-15 it would have the capacity 
to investigate 4000 cases a year. By the end of March 2014 it had the equivalent of 427 full time staff. 
As it works jointly with the LGO, whose head has recently joined the PHSO’s board, we include a brief 
account of that organisation. It may be a harbinger of the future structure of this area of audit in the 
UK that the heads of the two organisations recently argued for the creation of a combined Health and 
Local Government watchdog, with powers to initiate investigations.   
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN 
Over the last half century the Ombudsman system has evolved by expanding to cover wider areas of 
administration, often by the creation of new ombudsmen covering more specialised areas of activity. 
The Local Government Ombudsman was created in 1974. In 2013-14 it registered 20,306 new 
complaints and enquiries, of which 11,725 were considered, and 5,680 of those eventually passed to 
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an investigation team. Of those, 70% were dealt with in 13 weeks, 90% in 26 weeks and almost 100% 
within 52 weeks. 46% of the complaints dealt with in detail were upheld and 60% of the customers 
were satisfied or very satisfied with the service. The operating expenditure of the service in 2013-14 
was £12.2 million and there were 161 staff.  
Since April 2013 the Commission has published all of its decisions, save for those where publication 
might reveal the complainant. Publication increases the transparency of the decision making process 
and the accountability of the service. 
Apart from parish and town councils, which have their own arrangements for dealing with complaints, 
the jurisdiction of the commission includes all local authorities, police and crime bodies, school 
admission appeal panels and many other bodies providing local services. The vast majority of 
complaints concern the decisions of local authorities. Central government administration is covered by 
the separate Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, although both ombudsmen sit on each 
other’s boards and conduct joint inquiries where a complaint falls under both competences. They are 
concerned to investigate maladministration and injustice and to encourage appropriate remedies. 
“Although we cannot make bodies do what we recommend, they are almost always willing to act on 
what we say” (http://www.lgo.org.uk/about-us/ accessed 28.1.15). 
From the viewpoint of the LIPSE study perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Local Government 
Ombudsman’s work is their focus on promoting best practices. This objective has been partly met by 
their recent decision to publish every decision they reach. Even more importantly, in 2013-14 58 
detailed reports of investigations were published because the cases involved issues of wider public 
interest. “By publishing such cases we seek to ensure that all local authorities apply the lessons to 
their own councils and learn from the experiences of people in one area to inform service 
improvement in another” (ibid.). 
OVERVIEW AND SCRUTINY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
“Overview and Scrutiny committees were established in English and Welsh local authorities by the 
Local Government Act 2000. They were intended as a counterweight to the new executive structures 
created by that Act (elected mayors or leaders and cabinets). Their role was to develop and review 
policy and make recommendations to the council” (Sandford 2014). Current committees operating in 
England draw their powers from the Localism Act 2011. Other regions operate under different 
legislation or in the case of Scotland no legislation, though many local authorities there have such 
committees.  
In addition to committees scrutinising the operation of local administrations there are also local 
authority managed scrutiny committees covering activities that lie outside the local authority’s 
responsibilities. In England they have the power to scrutinise health bodies, crime and disorder 
partnerships, Police and Crime Commissioners, and also flood risk management bodies. In recent 
years the number of such scrutiny bodies has expanded along with the policy to devolve powers away 
from the central government. One such policy has seen the Audit Commission, which dealt with local 
government audit, closed from 1st April 2015, and local authorities freed to engage private auditors. 
Some have argued this strengthens the case for the creation of Local Public Accounts Committees to 
examine the whole range of publically financed activities in an area, mirroring the national PAC. If such 
committees are created, and that is not the present government’s intention, though it is the policy of 
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the opposition, then there is a strong case for either extending the NAO’s remit, or creating a similar 
body to advise local PACs. 
Before the Local Government Act 2000 local authorities conducted their business through committees 
or meetings of the whole council. After the act all local authorities had to have at least one “overview 
and scrutiny officer” though there was no provision to finance the post. Finance has remained a 
problem to the present day. While larger authorities were to introduce a range of scrutiny panels, 
district councils in England and Wales with fewer than 85,000 inhabitants could opt for a “streamlined 
committee system” with at least one overview and scrutiny committee. With the passage of the 
Localism Act 2011 this option was extended to all English local authorities and many have reverted to 
the government by committee system. In Wales the Act mandated the opposite choice and required all 
councils to have either an elected mayor or a leader and cabinet system. The upshot of the Act and 
others covering Northern Ireland and Scotland is a great variety of local government models across 
the country, and a range of scrutiny models.  
The scrutiny system’s structures and outcomes are thus varied and sometimes complex, which makes 
generalisation difficult. The Centre for Public Scrutiny (www.cfps.org.uk) an independent charity has 
produced over 200 reports and other publications since 2004 and is the most important source for 
research on the system. It also produces practical guides to accountability, transparency and 
involvement. It also produces good practice advice and makes annual Good Scrutiny Awards, as well as 
less frequent surveys of the field. Common problems in the system reported in surveys are a shortage 
of resources, lack of access to information, insufficiently robust criticisms of leadership, and senior 
managers who do not value the scrutiny’s efforts and evade challenges (Crowe, 2014; CfPS, Annual 
Survey of Overview and Scrutiny in Local Government: 2013-14 
(http://www.cfps.org.uk/domains/cfps.org.uk/local/media/downloads/CfPS_Survey_LG2013_14_WE
B.pdf) Assessed 06/03/15. 
In Bath and North East Somerset (BANES), a local authority in the west of England with an estimated 
population of 178,000, the Overview and Scrutiny system is referred to as Policy Development and 
Scrutiny and is operated by six panels. This is our local government case study area for scrutiny. The 
panels are: 
 Early Years, Children and Youth 
 Economic Community Development 
 Housing and Major Projects 
 Planning Transport and Environment 
 Resources 
 Wellbeing 
The panels’ membership is drawn from elected councillors who are not Cabinet members. The 
“Overview” part of their remit is to help with policy development, comment on issues raised by the 
Cabinet, input into the early stages of major reviews of services, and comment on draft budget and 
service plans. The “Scrutiny” activities include using performance management information to check 
that targets are being met and action plans followed, to question certain Cabinet or officer decisions 
that have not yet been implemented, to check that certain Cabinet decisions are consistent with 
Council policies and plans, and to evaluate the effects of Council or Cabinet policies and decisions.  
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The Overview and Scrutiny panels are thus not decision-making, but recommendation-making. They 
can co-opt extra non-elected members for specific investigations, and can engage the public in their 
work. But they do not deal with individual citizens’ queries or with their complaints: these are handled 
by other council services. Neither do they cover regulatory or quasi-judicial decisions such as planning 
or licensing. Finally, there is a separate Health Scrutiny Panel that now operates under powers derived 
from the Health and Social Care Act 2012, to make recommendations to improve health care delivery. 
The reason that BANES calls the panels “Policy Development and Scrutiny” rather than the legislatively 
accurate “Oversight and Scrutiny” is interesting. An informant with extensive Cabinet level experience 
including the time when the Scrutiny system was set up said that the “Policy Development” part of the 
title was an “add on” made because it was felt that “If the panel has some expertise then it would a 
waste to omit their insights”. This suggests that there was significant commitment in BANES to make 
the system effective. It should be placed alongside CfPS’s 2013-14 Annual Survey finding that 
“Responses to the survey suggest that when an authority places little value on scrutiny, the 
effectiveness of the function is less than it would be otherwise. It appears that this is a mutually 
reinforcing vicious circle” (p.5).  
We investigated five of the reports produced in recent years, gathering information from those who 
participated in their production.  
The annual reports of BANES’s Policy Development and Scrutiny panels are available at 
http://democracy.bathnes.gov.uk/ecCatDisplay.aspx?sch=doc&cat=13203&path=0. The reports are 
collected in a review archive at 
http://democracy.bathnes.gov.uk/ecCatDisplay.aspx?sch=doc&cat=13202&path=0. The review 
archive also contains the Cabinet’s responses to the reports’ recommendations. These have to be 
delivered within two months of receipt of a report. On average a panel will produce a report about 
every eighteen months.  
It is interesting to note that the CfPS 2013-14 survey reports that “70.30% of [the 273] councils [that 
provided a response] reported having a formal system for monitoring recommendations: an 
improvement on last year’s figure of less than 50%....[and] [t]here is evidence that councils with 
monitoring systems have a more positive view of the impact scrutiny is having…and are more likely to 
view scrutiny as fulfilling its potential” (p.5). 
4. Does audit and scrutiny foster learning organisations? 
We tackle this question by looking for evidence in the reports of the audit and scrutiny organisations 
whose activities were outlined in the previous section, and in our questionnaires to those who worked 
on the audits or had knowledge of them. Unless otherwise indicated, direct quotations are from 
questionnaire answers. We begin with the NAO, and then the PAC, PHSO, and BANES PDS panels. We 
draw some final conclusions in the next section. 
The NAO 
The first report we considered was for the Ministry of Justice, entitled “Financial Management Report 
2011” (http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/10121591es.pdf). Recommendation 1 
suggests the need to improve the collection of fines, fees and assets under confiscation orders. There is 
strong evidence of an effective feedback loop here because after the Ministry accepted the need to act 
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the NAO found significant remaining problems and highlighted them in its December 2013 report on 
“Confiscation Orders”. The Ministry then responded with further measures but “It is too early to know 
if this will provide a solution to the problem.” The NAO feels that Recommendation 2, to improve its 
accounting management process, has been dealt with satisfactorily. 
The process by which the original NAO report was dealt with is worth noting. The PAC felt this value 
for money report was sufficiently important to hold a hearing on it. Their report incorporated the 
NAO’s suggestions and was accepted by the government in a Treasury Minute. The minute included a 
target implementation date. There are publically available documents that describe the process and 
hearings and give the results at each stage of the process. This is a standard procedure. Our NAO 
informant wrote “Our conclusions and recommendations are published in reports that are laid in 
Parliament. Our reports are accompanied by press releases to alert the media to our work. We discuss 
our conclusions and recommendations with our clients and they form part of the Committee of Public 
Accounts hearing on the report.” We “want to offer expertise and respond to requests from the 
client…We do not generate media coverage in order to put pressure on the organisations being 
audited.” 
We noted above that the NAO makes a bright line distinction between investigating matters of 
administration and avoiding matters of policy. This distinction is reflected in the work of the 
parliamentary committees. While the administrative activities of the Ministry of Justice, in so far as 
they affect expenditure, are dealt with by the PAC, policy issues are discussed in the Home Affairs 
Select Committee, and it is interesting to note that the NAO states it also “engages” with this 
committee. 
The NAO’s view of its role on the spectrum Watchdog – Advisor is clearly the former. But it does try “to 
build productive working relationships with organisations to help drive beneficial change. [For] we 
hold government departments and bodies to account for the way they use public money, thereby 
safeguarding the interests of taxpayers. [But] in addition our work aims to help public service 
managers improve performance and service delivery.” 
The second report we considered was the NAO’s report on the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) “Managing Front Line Delivery Costs” (http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/10121279es.pdf). Our investigation involved collecting evidence from the 
NAO group that dealt with this ministry, and the general impression of the NAO’s role and culture was 
consistent with that from the Ministry of Justice report. This report was less high profile and the PAC 
did not choose to hold a hearing on it. The Treasury Minute confirmed the Government’s acceptance of 
the recommendations and set out a timetable for their implementation. DEFRA informed the NAO that 
implementation had been completed by 31/03/13. 
The NAO informant reported their view of DEFRA’s learning culture as “fairly tolerant” and their 
cooperativeness as “ultimately…high”. The NAO undertakes what they call a clearance exercise when 
they agree on all the key facts in their report with the client. “We also discuss tone and content where 
applicable. The Financial Director and Accounting officer both have an opportunity to comment.” This 
process is clearly part aimed at building the good working relationship that will facilitate change, 
noted by our informant on the Ministry of Justice report. However it is worth noting that the decision 
to implement change lies with government. Ultimately responsibility is political. This is a pattern that 
repeats across the institutions we studied. 
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 COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS 
Our report by this key audit organisation was their June 2014 report “BBC Digital Media Initiative” 
(52nd Report of the session 2013-14, HC 985). A second agreed study had to be abandoned because all 
of its authors had moved on from the PAC. 
The BBC project was an expensive failed investment project. The BBC failed to use competitive 
processes before signing a contract that later had to be no-fault terminated. An anticipated £18 million 
benefit was transformed into a £38 million loss. The NAO identified very significant management 
weaknesses, but its investigation was delayed for eight months by the BBC’s refusal to provide certain 
data on the grounds of financial confidentiality. The public body responsible for the running of the BBC 
is the BBC Trust, an independent non-departmental organisation. So the BBC Trust rather the BBC 
itself was the auditee. 
The NAO report was sufficiently high profile for the PAC to schedule a hearing, and the resulting report 
recommended that the BBC make changes in the governance of major projects and improve 
arrangements for challenging project performance. The PAC informant confirmed that parliamentary 
attention had helped produce a positive response from the BBC. The PAC to some extent tailored its 
recommendations to their feasibility, and the BBC response was characterised as a “good solution”. As 
part of this agreement the Treasury Minutes make it clear that in future the NAO would have an 
enhanced role in accessing and assessing BBC data and performance. This would include access to 
confidential contracts with third parties. The outcome thus involved significant innovatory change that 
was anchored in the auditing culture of this independent public corporation.  
PARLIAMENTARY AND HEALTH SERVICE OMBUDSMAN 
The investigated report was “A False Economy: Investigations into how People are Recompensed for 
Government Mistakes” (http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/reports-and-
consultations/reports/parliamentary/a-false-economy-investigations-into-how-people-are-
compensated-for-government-mistakes/10). Here the auditee was the Planning Inspectorate, and our 
informant works for them. 
In 2010 the Planning Inspectorate was forced to look for savings because it faced a 35% cut in its 
budget by 2014-15. The cut amounted to £9 million. They decided to drop an ad hoc compensation 
scheme that they had previously operated to compensate people who had suffered losses because of 
their mistakes. The annual saving would have been £250,000. The PHSO investigated a series of 
similar individual complaints and, realising that they had a pattern, issued a report that had a much 
larger potential audience than just the Planning Inspectorate.  
The PHSO judgement was that “The Planning Inspectorate were acting contrary to HM Treasury 
guidance Managing Public Money and contrary to the Ombudsman’s Principles when they decided that 
they would routinely refuse to pay compensation for the impact of their mistakes on users of their 
service.” 
Although PHSO did not specifically make the suggestion to the Planning Inspectorate, the latter had 
already decided to reinstate the original compensation scheme. In addition the PHSO, as it does for all 
its reports, issued a Learning Points document on its website, aimed at Permanent Secretaries – the 
most senior civil servants in ministries, Boards and Senior Managers. The Learning Points warn about 
the dangers of false economies, and the importance of fairness and equity when cutting expenditure. 
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They urge these senior officers to consult the PHSO’s Principles of Good Administration, Principles of 
Good Complaint Handling and Principles for Remedy when they are considering budget cuts. This was 
a timely reminder in the face of continuing and intensifying austerity. 
The report directly resulted in a limited positive change, and reinforced the importance of good 
communication across auditors and auditees. The PSHO clearly demonstrated its ability to effect 
change, and to generalise that change across its whole remit of organisations. There is evidence of 
learning and the opportunity for innovation.  
BANES POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND SCRUTINY REPORTS 
We selected five reports from four different panels. There were three participant informants, two of 
whom had served on two panels. The reports were: 
 Boat Dwellers and River Travellers Review 2013 
 Home Care Review 2011 
 Home to School Transport Review 2012 
 Community Assets 2013 
 A Review of the Council’s use of Consultants 2011-12 
Here we try to give an assessment of the five reports taken as a whole, particularly from the angle of 
learning, innovation and anchoring change.  
For four reports the Cabinet accepted almost all the recommendations and when not accepted a 
recommendation was usually just deferred. The informants were less likely than those at the national 
bodies we have already assessed to say that their recommendations were made with a view to their 
feasibility. However, one noted that “Usually we have an idea from officers how Cabinet are likely to 
respond…but this does not change the process.”  
The remaining report was the Boat Dwellers and River Travellers Review. This was a very innovative 
review into the significant minority community of boat dwellers who live on the rivers and canals of 
the area. Bath is unusual in having about one per cent of its population living on boats. They face 
rather different challenges to other householders. The review had 13 recommendations or parts of 
recommendations. Four were agreed, seven were deferred and two were rejected. The large number 
of deferrals was caused by the fact that some decisions will have to wait on river safety improvements, 
and others were delayed because it was necessary to develop joint policies with other organisations 
with responsibilities for waterways. A new policy officer will be employed from January 2015 and this 
should help move forward the report’s recommendations. The issues will need to be revisited in 2016 
and 2017 and will require an evaluation framework to measure need and success, for example, 
including families’ state of health and access to schools. 
The experiences of participants on the panels were generally positive. Our informants noted that 
Cabinet members were “very helpful and willing to cooperate at all stages” and they had “good 
working relationships and criticisms were taken seriously”.  There was “respect” between the 
participants. However, one informant noted that the level of tolerance was “Not great. It varies with 
the cabinet member, age and experience.” But the panels felt they had some power because “Panels 
have an input into budgets, and that gives them some influence. The reputation of the chair is 
important, but how the reputation is perceived depends on both sides’ personnel.” Our information 
from the Cabinet side is consistent with these views. 
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Getting a recommendation accepted depended on cost: zero cost recommendations are more likely to 
be accepted. “Changes are linked primarily to budget, political impact and timing – nothing too drastic 
before an election!” 
It was clear that the panels have significant potential to introduce small alterations and changes in 
administration, and even innovations as defined by LIPSE. In one case the relevant Cabinet member 
confirmed this, saying “The issue of the changes [the panel was scrutinising] was so initially 
contentious that the small changes [the panel suggested] were sensibly accepted.”  
But what stands out from reading the reports and talking to participants is that lasting changes 
require updates. We have noted that for the Boat Dwellers report, but it is more widely true. For 
example, The 2010 Home Care Review is an impressive piece of work. BANES switched from council to 
private provision of home care some years earlier and the Healthier Communities and Older People 
Panel, which had monitored the situation since then set out to discover “whether the five Home Care 
providers … are achieving the Council’s stated objectives for the service.” An update on this review and 
its recommendations was produced in 2014, and a further update is planned for 2017. Such updating 
is a good indicator of the learning and anchoring potentials of the PDS panels’ work.  
Overall our view of the BANES scrutiny procedures is that they perform well and generate significant 
value added for its citizens. The whole area of Overview and Scrutiny across the UK has great potential 
and we suspect very significant achievements. But because of the wide variations in resources 
dedicated to it across local governments and the variations in scrutiny arrangements that can be 
operated, there is a very strong case for a national evaluation “of the operation, impact and 
effectiveness of overview and scrutiny” (Crowe, 2015) especially since there has not been one since 
2004.   
5. Watchdogs or advisors? 
Our questionnaires included items intended to explore how the auditors viewed their roles, and how 
they were viewed by their auditees; specifically whether the role was as a watchdog or an advisor. The 
results are interesting. The national level auditors we questioned, the NAO and the PAC clearly and 
unsurprisingly see themselves as watchdogs. But one of our NAO informants spelt out that 
organisation’s dual function, saying “We hold government departments and bodies to account for the 
way they use public money, thereby safeguarding the interests of taxpayers. In addition our work aims 
to help public service managers improve performance and service delivery.”   
The national level auditee, the Planning Inspectorate, audited by the PHSO, sees the latter as “more 
watchdog than advisor.” This is because the PHSO “act as the external independent review of our 
complaints handling.” The Planning Inspectorate reinstituted its previous ex gratia compensation 
scheme because they “largely accepted the [PHSO’s] diagnosis leading to the recommendation.” 
Interestingly the PSHO did not specifically recommend the previous scheme’s reinstatement, and the 
reinstatement preceded the PHSO’s report. Neither did the PHSO have the power to enforce its 
recommendations. The Planning Inspectorate acted because “We believed it was the right thing to do 
given the findings on the individual complaints.” 
The picture is more complicated when we look at the five scrutiny reports of the local authority 
BANES. Here the fact that for this unitary authority policy change recommendations can be allowed, 
even encouraged, is likely to lead to a less uniform impression of the role of the auditor. With the 
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Home Care Review report our panel informant saw the panel’s role as a watchdog, because every 
[monthly] cabinet meeting has an item where any panel chair can bring up a topic. In other words act 
as a watchdog, advocating for the panel’s conclusions. However, our cabinet informant on this report 
saw the role as advisory. The Cabinet could accept a recommendation, but did not have to. For the 
other four reports we had informants only from the panel side. On a scale of 1-7, where 1 was 
Watchdog and 7 was Advisor, there was one 1, one 5 and two 4s. Our impression was that different 
panel members had their own individual views of a panel’s role, and because policy and scrutiny were 
both possible their variation in views might also have reflected the reality of their different 
investigations.  
6. Does media pressure accelerate implementation? 
We wanted to explore the influence of media coverage on implementing recommendations, and 
whether auditors used the media to try to influence outcomes. The PAC is the one auditor that can be 
sure that its hearings, which are inquisitorial and sometimes almost theatrical, will attract 
considerable attention and its reports and attendant press releases will put auditees under additional 
pressure to implement recommendations. Our PAC informant confirmed that this was the case with 
the BBC Trust investigation. 
The NAO on the other hand, is keen to dispel any suspicion of media manipulation. Both our NAO 
informants gave the statement that “The National Audit Office has a press office the role of which is to 
promote the NAO and its audit findings in the media. Our overriding aim in publicising our work is to 
generate balanced, good quality coverage of our findings. We do not generate media coverage in order 
to put pressure on the organisations being audited.” Neither did the informants feel that in our case 
studies either the Ministry of Justice or DEFRA would have been influenced by any coverage. Both have 
their own press offices, and especially for the former “Given the [considerable] level of coverage the 
Ministry of Justice attracts it is not likely that they would have felt particularly pressurised.”  
We have already noted in the previous section that the Planning Inspectorate reinstated their ex gratia 
compensation scheme before the PHSO published their report, so it was not a direct consequence of 
media coverage. However, our informant did note that “the impact [of four negative PHSO 
investigations] on our reputation was a factor.” 
The BANES policy and scrutiny reports are issued through the council’s website and press releases are 
issued through the Communications and Publicity Department. One panel informant remarked that 
this meant in effect the communications policy used would be the public relations strategy of the 
Cabinet. Another added that the Communications and Publicity Department “obviously like to pitch 
stories from a positive angle.” A different panel informant thought that while their panel could have no 
specific media strategy different from the Cabinet’s, political parties could use their own 
communications systems if they disagreed with policies. 
All informants thought the media coverage, where there was some, was either balanced or neutral, or 
at least more in that direction than dramatic and negative. But they did not agree on whether it 
influenced decisions. The one Cabinet informant denied it did, while the panel informant for the same 
report thought it possibly put some extra pressure on the Cabinet to agree to implement the 
recommendations. Another panel informant thought it was “pressure …from individual councillors 
pressing for action that got implementation” of the Boat Dwellers and River Travellers report, rather 
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than public reaction to media reports. However the same person did suggest that the recent decision 
to webcast Cabinet proceedings “adds somewhat to the pressure.”   
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7. Why are recommendations accepted? 
The following table shows the number of recommendations in each report and the decision of the 
political authorities on implementation. 
CASE STUDY                 IMPLEMENTED                  NOT IMPLEMENTED 
BBC Trust                               7                                                  0 
Ministry of Justice                2                                                  0 
DEFRA                                     5                                                  0 
Planning Inspectorate          1                                                  0 
BANES Boat Dwellers           4                                                  7 
BANES Home Care              14                                                  1 
BANES School Transport      5                                                  0 
BANES Community Assets   4                                                  1 
BANES Consultants               5                                                  0 
Totals                                    47                                                   9 
The table shows that all the recommendations made by national auditors were accepted, and as far as 
we can tell implemented. All 9 recommendations that were not accepted were for BANES Scrutiny 
reports. However, our “not implemented” category includes both rejection and deferment – where a 
decision will be made at a later date. In fact there were only 3 rejections, all for the Boat dwellers 
report. So generally the pattern of local decisions is different from national ones, but a detailed 
breakdown of the pattern of non-implementation reduces the difference. Overall the level of 
acceptance and implementation is high and the natural question is why? 
First, for national auditors we are dealing mostly with VFM recommendations, and there may be a 
feeling that it would be difficult to reject a well-qualified and respected agency’s recommendations on 
the sensible use of public funds. With the NAO and hence with the PAC the facts of the matter are 
agreed with the auditee in advance. There can be disagreement about interpretation but not facts. This 
reduces the grounds for dispute but does not eliminate them. In addition there should be no dispute 
over policy, as that is excluded in the terms of reference of the auditors. Policy issues are for the 
departmental parliamentary select committees. The audit and ombudsmen only consider 
administration. 
Second, those making recommendations will have a good idea about what the political authorities will 
accept. Put another way they should or could know what is feasible. We asked our informants whether 
their institutions “consider the practical feasibility of its recommendations.” Both our NAO informants 
said yes, always. The PAC informant said “Yes, to some extent.” 
Third, rather similar considerations clearly operate with local government Scrutiny panels, but there 
is a wider range of views across the investigators and certainly in BANES they can discuss some policy 
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changes. One panel informant denied they considered feasibility, but admitted that before publishing 
their report they consulted with the Cabinet to see what they felt about the conclusions and 
recommendations. Another also denied they considered feasibility, but added that if there were no 
cost implications the recommendations were more likely to be accepted. The Cabinet informant for 
this report gave the impression that the more specific, concrete and clear the recommendation the 
better the chances of acceptance. But they also said that because the issue behind the report was very 
contentious the Cabinet felt it would be sensible to accept some small changes. Another panel 
informant said they had not consulted the Cabinet before publishing “but usually we have an idea from 
Officers how Cabinet are likely to respond … but this does not change the process…We can also work 
out from members of the same party as Cabinet members if that party has a particular position it 
would like us to recommend, but that does not always work to their advantage!! (sic) …I try to ensure 
our recommendations are clearly evidence based and answer the initial brief set.” This informant said 
their panel considered feasibility and that the acceptability of changes was primarily influenced by the 
budget, their political impact, and timing – “Nothing too drastic before an election.” 
8. The audit experience; cooperation or conflict? 
What is the audit experience for the auditee? What is it for the auditor? Are their views the same or 
different? Is it a cooperative endeavour or is it conflictual? Does that affect outcomes or just stress 
levels? We would like to know the answers to these questions. Unfortunately sample size and 
composition limit our evidence and thus our conclusions. We noted at the start of this paper that we 
have nine case studies, but we have answers from only two auditees, and in only one case were we 
able to get both auditors and auditees to answer our questions. There may be good reasons for these 
sample weaknesses, but that is of little help in answering the questions just posed. What follows is 
therefore an accurate reflection of our data, but cannot be a complete answer to our questions. We 
know something useful about the auditor side and the auditors’ views of the auditees. We know too 
little about the auditees’ views to form a reliable view about them.  
If the views of auditors and auditees differ it might seem likely that this is rooted in an asymmetry of 
power – auditors have statutory rights to audit, and auditees must comply. In fact it is much more 
complex. Many of the large auditees are powerful institutions, while their auditors have budgets that 
in public finance terms are only small change. Their power comes from their reputations and 
particularly their power to determine others’ reputations. But then again none of the auditors can 
enforce their recommendations. With these caveats this section sketches what we think we know 
about the audit experience. 
The relations between the NAO and the organisations it audits are, as the NAO sees them, cooperative. 
One of our informants injected a note of caution when they said “Ultimately [cooperation] is high, 
given our statutory powers.” But facts are, as we have seen, agreed with the auditees. Draft reports are 
discussed with them, and they can comment on the contents. But as another informant said when 
asked what they thought the auditees felt towards them “respect, fear, gratitude – all three at one time 
or another.” 
If the NAO’s VFM report is the cause of a hearing before the PAC then fear is likely to be the dominant 
feeling of the auditee. The BBC Trust case study is an example. On cooperation our PAC informant 
noted that “[The BBC Trust] are formally accountable to us for public spending and therefore have to 
engage formally, although in practice they could be more cooperative in providing material etc.” As we 
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have seen one consequence of the hearing was that the NAO now have significantly more power over 
the BBC. 
The one audited national body from which we have evidence is the Planning Inspectorate. “Our 
attitude {toward the PHSO] is one of cautious respect.” “[I]t is normal practice for draft reports into 
individual complaints to be shared with …[us] enabling comments to be made.” But [c]hanges in 
staffing at the PHSO impact on the level of understanding of our organisation’s remit to set complaints 
in appropriate context.” Communication is generally sufficient “However certain recent changes to the 
PHSO’s general remit have become and remain unclear. E.g. it was our understanding that they would 
refuse to take on cases which are still being actively pursued with us by the complainant. However, 
this appears to no longer be the case, and it is difficult to know how we should treat open and ongoing 
investigations which have effectively been escalated [by the complainant involving the PHSO].” 
The BANES scrutiny panels’ case studies reveal an audit experience that is perhaps based more on 
cooperation than the national audit experiences, though still subject to some tensions, if only because 
as one panel informant said “Panels have an input into budgets and that gives them some influence.” A 
Cabinet informant claimed that it is very receptive to feedback, constructive criticism and different 
opinions “because it gives us the confidence we have made the correct decision.” They felt that the 
relationship between the Cabinet and the panels was based on trust and good understanding rather 
than distrust and confrontation. Another panel chair noted that “… the Cabinet member was present 
for much of the evidence gathering. As Chair I am more than happy for this to happen.” “Generally I 
think we had a good working relationship and criticisms were taken seriously…the final Cabinet 
decision was better than our Panel’s recommendation.” The remaining panel informants’ views were 
similar.  
9. Concluding remarks 
The evidence suggests that the UK audit, scrutiny and ombudsman system has very significant 
learning, innovation and anchoring functions, potential and actual. Some conclusions are: 
 Routine, repeated audits improve the chances of change, of anchoring change, and the chances 
of discovering dysfunctional behaviour. 
 Parliamentary attention and Council attention can drive change. 
 The national bodies in this area are probably better than local ones at spotting and acting on 
the more general applications of a particular finding. 
 The different models of local government and local government scrutiny suggest that there 
could be a wide range of responses across local authorities to the same problem. It is not 
obvious why such variation might be optimal. 
 Being able to conduct joint investigations across organisations increases the scope for change. 
For example, the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman and the Local Government 
Ombudsman can conduct joint investigations. There may be scope for considerable benefits 
with more inter-local authority joint investigations. 
 There is a strong case for allowing Ombudsmen to initiate investigations in any area of their 
competence. 
 The more authorities and other organisations monitor and publicise change the better the 
chance of change and of anchoring it. 
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 Most auditor recommendations are accepted, especially if they promise better VFM, are 
clearly minor administrative changes, obviously feasible, and costless.  
 It is worth noting that the UK system, at central and top tier local level, reserves to politicians 
the decision-making power for adopting recommendations. Powerful audit, scrutiny and 
ombudsmen organisations make suggestions, but ultimately defer to Parliament or councils. 
The NAO may now get ready access to the BBC’s financial contracts, but only politicians will 
decide if the subsequent recommendations are adopted. It is consistent with democracy, but it 
is not the only way of managing such systems. 
 The Watchdog – Advisor distinction is more applicable at a national than a local level. The PAC 
and the ombudsmen are clearly watchdogs, but the NAO sees itself as fulfilling both functions 
simultaneously. If forced to choose they opt for Watchdog, but their language, and especially 
the use of “client” for auditee, suggests Advisor as well. At a local level, scrutiny panel 
members and Cabinet members hold a variety of views which reflect the more flexible or more 
varied local practices. 
 The conventional wisdom is clearly that cooperation is desirable in the audit and scrutiny 
process. Our evidence suggests that national level auditors aspire to cooperation and 
sometimes achieve it. But at a local level provided the Leader and Cabinet see advantages in 
the process of scrutiny cooperation is more likely to be achieved. 
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